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Timothy C. Walton ISB #2170 
r.=====::;i CHASAN & WAL TON LLC 
n: 
C> 
L°""-=-~.,,~-~I 
Park Center Pointe 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
Post Office Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 
Telephone: (208) 345-3760 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0288 
Stephen E. Blackburn ISB #6717 
BLACKBURN LAW, P.C. 
660 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 255 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 898-3442 
Facsimile: (208) 898-9443 
F I . E D --·~· A.~-~.M. 
AUG 2 ~ 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. Guzman 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA by and through ) 
LOREE RIVERA her mother and ) 
natural guardian, AND LUIS J. GUZMAN) 
by and through BALLARDO GUZMAN ) 
his father and natural guardian, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON individually, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CVOS-4848 
Judge: Gordon W. Petrie 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE AND NOTICE OF 
HEARING 
August22,2007 
COME NOW the above-captioned plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of 
record, and hereby moves this court to strike the following: 
1. Defendant Piercy's "Federal preemption" argument, advanced in his 
motion for Summary Judgment; 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (8/22/07) - Page 1 
379 
2. The Second Affidavit of Dale Piercy in support of his Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
3. The Affidavit of E.G. Johnson in support of Piercy's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
4. The Affidavit of Dawn McClure in support of Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
5. The Second Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas submitted by Piercy in support 
of his Motion for Summary Judgment (Ms. Thomas' Third Affidavit). 
This Motion, and Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is based upon Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike, or in the 
alternative, Plaintiffs' Second Memorandum Opposing Piercy's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, upon plaintiffs' original memorandum and opposition to defendant Piercy's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, upon the affidavits and exhibits submitted in opposition 
to Defendant Piercy's memorandum, and upon the Affidavit of Deborah Schrecongost, 
submitted herewith. 
Plaintiffs will call up and present for disposition the Motion to Strike before the 
Honorable Gordon W. Petrie at the Canyon County Courthouse, 1115 Albany Street, 
Caldwell, Idaho, on Thursday, September 6, 2007 at 1 :30 p.m. 
J-2-J DATED this __ day of August, 2007. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (8/22/07) - Page 2 
CHASAN & WALTON, LLC 
Timothy C. Walton, of the firm, attorneys 
for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERT! FY that on the ;µ?fay of August, 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document was served upon by: 
Joshua S. Evett 
Elam, Burke 
251 E. Front St., No. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
Attorney for Jennifer Sutton 
Ryan Peck 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Dale W. Piercy 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (8/22/07) - Page 3 
~Mail 
D H Delivery 
D vernight Courier 
Facsimile to 384-5844 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery D Avernight Courier Gr Facsimile to 336-0448 
CHASAN & WALTON, LLC 
~----== 
----- ' ·- -·- ··-
Timothy C. Walton, of the firm, attorneys 
for Plaintiffs 
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Park Center Pointe 
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ost Office Box 1069 
oise, Idaho 83701-1069 
elephone: (208) 345-3760 
acsimile: (208) 345-0288 
tephen E. Blackburn ISB #6717 
· LACKBURN LAW, P.C. 
60 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 255 
eridian, Idaho 83642 
Ll::::::==::!l elephone: (208) 898-3442 
Facsimile: (208) 898-9443 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. Guzman 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA by and through ) 
LOREE RIVERA her mother and ) 
natural guardian, AND LUIS J. GUZMAN) 
by and through BALLARDO GUZMAN ) 
his father and natural guardian, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON individually, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV05-4848 
Judge: Gordon W. Petrie 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEBORAH 
SCHRECONGOST IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
August 21, 2007 
My name is Deborah Schrecongost and the statements contained herein are 
made from my own personal knowledge. 
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382 
I am employed as a paralegal with the law firm of Chasan & Walton, counsel for 
plaintiffs in this matter. 
I conducted a search of the Idaho State Historical Society's website and learned 
that from 1909 until 1993 there was published in Canyon County a paper by the name 
of The Parma Review. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of a document I 
downloaded from the Idaho State Historical Society's website documenting that that 
paper was published in Canyon County from 1909 until 1993. 
I have not conducted an exhaustive search to determine if there were other 
newspapers published in Canyon County in 1982. 
Further your Affiant saith not. 
DATED this 21st day of August, 2007. 
By ...__ _ __,,.L----tt--'-"""' 
Deborah Schrecong t, Paralegal with 
CHASAN & WAL TON, L.L.C., counsel for 
Plaintiffs 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, this 21st of 
August, 2007. 
DOREEN R. GARDNER 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission Expires 2/24/2012 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ::12cify of August, 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document was served upon by: 
Joshua S. Evett 
Elam, Burke 
251 E. Front St., No. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
Attorney for Jennifer Sutton 
Ryan Peck 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Dale W. Piercy 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D __.Overnight Courier 
~ Facsimile to 384-5844 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
0 _Qvernight Courier 
~· Facsimile to 336-0448 
CHASAN & WAL TON, LLC 
Timothy C. Warton, of the firm, attorney 
for Plaintiffs 
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Exhibit "A" 
Idaho State Historical Society website showing 
The Parma Review, newspaper 
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Joshua S. Evett 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
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Evett - ISB #5587 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
' 
AUG 2 8 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T.' CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA, by and through 
LOREE RIVERA, her mother and natural 
guardian; and LUIS J. GUZMAN, by and 
through BALLARDO GUZMAN, his father 
and natural guardian, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV05-4848 
DEFENDANT SUTTON'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO NEW ARGUMENTS 
AND FACTS RAISED BY PIERCY 
I.INTRODUCTION 
Piercy has raised new legal arguments and asserted new facts in the course of briefing his 
motion for summary judgment. This opposition by Sutton addresses Piercy's federal preemption 
argument (first made in his Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy's 
Motion for Summary Judgment), and the Affidavit of E.G. Johnson. 
DEFENDANT SUTTON'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
NEW ARGUMENTS AND FACTS RAISED BY PIERCY -- 1 
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II.ARGUMENT 
A. Federal Peemption Does Not Invalidate Canyon County's Herd District. 
Piercy argues that federal preemption invalidates the 1982 herd district ordinance at issue 
in this case. Piercy argues that states cannot regulate federal land within their borders, and that 
therefore the inclusion ofBLM land within the 1982 herd district invalidates the herd district in 
its entirety.1 Conveniently, - because whether or not the 1982 herd district includes BLM land is 
entirely collateral to the issue of who is potentially liable for Piercy' s black bull being on 
W amstad Road in March, 2005 - Piercy claims federal preemption voids the various statutory 
provisions relating to the liability of a livestock owner for injuries or damages caused by his 
livestock. 
In an argument that strongly supports Sutton's position that this Court cannot decide the 
validity of the 1982 ordinance without Canyon County's involvement in the case, Piercy 
impliedly argues that federal preemption invalidates Canyon County herd districts enacted as 
long ago as 1908. See, e.g., Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18 (arguing that 1908 herd district where accident occurred is 
void). 
1 It is questionable whether this issue is even properly before the court. Neither the BLM or any other branch of the 
federal government has raised any concerns about the herd district at issue in this case. Piercy has not shown that 
enforcement of the herd district ordinance in his herd district will have any impact on the BLM land within the 
district. It is unknown whether that BLM land contains fencing of any kind or, if it does, who erected it. Certainly, 
if this were a case where one party - the federal government - disputed that Canyon County could enforce laws that 
conflicted with federal law and/ or control of federal land, the Court could properly decide whether federal law 
preempted county law. This was precisely the situation in United States v. Shenise, 43 F.Supp.2d 1190 (D.Colo. 
1999), where the federal government criminally prosecuted a rancher for wilfully trespassing his animals on federal 
land. The rancher defended based on Colorado's open range laws. The U.S. District Court in Colorado found that 
federal law preempted state open range laws. Whether or not the inclusion ofBLM land in the 1982 herd district is 
preempted by federal law is not ripe for adjudication. There is no dispute between the federal government and 
anyone else. There is no evidence that Canyon County is attempting to force the federal government to fence in 
cattle that graze on federal land. Piercy cannot create a dispute or conflict between federal and state law where none 
exists, nor can he raise objections on behalf of the federal government. 
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This Court should not make such a sweeping ruling, one that clearly implicates the 
interests of Canyon County, without joining Canyon County as a party to this case. 
Piercy relies on various cases in support of his preemption argument: Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm 'n., 461 U.S. 190 
(1983); United States v. Shenise, 43 F.Supp.2d 1190 (D.Colo. 1999); Bilderback v. United 
States, 558 F.Supp. 903 (D.Or. 1982); Zinn v. BLM, Interior Dec, CO 030-87-1 (Sept. 9, 1998); 
United States v. Montgomery, 155 F.Supp. 633 (D. Mont. 1957). 
It is true that states do not have the authority to regulate federal lands within their 
borders, with the exception of police regulation and state laws regarding public health or public 
welfare. See 43 U.S.C. sec. 315n.2 Piercy has submitted no authority, however, that state laws 
of general application that in some instances may affect federal lands are, as a matter oflaw, 
void in their entirety. So, as a preliminary matter, even assuming that the Canyon County 
ordinance affects a small part of the 1982 herd district that contains BLM land, Piercy has not 
established that this mere fact - under federal or Idaho law - voids the 1982 herd district in its 
entirety. 
That point aside, Piercy cannot show that federal law would preempt the 1982 herd 
district ordinance even within BLM land. 
2 
315n reads as follows: Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as restricting the respective States from enforcing 
any and all statutes enacted for police regulation, nor shall the police power of the respective States be, by this 
subchapter, impaired or restricted, and all laws heretofore enacted by the respective States or any thereof, or that may 
hereafter be enacted as regards public health or public welfare, shall at all times be in full force and effect: Provided, 
however, That nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting or restricting the power and authority of the United 
States. 
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First, as already noted there is no preemption oflaws enacted for police regulation or 
public health and public welfare. See 43 U.S.C. sec. 315n. In this context, a case from Arizona 
supports the position that there is no preemption of state law regarding open range or herd 
district status to the extent such laws apply to private individuals who graze their livestock on 
federal land. 
This is the Arizona case of Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz.App. 10. 473 P.2d 812 (1970), 
which held that a person's grazing rights under the Taylor Grazing Act were subjected to state 
legislation creating a no fence district. In Ricca, the plaintiff was the holder of a grazing permit 
on federal land. He protested as unconstitutional the formation of a " no-fence district" as 
authorized by Arizona statute because he was not given notice prior to the enactment of the 
statute. The" no-fence district" legislation in effect reinstated the prior common law which held 
that an owner oflivestock was liable for damage caused when his animals trespassed onto the 
· land of another and the landowner had no duty to fence his lands to keep trespassing livestock 
out. Ricca complained that he was required to curtail the grazing activity of his cattle in and near 
the no fence district in order to avoid liability for trespass. A ·panel of the Arizona Court of 
Appeals rejected Ricca's argument, reasoning that the no fence district legislation was similar to 
town ordinances prohibiting the at large roaming of animals, and therefore an exercise of state 
police power permitted by Section 315n of the Taylor Grazing Act. 
In Ricca, the result oflegislatively creating the no fence district was to create liability for 
the BLM permittee when his cattle trespassed onto defendant's state land. Creation of the no 
fence district in effect made both federal and state lessees liable for trespass, thereby creating a 
uniformity and not a conflict between federal and state law. 
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The same reasoning applies here. The 1982 herd district creates uniformity in the law by 
making those who graze their livestock on federal and private land liable for damages caused by 
their cattle in certain circumstances. Herd district status does not create a conflict with federal 
law, and Piercy has not demonstrated any conflict. Therefore, his preemption argument fails. 3 
Second, the preemption issue is not properly before the Court. Piercy does not have 
standing to ask this Court to find that the 1982 herd district is void because it contains BLM 
land. Only the federal government or a private individual directly affected by inclusion of BLM 
land in the 1982 herd district can make a preemption argument. Piercy has not shown that he 
grazes animals on the BLM land, or that those who do now face a conflict between the 1982 
ordinance Piercy challenges and federal law. 
Piercy' s argument is pure speculation. He has not shown a concrete dispute that gives 
him standing to challenge the 1982 ordinance based on a preemption argument. "It is a 
fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a court's 
jurisdiction must have standing." Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits. 135 Idaho 121, 
125, 15 P .3d 1129. 1132 (2000). "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief 
and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Miles v. Idaho Power Co.,_116 
Idaho 635, 641 (1989). In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, the petitioners must 
"allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief 
3 The Taylor Grazing Act expressly recognizes the operation of state law with respect to fencing. It provides: 
Fences, wells, reservoirs, and other improvements necessary to the care and management of the permitted livestock 
may be constructed .on the public lands within such grazing districts under permit issued by the authority of the 
Secretary, or under such cooperative arrangement as the Secretary may approve. Permittees shall be required by the 
Secretary of the Interior to comply with the provisions of law of the State within which the grazing district is located 
with respect to the cost and maintenance of partition fences. 43 U.S.C. sec. 315c. 
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requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. Standing may be predicated upon a 
threatened harm as well as a past injury. Harris v. Cassia Count, 106 Idaho 513. 516 (1984). 
B. Idaho Case Law Does Not Permit a Court to Invalidate an Entire County 
Ordinance Based on a Discrete Defect in the Ordinance. 
Sutton does not dispute that the Idaho Supreme Court in its 1987 Miller decision voided 
the herd district at issue in that case because it contained BLM land. See Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 10, citing 
Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415 (1987). The Miller decision does not appear consistent with 
other Idaho cases, however, which permit county ordinances to stand if the valid portions of a 
challenged ordinance are "distinctly separable" from the remainder. In Johnston v. Savidge, 11 
Idaho 204, 209 (1905) (citations omitted), the Idaho Supreme Court held that: 
Where the portion of the statute or ordinance which is invalid is 
distinctly separable from the remainder, and the remainder in itself 
contains the essentials of a complete enactment, the invalid portion 
may be rejected, and the remainder stand as valid and operative. 
In similar contexts involving the exercise of municipal or county legislative power that 
exceeds the geographic limitations of an enabling act, the Idaho Supreme Court has not held that 
such exercise is invalid in its entirety. 
For example, while the Idaho Legislature has given counties the right to regulate the sale 
of alcohol, it has not given counties the right to regulate the sale of alcohol within municipalities. 
In the same way that Piercy seeks to invalidate the 1982 herd district in its entirety because it 
contains federal land, in the case of Hobbs v. Abrams, 104 Idaho 204 (1983), plaintiff argued 
that a county ordinance intended to regulate the sale of beer in a county was void in its entirety 
because the ordinance did not explicitly exclude municipalities within the county. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this draconian approach and let the law stand. The 
Court affirmed that the ordinance did not apply to municipalities. It did not, however, void the 
entire ordinance. The Court held that while the regulation in question did not expressly exclude 
municipalities, that did not make it "invalid in the territory to which it is applicable." Hobbs, 
104 Idaho at 207 (citations omitted). 
There is no principled reason why a herd district that includes BLM land must be 
invalidated in its entirety. While Idaho Code sec. 25-2402(2)(a) provides that no herd district 
shall contain any lands owned by the United States of America or the State of Idaho on which 
grazing has been historically permitted, nothing in the herd district statutes requires voiding such 
a herd district in its entirety. 
Taking Piercy's argument to its logical conclusion would have absurd results. Idaho 
Code sec. 25-2402(2) also provides that a herd district cannot "[r]esult in the state, a county, a 
city or a highway district being held liable for personal injury, wrongful death or property 
damage resulting from livestock within the public right-of-way'' or "[p]rohibit trailing or driving 
of livestock from one location to another on public roads or recognized livestock trails." See 25-
2402(2)(b) and (c). Under Piercy's approach, a herd district that did either of these things would 
be void in its entirety. 
No one disputes that if this case involved an effort to hold a county liable for personal 
injury (which it does not) or if this case involved an effort by the county to prohibit trailing of 
livestock from one location to another on public roads, this Court could grant relief from the 
ordinance to the party affected by the violation of the ordinance.4 It is absurd, however, to 
4 E.g., in a case where a plaintiff sought to have a city held liable in a livestock-auto accident, the city could have the 
case dismissed. 
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conclude that the Idaho Legislature intended for individuals in Piercy's situation to have a herd 
district declared void in its entirety because of defects in an ordinance that are completely 
collateral to the liability of a livestock owner created by herd district status. 
Stated differently, what statutory support is there for the proposition that Piercy is 
immune :from liability in this case simply because there is BLM land within the 1982 herd 
district? It would be absurd - in a hypothetical case involving a herd district ordinance that 
provided for state liability in violation of subsection (b) - for Piercy to argue that such a 
provision voids the entire ordinance and he escapes liability. 
The more sensible approach, supported by the 1905 Johnston case, is that the ordinance 
simply does not apply in the circumstances forbidden by the enabling act. The imposition of 
herd district liability, being "distinctly separable" from the remainder of the herd district statutes, 
remains valid. Johnston, 111 Idaho at 209. To hold otherwise would be to permit Piercy to 
escape liability because a small percentage ofland in the 1982 herd district contains BLM land, 
an issue that is entirely collateral to the issue of Piercy's responsibility to fence in his livestock 
under that ordinance. 
C. E.G. Johnson's Affidavit Supports Application of the Doctrine of 
Estoppel by Laches 
Mr. Johnson's Affidavit supports application of the estoppel by !aches doctrine. Mr. 
Johnson has known that his property has been in the herd district enacted in 1982 by the Canyon 
County Commissioners since 1982. Nevertheless, he apparently took no steps to challenge 
enactment of that ordinance. 
401 
Mr. Johnson has believed his farm has been in a herd district since 1982. He has ordered 
his affairs accordingly. It is too late to complain about technical aspects of the ordinance's 
passage. 
D. Testimony of Law Enforcement Personnel Supports Application of the 
Doctrine of Estoppel by Laches 
fu her opposition, Sutton noted that law _enforcement personnel who responded to the 
accident believed that cattle were not allowed on the road where the accident occurred. Sutton 
offers the following testimony from these officers: 
Q: Did you have a conversation with Mr. Piercy? 
A: My only conversation with him really was trying to establish whether this animal was 
his or not. Because ifit was his, of course, my FTO had informed me that we were going 
to have to cite him for his animal being on the roadway because there is no open grazing 
in Canyon County. And so we were going to cite him for his animal being on the 
roadway. 
Affidavit of Meghan E. Sullivan in Support of Defendant Sutton's Opposition 
To Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. A., Heng Depo., p. 28, I. 24-p. 29, 
I. 8. 
A: * * * * * With this being a closed range county the cattle aren't supposed to be 
out on the roadway. And if a cow was up on the roadway, it's not supposed to be there. 
Id., Exh. B., Herrera Depo., p. 41, 11. 6-9. 
A: * * * * * There was a bull in the roadway, that is not where the bull should be. 
In my opinion, I'm telling you we know what caused the accident, we've done numerous 
of these. The bull should be behind the fence. 
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Id., Exh. C., Sloan Depo., p. 83, 11. 17-22. 
The officers who responded to and invesigated this accident understood that cattle were 
not permitted on roads in Canyon County. This has been the law for 25 years. Deputy Sloan 
noted many such similar accidents, and that the conclusion is always the same (because Canyon 
County is a herd district): the animal is not permitted on the roadway. 
The 1982 ordinance is too old and too established to be thrown out 25 years after the fact. 
<Z-4:/i 
DATED this day of August, 2007. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By ~ c-4 ! {5.,-i;r 
Josua s. Evett 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ,Z.1}h- day of August, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Timothy C. Walton U.S. Mail 
Chasan & Wal ton, LLC Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1069 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 ~· Facsimile 
Stephen E. Blackburn U.S. Mail 
Blackburn Law, P.C. Hand Delivery 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 
~ 
Overnight Mail 
Meridian, ID 83642 Facsimile 
RyanB. Peck U.S. Mail 
Saetrum Law Offices Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 7425 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83707 (./ Facsimile 
Joshua S. Evett 
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ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Evett - ISB #5587 
Sullivan - ISB #7038 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA and LUIS J. GUZMAN, Case No. CVOS-4848 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF MEGHAN E. SULLIVAN 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT 
SUTTON'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT PIERCY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Meghan E. Sullivan, having first been duly sworn, upon her oath deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Defendant") in the 
above-captioned case, and I make these statements based on my personal knowledge and 
information. 
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2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the 
deposition testimony given by Deputy Gerald Heng on August 10, 2006: 29: 1-8. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the 
deposition testimony given by Sergeant Todd Herrera on September 19, 2006: 41 :1-9; 41 :13-20; 
62:22-63:4. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the 
deposition testimony of Deputy Eron Sloan on August 10, 2006: 42:21-24; 83:16-22. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the 
deposition testimony given by Deputy Bryce Smith on September 19, 2006: 43:3-6. 
DATED this l w day of August 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -1:.Sd day of August 2007. 
tluWL~ 
Notary Public for Id):; . 
Residing at ~ 
Commission expires Ll))2--
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1 vehicle south of the bridge itself, just off the 
2 northbound lane, off the side of the road to not 
3 block traffic, which of course was already 
4 blocked anyway, nobody was going across. 
5 However, we exited the vehicle, walked 
6 up on the scene. The first thing I visually 
7 seen, of course, was the cow laying in the 
8 southbound lane, being as large as he was, and 
9 then around the cow was debris from the vehicle 
10 itself. Then further on up the road in the 
11 southbound lane of the bridge was the vehicle 
12 itself. 
13 I didn't get a good look at the vehicle 
14 at that point because I was still standing 
15 considerably far back. However, nothing I could 
16 do for the cow at that point in time; in fact, I 
17 believe somebody was trying to make contact with 
18 the owner of the animal. If I remember 
19 correctly, it was a Parma officer --
20 Q. Calhoun? 
21 A. Calhoun, thank you. 
22 -- that indicated that he believed that 
23 the animal belonged to Mr. Piercy. And so they 
24 were trying to contact Mr. Piercy at that point 
25 to have him come out and identify the animal. 
Page 
1 At that time myself and Deputy Sloan 
2 proceeded forward up the bridge or further north 
3 up the bridge, and then I got a better look at 
4 the vehicle, and pretty much the entire front end 
5 of the vehicle was caved in, I'm assuming from 
6 impacting the cow, that would be a reasonable 
7 assumption, and in fact that was the case. 
8 Q. Were the occupants in the vehicle still 
9 present? 
1 o A. We were actually at that time 
11 waiting for -- somebody had already called in 
12 Life Flight for the female passenger. Ms. Sutton 
13 was at the time being attended to in an ambulance 
14 that was on location. The female passenger, I 
15 don't remember her name exactly. 
16 Q. Erika Rivera, my client. 
1 7 A. Thank you. Ms. Rivera, we were waiting 
18 for Life Flight for her. And Mr. Guzman was -- I 
19 don't remember if he was in another ambulance or 
2 o the ambulance that he was in had already taken 
2 1 of£ He was taken to Mercy Medical at first. So 
2 2 all three occupants of the vehicle were actually 
2 3 being attended to by medical personnel. So at 
2 4 that point we didn't have any contact with them 
2 5 whatsoever. 
27 
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1 Q. So then what happened? 
2 A. We basically contained the scene until 
3 Mr. Piercy came on location, and I myself 
4 questioned Mr. Piercy, asked him if that was his 
5 animal. He said he believed that it was his 
6 animal. Apparently he had some animals out in 
7 the surrounding fields there. 
8 Q. Do you know how he identified this bull 
9 as his? 
10 A. By the markings on the bull. I believe 
11 there was a tag on the ear. 
12 Q. Did you notice what that tag was all 
13 about? 
14 A. It's a numbering system that each 
15 rancher will use for their animals. 
16 Q. You didn't make notes of the specifics 
17 on this bull? 
18 A. No, not other than the fact that it was 
19 a bull of black fur; it was covered with black 
20 fur; it was large in size. That was about it. I 
21 didn't make any notations on the numbering. 
22 Q. On the ear tag, that is what I meant. 
23 A. Right. No. 
24 Q. Did you have a conversation with Mr. 
25 Piercy? 
Page 
1 A. My only conversation with him really 
2 was trying to establish whether this animal was 
3 his or not. Because if it was his, of course, my 
29 
4 FTO had informed me that we were going to have to 
5 cite him for his animal being on the roadway 
6 because there is no open grazing in Canyon 
7 County. And so we were going to cite him for his 
B animal being on the roadway. 
9 Q. So what conversations did you and Mr. 
1 o Piercy have? 
11 A. After establishing that this animal was 
12 his by his own indication, I don't remember 
13 verbatim word for word what we spoke of, but I 
14 did inform Mr. Piercy that I was going to have to 
15 cite him. It was a misdemeanor charge, a county 
16 charge, as a matter of fact, for his animal being 
1 7 on the roadway. I apologized to him for having 
18 to give him the citation, but I did let him know 
19 it was his responsibility to maintain his 
2 o animals, so that is why I was having to cite him. 
21 Q. Did Mr. Piercy discuss with you how the 
2 2 animal got out? 
2 3 A. He didn't. Well, I shouldn't say he 
2 4 did not. He asked me if we had seen anywhere in 
2 5 the fence line where the animal had gotten out, 
8 (Pages 26 to 29) 
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1 Q. Anything else about this accident that 
2 you can talk about that we haven't talked about 
3 that you recall? 
4 A. I don't. You know, you might query the 
5 Parma QRU folks or some of those medical people 
6 that were out there. They might be able to tell 
7 you a little bit more about interaction with the 
8 patients and whatnot. 
9 Q. I want to ask you about your 
10 experiences you have had, if any, with Mr. Piercy 
11 and his livestock getting out. 
12 A. I haven't. And when I looked it up on 
13 Spielman this morning it looked like somebody 
14 else had been out and referenced that this year 
15 or something like that. Maybe last year. Since 
16 this time. Because I notice there was entry in 
17 the log table or something. It looks like a 
18 Parma police report. Parma City had dealt with 
19 him. But I haven't. 
20 Q. Have you ever had experience with 
21 Mr. Piercy's livestock getting out on any 
22 occasion? 
23 A. No. I dealt with livestock around 
24 the county. But not in that location with 
25 Mr. Piercy. 
Page 
1 Q. Do you recall what part of the bull was 
2 injured? 
3 A. I do not. You know, it seemed -- ifl 
4 had to take a guess I would guess it was bleeding 
5 from the nose. Maybe some facial or head type of 
6 lllJury. 
7 Q. You're guessing? 
8 A. I'm guessing. It almost seems like one 
9 of the back legs. But I have dealt with several 
1 o over the years. But that is the impression I get 
11 from just guesstimating. 
12 Q. Recognizing this might be a delicate 
13 question. Not meaning to embarrass anybody. Is 
14 there a reason Officer Heng has not gone back to 
15 patrol? 
16 A. I am not sure why he was removed from 
1 7 patrol personnel wise. Like I say, I was 
18 transferred out of division about two weeks later 
19 to take an emergency management position. I'm 
2 o not sure of the outcome of his FTO. 
21 Q. Of his what? 
2 2 A. Field training officer program. His 
2 3 training program 
2 4 MR. WAL TON: I believe that is all I 
2 5 have. These folks might have questions for you. 
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MS. MEIKLE: I do. I apologize, but I 
need to take a two-minute break. 
(Recess.) 
EXAMINATION 
QUESTIONS BY MS. MEIKLE: 
Q. We are back on the record. Sergeant 
Herrera, I do want to ask you some questions. We 
were off the record and you indicated that -- and 
I'm trying to rephrase what you had just stated. 
You had just stated that --
A. About the seriousness of the accident? 
Q. Well, you were stating with regard to 
the fact that you thought this was a cut and 
dried incident. That a bull was on the road. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you clarify what you were saying? 
A. Well, you know, my impression is, and 
with a feeling of working in traffic accident 
cases, is that through the sheriffs office we 
are looking for criminal prosecutable cases. And 
so the officers out there that night, and I'm not 
speaking for them, but the impression they are 
trained to do is to look for those criminal cases 
where something can be prosecuted or not. Where 
Page 41 
1 is the criminal problem there? In Idaho, Canyon 
2 County, for the most part, 98 percent is closed 
3 range county. I think we've got a couple spots 
4 of open range in the very southern tip, and maybe 
5 a little bit up in the northern tip, of the 
6 county. With this being a closed range county 
7 the cattle aren't supposed to be out on the 
8 roadway. And if a cow was up on the roadway, 
9 it's not supposed to be there. Maybe that's the 
1 o intent of the cow. And I'm not speaking for 
11 owners or anything like that. I don't know the 
12 intent of the owner and his fence or anything 
13 like that. Or how the cow got out. But the cow 
14 is not supposed to be there. That's number one. 
15 It is not supposed to be up on the roadway. So 
16 cut and dry. The cow was on the roadway and it 
1 7 caused an accident. So the cow then would be 
18 technically at fault. And so it is fairly cut 
19 and dry that the cow was there and that is what 
2 o caused the accident. 
21 Q. So is it fair to say you weren't taking 
2 2 these measurements and doing these -- completing 
2 3 Exhibit 3 to make a determination as to the 
2 4 driver or any other fault? Because you had 
2 5 made a determination that the cow was on the road 
11 (Pages 38 to 41) 
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1 fairly cut and dry. Whereas, it is quite obvious 
2 as to what the outcome of the wreck was. But 
3 that is just the once and rare occasion. For the 
4 most part, though, 99 percent of the time on an 
5 accident fatality we'll do a reconstruction or 
6 have the State come out and do those. We have 
7 two reconstructionists and sometimes it is hard 
8 to get them at the end of the week to come out if 
9 they are not available, or if they are out of 
1 O town, or whatnot. 
11 And on this one we had just one vehicle 
12 involved. It is not involved with another 
13 vehicle. Where a reconstructionist might be 
14 brought out if there is two vehicles involved 
15 where you can show the fault of the other 
16 vehicle. Either/or. If you have a crash with 
1 7 two vehicles at an uncontrolled intersection you 
18 are probably going to want to be able to 
19 determine who entered the intersection first. Or 
2 O who had the right-of-way. Who ran the stop sign. 
21 Who didn't yield. Who did what or when. 
2 2 One vehicle involved with a cow -- I'm 
2 3 sorry, but the impression is that it is a fairly 
2 4 cut and dry accident. The cow is at fault. We 
2 5 know what caused the accident. We don't know if 
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1 the cow got out of the pen. Or maybe it was 
2 going to the other pasture. But the cow was up 
3 on the roadway. And that was the primary cause 
4 of the accident. 
5 Q. So based on that fact, once you 
6 determined that the cow was on the roadway, and 
7 that is what you determined to be the primary 
8 cause of the accident, there wasn't a further 
9 i.nvestiga!!Qn El:S to the _¢iv~r? 
10 A No. 
11 Q. Is that correct? 
12 A Right. And that might not be the case. 
13 If an officer found out the driver was drunk, 
14 then, sure, he is going to follow through with 
15 that. And follow through with even going back to 
16 the hospital and maybe doing a blood draw or 
1 7 something. And seeing what the alcohol content 
18 of the driver was. And I don't know what the 
19 other two officers found there. It seems like 
2 o when I looked in the vehicle, and from the 
2 1 photos, it didn't seem like there was anything 
2 2 alcohol obvious to be seen or not. I'm not sure 
2 3 if they found anything there or not. 
2 4 Q. Did you actually look in the vehicle? 
2 5 A Just probably from the distance that 
Page 64 
1 the photographs were taken. As I walked by the 
2 vehicle, and looked, and said, "Ooh, good crash." 
3 Q. So you didn't do an investigation? 
4 A No, I didn't. 
5 Q. Do you know if one was done? 
6 A Those officers should have done an 
7 inventory when they did the accident. And I 
8 didn't see an inventory sheet in there, also. 
9 That should have been in there. Which would have 
1 O documented if they found alcohol. Whatever they 
11 found they would have documented it on the 
12 inventory sheet. 
13 Q. Was there any discussion with the 
14 officers about doing an inventory of the vehicle? 
15 A I didn't have any discussion: with them 
16 on that. 
1 7 Q. But one should have been done? 
18 A If the vehicle was towed by a tow truck 
19 at our request we do an inventory sheet. If it 
2 o was something that they requested, an inventory 
2 1 sheet might not have been done. If Uncle Joe 
2 2 came out with the wrecker or something like that 
2 3 and towed it away. And sometimes when they are 
2 4 using -- these people might have said, "Oh, we 
2 5 are calling Parma." Which has its own wrecker. 
Page 65 
1 Which isn't on our wrecker list. And then an 
2 evidence sheet might not -- or an inventory sheet 
3 might not have been done. 
4 Q. But it would be protocol to actually 
5 inspect the vehicle --
6 A Yes. 
7 Q. -- at the time? Regardless of how it 
8 is being towed? 
9 A. Y e.s. I. WQl!l4 ~_µgge§t t() tl19se 9f ;tie:ers 
1 O that they should do that inspection. 
11 Q. And that should be noted in the report? 
12 A Because that goes back to what you are 
13 kind of after here, too. You are looking -- you 
14 want to make sure that, you know, them hitting 
15 the cow, that there wasn't something else along 
16 there. Be it --you know, this guy is trying to 
1 7 commit suicide or something by running into a cow 
18 or a wall. Or there is a homicide. Or there is 
19 bald tires on the thing. No headlights. That is 
2 O part of the whole thing is just to kind of --
21 part of the investigation is looking at things 
2 2 and seeing if there is things obvious that just 
2 3 aren't right there. 
2 4 You know, you could do the "what if' 
2 5 game and say, what if these people were drag 
17 (Pages 62 to 65) 
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1 A. We ID them, we talk to them, get their 
2 side ofthe story, what happened, andjust 
3 collect evidence that way, either verbal 
4 statements or just looking at the scene itself. 
5 Q. What is the purpose of talking to them? 
6 A. We weren't there when it happened, so 
7 you need to get everybody's side of the story. 
8 If there is just one vehicle involved, you are 
9 just talking to the driver, you try to get as 
1 O much information as you can. If there's other 
11 witnesses, you just try to take it all in and you 
12 develop your own opinion with evidence that way. 
13 Q. Counsel asked you about the 
14 determinations you made at the scene. You said 
15 that there was a bull in the road and a car hit 
16 the bull. Why didn't you investigate the driver? 
1 7 A When you are asking "investigate," what 
18 are you asking? 
19 Q. In terms of the driver, any causation 
2 o by the driver? 
21 A Because it's pretty self-explanatory 
2 2 what happened. We know what happened. Because 
2 3 it's obvious, because there was a bull in the 
2 4 road. It's not the driver's fault. 
2 5 . What if the driver were im aired? 
Page 43 
1 A What is that? 
2 Q. What if the driver were impaired? 
3 A Would it be their fault if they hit a 
4 bull in the road? 
5 Q. If they were impaired? 
6 A Possibly. 
7 Q. But you didn't do an investigation of 
8 whether the driver was impaired; correct? 
9 A Did I do an investigation? No. 
1 O Q. Did anyone do an investigation with 
11 regard to the impairment of the driver? 
12 A Me and Deputy Heng did not. 
13 Q. Why was there no testing done with 
14 regard to alcohol or drugs on the driver? 
15 A Sergeant Herrera was in charge. I was 
16 not in charge. You'll have to ask him. We 
1 7 conducted -- if you want me to elaborate, I can 
18 as much as possible --
19 Q. Please. 
2 o A -- if you need that. We conducted an 
2 1 interview with the driver at the hospital who 
2 2 spoke just fine. We had no indications of any 
2 3 type of alcohol, drugs, and we always have the 
2 4 indications when we are on the scene, either 
2 5 alcohol in the car, smell. And Deputy Smith also 
1 informed us at the scene that there was no 
2 indications of any of them. 
Page 44 
3 Q. Did Mr. Piercy -- do you know if Mr. 
4 Piercy asked that any blood testing or breath 
5 testing be conducted on the driver? 
6 A. Not to me. I don't remember him saying 
7 anything. 
8 Q. How long after you arrived at the scene 
9 did you have the conversation with Ms. Sutton at 
1 O the hospital; do you know how long that was? 
11 A I can look on the radio log. I can 
12 look and tell you. 
13 Q. Would you check for me? 
14 A. It was quite a ways after that, but let 
15 me see. (Reviewing document.) 
16 I believe it shows in the radio log 
1 7 history, which you guys have labeled page 10, I 
18 think, unit number is 5259, which is Deputy Heng, 
19 at 01:19 hours on March 21st, '05. It says: We 
2 o arrived at West Valley for follow up. It says: 
21 "WV," which is West Valley, "FUP" is follow up. 
2 2 Q. So is that about three hours after the 
2 3 initial officer arrived? 
2 4 A Close to it. 
2 5 . And De u Sloan, ou and I have 
Page 45 
1 chatted before, correct, on the phone? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Does January 18th pretty much -- is 
4 that about the time you recall having a 
5 conversation with me? 
6 A. I chatted with you a couple times and 
7 then I talked with you, of course, in the 
8 courtroom. I don't remember when it was. 
9 Q. And I had asked you about the testing 
1 o at the scene and you indicated -- do you recall 
11 telling me that you didn't think that Officer 
12 Herrera wanted testing done? 
13 A. Yeah, because he never directed us to 
14 do that. That is why I said that. 
15 Q. Were you present during any 
16 conversations in which testing was discussed? 
1 7 A. No. I don't remember that, no. 
18 Q. You indicated that Officer Smith had 
1 9 indicated there were no indications of the smell 
2 O of alcohol. To the best of your recollection, 
21 what was the conversation you had with Deputy 
2 2 Smith about this? 
2 3 A. It was -- I didn't have a conversation 
2 4 with Deputy Smith. It was a group conversation 
2 5 while I was doing -- because everybody was doing 
12 (Pages 42 to 45) 
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1 A. Are you talking about like impact 
2 sites, where there is actually huge chunks of 
3 asphalt out of the road because the vehicle slams 
4 into the pavement? Yeah. That is different than 
5 skid marks. 
6 Q. Did you see any of that at this scene? 
7 A. Yeah. I don't remember exactly where 
8 they were though. So the skid marks and impact 
9 points where the vehicle slams against the 
1 O asphalt is different than skid marks and we know 
11 what those are. 
12 Q. But you don't recall what the location 
13 is of those? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Earlier you testified that the speed 
16 limit was 50 miles an hour? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And you indicated that Ms. Sutton 
19 actually testified that she thought she was 
2 O traveling about 55 miles an hour? 
2 1 A. Correct. 
2 2 Q. So technically she was speeding from 
2 3 the information you were given? 
2 4 A. Yes. She said possibly, yeah, 
2 5 traveling about 55. 
Page 83 
1 Q. There was no accident reconstruction to 
2 determine her speed; correct? 
3 A. We did not go that far, do the 
4 reconstruction to figure out her speed because 
5 that wasn't the issue. We know what happened, we 
6 know what caused the accident. 
7 Q. You are saying you know what caused the 
8 accident. Do you know how long it took the 
9 vehicle to get stopped? 
1 o A. Do I know? No. 
11 Q. If you don't know Ms. Sutton's speed, 
12 if you haven't done an analysis as to her speed, 
13 · is it possible that she was driving faster than 
14 her -- over-driving her headlights, if it were? 
15 Do you know what I mean when I say that? 
16 A. Yeah, I understand what you are saying. 
1 7 But that is not what caused the accident. There 
18 was a bull in the roadway, that is not where the 
19 bull should be. In my opinion, I'm telling you 
2 o we know what caused the accident, we've done 
2 1 numerous of these. The bull should be behind the 
22 fence. 
2 3 Q. What if the driver isn't paying 
2 4 attention; could that be part of the cause? 
2 5 A. Could it be? 
Page 84 
1 Q. Yes. 
2 A. Possibly. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. But--
5 MR. WALTER: Wait a second. He was 
6 going to finish an answer. 
7 THE WITNESS: I don't know if you 
8 want -- are you asking for my opinion in these 
9 things? 
1 o Q. (BY MS. MEIKLE) I'm asking for you --
11 MR. WALTER: Let him answer, kindly, 
12 Counsel. 
13 MS. MEIKLE: He asked me a question. 
14 I'm clarifying. 
15 THE WITNESS: Do you want my opinion 
16 and why--
1 7 Q. (BY MS. MEIKLE) I'll restate the 
18 question. Is it possible that a driver is not 
19 paying attention and didn't see the object soon 
2 O enough to stop? 
21 A. Are you talking about in this case? 
2 2 Q. Is it possible that could have 
2 3 happened? 
2 4 A. We wouldn't have had skid marks then. 
2 5 She would have just hit the bull. She at least 
Page 85 
1 hit her brakes, that is what I can tell you. At 
2 least she reacted initially to either: Okay, we 
3 hit something because it's black and it's pitch 
4 dark out here and we couldn't really see possibly 
5 because it's dark. If this big black bull -- and 
6 things happen just like that, but at least we had 
7 skid marks, so there was some reaction there. 
8 So I don't know how you want me to 
9 answer your questions, but in my opinion, and I 
1 o can just tell you that, what I think. 
11 Q. In typical accident reconstructions do 
12 you ask the driver what they were doing right 
13 before impact? 
14 A. It depends. Ifwe have a case where, 
15 okay, they ran through a stop sign or there was a 
16 sign or a signal where they should have saw or if 
1 7 we have a witness who saw them on a cell phone, 
18 things like that, possibly. But not every 
19 accident do we ask them: What were you doing 
2 o right before you ran off the road or --
21 Q. So in this case did you ever interview 
22 Mr. Guzman? 
2 3 A. I didn't. 
2 4 Q. So do you know whether someone was 
2 5 using their cell phone at the time? 
22 (Pages 82 to 85) 
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Page 42 
1 investigate the driver and determine ifthere 
2 were causes to the accident? 
3 A. Absolutely. But I did not do the crash 
4 investigation. 
5 Q. Okay. But you are assuming that 
6 another officer would? 
7 A. I knew they would. They requested to 
8 take the investigation. 
9 Q. So your assumption is that they -- but 
1 O they didn't arrive until later on; correct? 
11 A. Correct. Several minutes later. 
12 Q. Is it typical to have the primary 
13 officer that is doing the report be one that is 
14 not responding until later? 
15 A. For training purposes, yes. That is 
16 how you gain experience. 
1 7 Q. So you're assuming that the other 
18 officers who were conducting the crash 
19 investigation would have asked the questions 
2 o that we talked about in terms of what was 
21 happening in the car, where they were going, what 
2 2 they were doing? 
2 3 A. If there were no other cause for the 
2 4 crash, if they had just driven off a straight 
2 5 road, then, eah, we look re hard at things 
Page 43 
1 like that. If you are driving down the road and 
2 hit a bull, that's another scenario. 
3 Q. How is that different in terms of a 
4 driver's attention or impairment? 
5 A. Because the bull shouldn't have been in 
6 the road. 
7 Q. But just because a bull is on the road 
8 doesn't mean necessarily that the driver isn't A, 
9 impaired, also. Or B, distracted. 
1 o A. Correct. Which all comes as part of 
11 the crash investigation. Which I didn't do. 
12 Q. But you are assuming that those 
13 questions in the investigation should have been 
14 conducted? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. Deputy, what did you do to prepare for 
1 7 your deposition today? 
18 A. I gathered the requested information 
19 and brought it with me. Other than that, I 
2 o glanced over the crash report just to refresh my 
21 memory. That's about it. 
2 2 Q. Have you talked with any other 
2 3 individuals about this accident before --
2 4 recently in preparation for your deposition? 
25 A. No. 
Page 44 
1 Q. Have you reviewed any transcripts of 
2 depositions in this case? 
3 A. I have looked at some of the exhibits. 
4 Diagrams and things. Just to refresh my memory. 
5 Just today when I got here. 
6 Q. Have you talked to any of the officers 
7 involved in this accident recently? 
8 A. Specifically about the accident, no. 
9 They are on my team. So we associate. 
1 o Q. Did you talk with anyone else such as 
11 counsel in preparation for your deposition? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. When Deputy Sloan and Heng arrived at 
14 the scene did anyone talk to you about your 
15 contacts with the driver? 
16 A. We spoke regarding -- I gave them their 
1 7 personal information so that that could be 
18 included in the report. I don't know as to 
19 whether they made further investigation with the 
2 O people involved at the hospital or not. I would 
21 have ifl would have been doing the 
2 2 investigation. But I don't know if they did that 
23 ornot. 
2 4 Q. When they arrived on the scene -- and 
2 5 when I sa "they" I mean De u Sloan and De u 
Page 45 
1 Heng -- was the driver and Mr. Guzman still at 
2 the scene? 
3 A. They were at the scene, but they were 
4 in separate ambulances being checked out. 
5 Q. Okay. And back to my previous 
6 question. You indicated that you gave Deputy 
7 Sloan and Heng the identification information 
8 that you had asked for. 
9 Did you have a conversation with them 
1 o about your contacts with the driver? 
11 A. No. I just gave them the information 
12 so they could have it. 
13 Q. So they didn't know if you had asked 
14 any questions of her? 
15 A. Huh-uh. 
16 Q. Wasthata"no"? 
1 7 A. That was a no. 
18 Q. I just want to make the record clear. 
19 Did you ever have a conversation with Deputy 
2 O Sloan or Heng after you left the scene with 
2 1 regard to your conversations with the driver? 
2 2 A. I don't believe so. Oftentimes we 
2 3 confer and compare notes before we write reports. 
2 4 And that may have been the case. But I don't 
2 5 recall that specifically. 
12 (Pages 42 to 45) 
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I. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Dale Piercy provided the relevant factual background in the Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment. The investigation into this 
matter has been ongoing and extensive, and therefore, it has been necessary for Defendant 
Piercy to file additional memorandums and affidavits as new evidence was revealed. This 
memorandum is filed as a reply to the Plaintiffs' and Co-Defendant's responding memorandums. 
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Defendant Dale Piercy also moves this Court to strike the Co-Defendant's supplemental 
memorandum as being untimely or in the alternative to allow Defendant Piercy additional time 
to file supplemental briefing solely on those portions involving new law and argument. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS ON DEFENDANT PIERCY'S MOTION TO STRIKE CO-
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states: 
The motion, affidavits and supporting brief shall be served at least twenty eight (28) days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. If the adverse party desires to serve opposing 
affidavits the party must do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. The 
adverse party shall also serve an answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date of the 
hearing. The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief not less than 7 days before 
the date of the hearing. . .. 
Co-Defendant Sutton filed Defendant Sutton's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to New 
Arguments and Facts Raised by Piercy on, Friday, August 24, 2007, which was approximately 
one d,ay past the deadline for filing a responding memorandum in this case. This Brief was 
facsimiled to our office at 4:56 p.m. (Affidavit of Ryan B. Peck in Support of Motion to Strike, 
Exhibit A.) The time of facsimile made it so that this document would not be reviewed until 
Monday morning. Id. Co-Defendant Sutton has provided no reason for the delay considering 
that Co-Defendant Sutton has had almost four months to prepare and file a responsive 
memorandum. 
Defendant Piercy would be greatly prejudiced by this late filing. Defendant Piercy has 
had to respond to Plaintiffs' briefing and affidavits, Plaintiffs' motion for punitive damages, 
Plaintiffs' motion to strike and Co-Defendant Sutton's original responsive briefing. To force 
Defendant Piercy to also respond to late briefing which adds new arguments and law would be 
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extremely unfair. Therefore, Defendant Piercy requests that the Court strike Co-Defendant 
Sutton's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to New Arguments and Facts Raised by Piercy. 
If the Court does decided to consider the arguments and law presented in Co-Defendant's 
brief, Defendant Piercy requests that he be allowed to provide supplemental briefing regarding 
any new law or argument contained in Co-Defendant Sutton's supplemental brief. 
III. REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUMS 
Despite the arguments in the Plaintiffs' responsive memorandums the evidence provided 
by Defendant Piercy conclusively establishes: (1) That the Canyon County Commissioners did 
not establish a herd district pursuant to the 1982 ordinance; (2) That the area from which the 
bull involved in the accident came from was open range at the time of the accident; (3) Mr. 
Piercy is not liable by law for the injuries incurred by Plaintiffs. 
A. The Canyon County Commissioners did not properly establish a herd district under 
State Law. 
1. The Canyon County Commissioners did not act pursuant to a petition. 
Defendant. Piercy in his memorandums and affidavits have provided conclusive evidence 
that the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 invalidly attempted to create a county-wide herd 
district by ignoring the steps necessary in establishing a herd district at that time and exceeding 
their authority as provided by LC. § 25-2402-2409. 
The evidence that has been presented thus far establishes that the Canyon County 
Commissioners in 1982 did not act pursuant to a petition as required. Not only does the order 
and minutes exclude mention of a petition or any indication that a petition was discussed, but 
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the minutes provided specifically that the motion to create a herd district was made by Del 
Hobza and not pursuant to a petition. (Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendant 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 2007 at ). Neither Plaintiff nor Co-
Defendant in their responding briefs attempt to refute this clear evidence. In addition to the 
above evidence, Plaintiff has submitted affidavits from two significant landowners, Mr. Piercy 
and Mr. Johnson, in the open range area that the Commissioners attempted to include in a herd 
district pursuant to the 1982 ordinance which is shown by the area outlined in red and striped 
in blue on Exhibit A to Defendant Piercy's initial memorandum. It would be surprising to 
suggest that a petition attempting to include their land in a herd district would be circulated and 
a hearing had without Mr. Johnson having been privy to that information. 
It is significant that neither Plaintiffs nor Co-Defendant have provided any positive 
evidence that the Canyon County Commissioners acted pursuant to a landowner petition after 
having four months to research these issues. All the evidence weighs in favor of the conclusion 
that the Canyon County Commissioners were not acting pursuant to a petition. 
2. The Canyon County Commissioners did not include any metes and bounds in 
their order or discussions concerning the 1982 ordinance. 
While it is true that the 1963 version of I.C. § 25-2402, does not specifically say that a 
metes and bounds description must be in the order, it can be presumed by the requirement. It 
does not provide any notice to the citizens of Canyon County that a herd district has been 
created without specifying the bounds of that herd district. 
Plaintiff also contends that the Canyon County Commissioners were specifying 
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boundaries by stating that the entire land area of Canyon County is the herd district. (Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment at 17.) This 
argument is in direct contradiction to their argument that the Canyon County Commissioners 
only created a herd district containing the three remaining open range areas in Canyon County. 
Id. at p. 9, fn. 7.) Plaintiffs need to choose which argument they are making. If they are 
claiming that the Canyon County Commissioners were creating a county-wide herd district, then 
this does potentially answer the metes and bounds problem. If Plaintiffs are arguing that the 
ordinance only created one herd district containing three specific areas, then the metes and 
bounds requirement was not met and the ordinance is invalid. It is contrary to justice to allow 
an ordinance to deate legal obligations with no reasonable way for people to determine the area 
of effect of that ordinance. 
3. The Canyon County Commissioners failed to specify a certain time in their order 
when the herd district was to take effect. 
The 1982 ·ordinance also fails to "specify a certain time at which it shall take effect,." 
I.C. § 25-2404. This lack of a specified time invalidates the ordinance. The Idaho Code states 
that the ordinance 'shall' contain a specific time at which it will take effect. Id. This language 
is mandatory. The 1982 ordinance evidently has never taken effect due to the lack of a time 
certain for its inception. This facial defect also rebuts the presumption of validity found in I.C. 
§ 31-857. 
Plaintiffs made arguments to this issue in their first response. Id. at p. 18. This 
argument was refuted by Defendant Piercy. (Supplemental Memorandum in Support of 
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Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment filed July 30, 2007, at p. 8 and 9.) Neither 
Plaintiffs nor Co-Defendant has provided any evidence or rational to refute Defendant Piercy's 
argument. This constitutes a facial defect in the 1982 ordinance, which is fatal to Plaintiffs' 
arguments that it is impossible, 25 years later, to determine if the Canyon County 
Commissioners failed to validly enact the 1982 ordinance. It is beyond dispute that they failed 
to follow the express requirements provided in the 1963 version of LC. § 25-2402-2404. 
Because it is beyond dispute that the Canyon County Commissioners failed to follow such 
an obvious requirement, this is evidence that they failed to even read the provisions of I. C. § 
25-2402-2404, or that they were choosing to ignore them. 
4. The Canyon County Commissioners failed to properly provide notice of a hearing 
on the alleged creation of a herd district. 
Defendant Piercy admits that this specific argument was not presented until the filing of 
the July 30, 2007, supplemental memorandum. This may have been a cause for an objection 
by Plaintiffs or Co-Defendant, but they chose to move the hearing date to cure the problem. 
Defendant Piercy has relied on that action in moving the date of the hearing to September 6, 
2007, as a cure to any objection. Plaintiffs, however, now request that the Court strike this 
argument and the information supporting it. Despite the fact, that the information and argument 
provided is very harmful to Plaintiffs position, Plaintiffs have had over a month to find evidence 
to respond to this argument, which is adequate under the rules. 
Plaintiff in responding to this argument contends that the statute does not specifically state 
when the notices Would have to be provided. The only logical reading of the statute is that the 
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Canyon County Commissioners were required to provide notices for the two weeks prior to the 
hearing. Allowing the Commissioners to provide notices at any time prior to the hearing would 
defeat any reasonable purpose of that provision. 
The Affidavit of Dawn McClure establishes that there were no notices provided in the 
Idaho Press Tribune for over a month prior to the hearing on the 1982 ordinance. (Affidavit 
of Dawn McClure, Exhibit 1; and p. 2.) It is clear from the content of the newspapers provided 
that the Canyon County Commissioners at the time were using the Idaho Press Tribune to post 
their legal notices. Further, no notices were found that a hearing was to be held. Plaintiff 
makes the claim that perhaps the notice was posted in another newspaper at the time. Plaintiff 
even provides an affidavit providing evidence that another paper existed in Canyon County at 
the time and was easily located. More interesting is that Plaintiff does not provide any evidence 
that a notice of the hearing was issued. If it is so easy to locate and review these newspapers, 
why did Plaintiff not review them? The only evidence before the Court is that the Canyon 
County Commissioners failed to provide notice of the hearing regarding the 1982 ordinance in 
violation of LC. ·§ 25-2402-2404. 
Plaintiff then argues that if the notices were not provided then Defendant Piercy has not 
been prejudiced by that lack of notice. This argument is not relevant to the issue of whether or 
not the County Commissioners validly established a herd district. Plaintiffs argument simply 
is a repeat of his estoppel argument, which is refuted below. 
5. As evidenced by Plaintiffs original responsive brief, the Canyon County 
Commissioners improperly attempted to include open range areas in their 1982 ordinance. 
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Plaintiff points out one more facial defect in the 1982 ordinance creating a county-wide 
herd district. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at p.4, fn. 3.) Plaintiff properly points out that the 1963 version of I.C. § 
25-2402 forbids Commissioners at that time to create herd districts that include then existing 
open range. Despite this clear limitation on the authority of the Canyon County Commissioners, 
the 1982 ordinance's stated purpose is to include previously established open range areas into 
a herd district. It seems that the Canyon County Commissioners did not review I.C. § 25-2402-
2404 in attempting to create the 1982 ordinance or ignored its express limitations. 
--------~---------------- -------------------------------·-- ------~--
All the evidence provided by both Plaintiffs and Defendant Piercy irrefutably establish 
that the Canyon County Commissioners did not act within their authority in passing the 1982 
ordinance. The 1982 ordinance is therefore invalid. 
B. The 1982 ordinance violates the prohibition found in I.C. § 25-2402(2). 
Despite the above evidence rebutting the presumption of validity in the formation of the 
herd district, Defendant Piercy has also provided evidence that the enactment of the 1982 
ordinance was not within the jurisdiction of the Canyon County Commissioners. 
Plaintiff initially attempted to argue around this prohibition by looking to the statutory 
history of l.C. § 25-2402. Plaintiff correctly cites that the 1963 version of l.C. § 25-2402 does 
not include the present prohibition against herd districts including 11 any lands owned by the 
United States of America or the state of Idaho, upon which the grazing of livestock has 
historically been permitted. 11 I.C. § 25-2402(2)(a)(2007). Plaintiff, however, ignored the 
statutory history establishing the legislature's intention that this provision be retroactive. In 
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1983, a new section (2) was added to I.C. § 25-2402 which stated: 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, no herd district 
established before or after July 1, 1983, shall: 
(a) Contain any lands owned by the United States of America, and managed by 
the department of the interior, bureau of land management, or its successor 
agency, upon which lands the grazing of livestock has historically been permitted. 
Chapt. 120 Idaho Session Laws 314 (1983). 
The legisfature intended by the 1983 amendment to invalidate any herd districts created 
prior to July 1, 1983, that contained federal land upon whiCh grazing of livestock had 
historically been permitted. The "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary" 
language is effective as against the portion of LC. § 25-2402 cited by Plaintiff stating that "any 
herd district heretofore established shall retain its identity, geographic definition, and remain in 
full force and effect, until vacated or modified hereafter as provided by section 25-2404. These 
two portions of I:C. § 25-2402 are right next to each other. The effect of I.C. § 25-2402(2)(a) 
is governing to the extent it conflicts with "any other provision of law. " This language was 
never dropped in the subsequent changes to the statute. Any intent by the section cited by 
Plaintiff to grandfather in previously created herd districts is ineffective as they conflict with 
I.C. § 25-2402(2)(a). 
In Plaintiffs subsequent responsive brief they do not provide any response to the above 
analysis, other than to cite to the current version of I.C. § 25-2401(1). Once again, to the extent 
that this language conflicts with LC. § 25-2402(2)(a), LC. § 25-2402(2)(a) governs. This is set 
forth in the langtiage without any exceptions. 
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Plaintiff also maintains that the evidence provided by Rosemary Thomas does not prove 
there is BLM land in the area covered by the 1982 ordinance. If Plaintiff chooses to make the 
argument that the area of the 1982 ordinance contains all the land area of Canyon County, which 
is supported by the weight of all the evidence, it is clear that the map provided in Ms. Thomas' 
affidavit shows BLM land that is within the boundaries of Canyon County. 
If Plaintiff abandons his argument regarding metes and bounds above, and argues that 
the land area included in the 1982 ordinance is only those areas of the map that are clear of herd 
districts, a casual look at the map provided by Ms. Thomas will show significant areas of BLM 
land in the Northeast portion of Canyon County. This is one of the areas according to the 
Canyon County Commissioners' map that was not in a previously created herd district area. 
Plaintiff has not refuted the evidence provided by Ms. Thomas third affidavit establishing 
that these BLM areas were being grazed under BLM management as far back as 1967. 
Defendant Piercy has established that the 1982 ordinance attempted to include in a herd 
district BLM land that was permitted for grazing. This inclusion is in violation of I.C. § 25-
2402(2)(a), and therefore, the attempted herd district is invalid. 
C. The Canyon County Commissioner's Actions are Preempted by Federal Law 
Plaintiffs contend that this argument was first introduced in Defendant Piercy' s brief filed 
on July 30, 2007'. however, this argument is actually an extension of Defendant Piercy's stated 
argument that I.C. § 25-2402(2)(a) was simply the Idaho Legislature's recognition of federal 
law. This was argued in Defendant's original brief. Defendant Piercy does recognize that the 
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argument was significantly bolstered by federal case law and analysis in Defendant Piercy' s later 
brief. Any claim that these arguments were late is cured by Defendant Piercy moving the 
hearing date to September 6, 2007. 
Plaintiffs responsive brief fails to provide any evidence or case law refuting Defendant 
Piercy's analysis on the question. Plaintiffs do claim that Defendant Piercy is arguing that all 
herd districts that contain federal land in Idaho are void. This is not the question before this 
Court. The question before the Court is whether the 1982 ordinance is pre-empted by federal 
law. Federal law preempted the 1982 ordinance from including federal land in a herd district. 
See pp. 13-15. 
As stated in Defendant Piercy's motion to strike Co-Defendant's second brief, Co-
Defendant's brief was untimely and should not be considered by this Court. If it is allowed 
Defendant Piercy provides the following analysis. 
Co-Defendant's arguments in her Supplemental Opposition at pp. 2-5 ignore the statutory 
requirements of what types of lands may and may not be included in a herd district and argues 
that a herd district is not preempted by the federal grazing acts. 
1. Defendant Piercy has Standing to Argue the Validity of the 1982 Ordinance. 
Co-Defendant asserts that Mr. Piercy "does not have standing to ask this Court to find 
that the 1982 herd district is void because it contains BLM land." Id., p. 5. As held by the 
Supreme Court of Idaho: 
"Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before 
reaching the merits of the case." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 
44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party 
seeking re,lief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Miles 
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v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). To satisfy 
the requirement of standing, "litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an 
injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will 
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Id. "The injury must be distinct and 
palpable and not be one suffered alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction." 
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n, Inc. v. State ex rel. Batt, 128 Idaho 831, 833-34, 919 
P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (1996). There must also be a fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. Young v. City 
of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). 
Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). Here, Mr. Piercy has 
standing to request the 1982 ordinance be declared invalid. The "injury" suffered to Mr. Piercy 
is a judgment entered against him for Plaintiffs' damages due to his bull being on a county 
highway in violation of a herd district ordinance and being involved in the subject accident. The 
judicial relief requested, invalidating the 1982 herd district ordinance, will in all likelihood 
prevent Mr. Piercy from being found liable for Plaintiffs' damages. This is not an "injury" that 
is suffered by ail citizens of Canyon County because not all citizens are livestock owners. 
Finally, the challenged conduct of the Canyon County Commissioners in enacting the 1982 
ordinance is the only cause of Mr. Piercy's potential "injury" of being found liable for 
Plaintiffs' damages. Therefore, following the above elements, Mr. Piercy has standing to raise 
the validity of the 1982 ordinance. 
Further, in Miller, Defendant E. Paul Miller raised the validity of the Bannock County 
herd district. 113 Idaho at 416, 745 P.2d at 295. The Supreme Court of Idaho heard the 
argument on the herd district validity and ruled that it was in fact invalid. Id. at 418, 745 P.2d 
at 297. Had Mr. Miller not had standing to argue the herd district's validity, the Supreme Court 
would have held so. Following Miller, Defendant Piercy has standing to argue the invalidity 
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of the 1982 ordinance. 
2. The Federal Preemption Doctrine invalidates the 1982 ordinance because federal 
land is found within the county-wide herd district. 
As argued in Defendant Piercy' s July 30 Supplemental Memorandum, federal preemption 
prohibits states, or counties in this matter, from regulating what can be done on federal land. 
In this case, herd districts cannot contain federal land upon which there historically has been 
grazing. As previously argued, federal land cannot be regulated. 
Co-Defendant raises that there are exceptions found under 43 U.S.C. 315n of the Taylor 
Grazing Act, by citing Ricca v. Bojorquez, 473 P.2d 812 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). In Ricca, it 
was held that a state law allowing "no fence districts" was enforceable upon livestock owners 
who have permits to graze on federal land. Id. at 816-7. However, unlike the present case 
\ 
where a county lierd district would regulate what can and cannot be done within the district, 
even on federal land, Ricca did not have anything to do with what could or could not be done 
on the federal land: 
The effect of the sanctions imposed by A.R.S. § 24-334 is not to directly interfere 
with plaintiff's use of his property. He still may use it for cattle grazing purposes 
or otherwise to the full extent that he was previously able to do so. However, 
his right to use, or perhaps better stated, his freedom from liability for the use 
of the property of others is severely curtailed-he will be liable both civilly and 
criminally, for damages caused by his trespassing livestock under the 
circumstances set forth in the statute. 
Id. at 816. Plaintiff could not be told what he could or could not do on the federal land by the 
state, but should his livestock stray off of the federal land, he would be liable for the livestock's 
trespass. 
That is not what the 1982 ordinance has done by including federal land in the herd 
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district. By including federal land under the requirements of the herd district statutes, Canyon 
County is attempting to regulate the federal lands within the herd district. That is simply not 
allowed under the doctrine of federal preemption as previously argued. 
Even if the Idaho Legislature had attempted to give County Commissioners the authority 
to place BLM land in a herd district, the 1982 ordinance would still be invalid as regulating 
livestock on BLM land is specifically preempted by Federal Law. 
Therefore, since federal law preempts state law in this area of grazing land, and since 
the 1982 Ordinance, by its inclusion of federal BLM land interfered with federal law and is void 
as a result. 
D. The Bull That was Involved in the Subject Accident was Being Pastured in an Open 
Range Area. 
The precedent set for the Court regarding this issue has been stated to be found in 
Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 606, 990 P.2d 1213, 1217 (1999) and Moreland v. 
Adams, Idaho , 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007). Plaintiff has not responded to the arguments set 
forth in Defendant Piercy' s brief filed on July 30, 2007. Plaintiff attempts to create a confusion 
with regard to these bright line cases by citing to the 1963 version of I.C. § 25-2402, which 
prohibited open range from being included in a herd district. While this was the law in 1963, 
it has changed in later versions to allow commissioners to create herd districts in previously open 
range areas. There is no real conflict as Plaintiffs suggest. Instead, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has provided us with a bright line standard in determining the status of land. 
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Therefore, Mr. Piercy's bull that was involved in the subject accident was being pastured 
in open range. 
E. Mr. Piercy is Not Liable for the Accident Because the Bull Involved in the Accident 
was Being Pastured in an Open Range Area. 
The analysis provided in Defendant Piercy's brief filed on July 30, 2007, has not been 
further refuted by Plaintiffs or Co-Defendant. Therefore, further analysis is unnecessary in this 
reply brief. 
F. I.C. § 25-2118 Governs the Liability Issue in This Case. 
Defendant Piercy previously provided argument regarding this issue in the July 30, 2007, 
memorandum. Defendant Piercy now presents further analysis establishing that Canyon County 
Code 03-05-03, is not designed to provide relief to Plaintiffs. Canyon County Code 03-05-03, 
"Purpose and Authority", states in pertinent part, "This article is also designed to help solve the 
problems caused by 'livestock', . . . from running at large in the county." Both sections 03-05-
17 (2) and (4) ~tate that "it shall be unlawful" for livestock (subsection 2) and animals 
(subsection 4) for animals to be at large on county roads, and section 03-05-29 (1) states that 
"violations of the provisions of this article shall be a misdemeanor and shall be punished as set 
forth in Idaho Code 18-113". In other words, Canyon County has made it a misdemeanor crime 
to have livestock or other defined animals at large on the roads of the county. 
This is a similar approach taken by the Benewah County Commissioners which was 
discussed in Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass 'n, Inc. v. Board of County Com 'rs of Benewah 
" 
County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983). In Benewah County, the county commissioners 
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enacted an ordinance which prohibited livestock running at large in the county. As noted by the 
Supreme Court of Idaho, "The ordinance expressly leaves unaffected civil liability arising from 
trespassing livest9ck." Id. at 211, 688 P.2d at 87, see also 105 Idaho 213, 214, 688 P.2d 89, 
90. 
While agreeing that Canyon County validly exercised its legislative authority to create 
the above sections of its Code, see Plaintiffs' Opposition, pp. 24-5, the status of these sections 
is similar to the ordinance found in Benewah County which precludes civil liability for violation 
of these sections. As a result of the Benewah County decision, a livestock owner could be 
criminally liable for violation of the county ordinance by allowing his livestock to run at large 
within Benewah County, but would not be civilly liable should that livestock be hit by a vehicle 
and cause damages because the livestock was in open range and IDAHO CODE § 25-2118 
provides complete immunity. 
It is the same with the present case and the above Canyon County Code sections. In 
order "to help solve the problems caused by 'livestock', . . . from running at large in the 
county", Canyon County has made it a misdemeanor crime to have livestock running at large 
within the county. However, for those portions of the county still in "open range" status, such 
as where Defendant Piercy resides, there is no civil liability for any damages caused by livestock 
running at large under section 25-2118. 
Because the subject bull was running at large on Canyon County roads, Defendant Piercy 
may be in violation of the applicable Canyon County Code sections. However, because the 1982 
ordinance is invalid and the pasture from which the bull came was open range, Defendant Piercy 
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is not civilly liable for Plaintiffs' injuries sustained by the collision with his bull. Plaintiffs' 
argument that Mr. Piercy was negligent per se by violation of the above Canyon County Code 
sections must fail. Summary judgment is proper as it relates to Defendant Piercy. 
G. Plaintiff has Failed to Provide Adequate Evidence That Would Prove a Claim of Quasi-
Estoppel 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment 
of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken." (Citation 
omitted). This doctrine applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position 
than his or her original position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage 
or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
(Citation omitted). 
Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006). 
While not responding to Defendant Piercy's analysis of the law regarding equitable 
estoppel found in' Defendant Piercy's July 30, 2007, brief, Plaintiff continues to insist that this 
doctrine applies. Plaintiffs have not provided any relevant evidence that would suggest that 
Defendant Piercy ever took the position that the subject land was in open range. 
Further as indicated in Atwood, and the supporting cases, equitable estoppel is an 
affirmative defense. Plaintiffs arguments are that Defendant Piercy cannot prove that he never 
took the position:. that his land was in a herd district. This claim is a misunderstanding of the 
nature of an equitable estoppel claim. Plaintiffs have the burden to prove that Defendant Piercy 
took an opposite position to the one he is taking now. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that 
Defendant Piercy gained an advantage in taking the position that he allegedly took. In fact, if 
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the Court were to believe that Defendant Piercy did take the position that the subject land was 
in a herd district with regard to the 2001 accidents, Defendant Piercy was disadvantaged by that 
position. Furthe~, there is no evidence that Defendant Piercy ever took a different position 
regarding the specific parties to this case, and therefore, no disadvantage has been wrought upon 
the Plaintiffs. Essentially, Plaintiffs are arguing that they are disadvantaged because the state 
of the law is not what they originally thought. The Plaintiffs have not established any action by 
Defendant that led them to their mistaken belief that the area in question was contained in a herd 
district. 
The Idaho Appellate Court upheld a Trial Court's decision that such evidence as 
presented in this case was insufficient to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Winn v. 
Eaton, 128 Idaho 670, 675, 917 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Id.App. 1996). The Court held that the 
Defendants asserting equitable estoppel did not meet their burden of proof regarding equitable 
estoppel. Id. The Defendants alleged in an easement case that the because the Plaintiffs lived 
forty feet behind them and shared a driveway that they were well aware of what Defendants 
were doing in staking out their property. The Defendant also cited that it was only after 
Defendants had completed building their home, that Plaintiffs attempted to assert their rights. 
The Court stated that such silence before the trial on the issue is not evidence that Plaintiffs took 
a contrary position prior to the action they were pursuing. Id. 
The essence of all Plaintiffs' arguments in regard to the present case is that Defendant 
Piercy had not previously challenged the 1982 ordinance. As in Winn, this type of evidence is 
not sufficient to prove that Defendant Piercy ever took a contrary position to what he is currently 
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asserting. The affidavits provided by Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant Sutton merely state that they 
thought it was illegal to have cows on the road. This does not prove that they even thought that 
a herd district existed. As discussed below, they may be referring to knowledge of the criminal 
statute not the 1982 ordinance. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendant Piercy even 
knew about the 1982 ordinance. Plaintiffs certainly have not established that Defendant Piercy 
ever took the position that the 1982 ordinance was valid and created a herd district including the 
subject land. The Plaintiffs have also joined in Co-Defendant's arguments regarding estoppel 
by laches. This argument is discussed below. 
Defendant has definitively established that the subject bull was being pastured in open 
range, and therefore, Defendant Piercy is not liable for the damages to the Plaintiffs. 
IV. DEFENDANT PIERCY'S RESPONSE TO CO-DEFENDANT'S BRIEFS 
Co-Defendant makes three arguments in his initial brief. These arguments are: (1) That 
the Court cannot 'rule on this question without joining Canyon County as a party; (2) That any 
decision would be an advisory opinion; and (3) The Court should apply the doctrine of estoppel 
by !aches. 
A. Canyon County is Not a Necessary Party in this Dispute. 
Co-Defendant spends a considerable amount of her Opposition (pp. 3-11) arguing that 
Canyon County must be joined under to this action IDAHO R. CIV. P. 19(a) if the validity of the 
1982 ordinance is to be determined by the Court. Co-Defendant contends that if Canyon County 
is not joined, any decision regarding the 1982 ordinance would be an advisory opinion. Id., at 
11-2. 
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Due to factual distinctions and established Idaho case law on the exact matter at issue 
here, Canyon County does not need to be joined in this matter for the Court to determine the 
1982 ordinance's validity despite those case provided by Co-Defendant. 
1. Rule 19 Joinder of Canyon County is not Necessary to Determine the 1982 
Ordinance's Validity. 
Co-Defendant argues that Canyon County must be joined to this action before the 1982 
ordinance's validity can be determined. This is not true for the situation at issue in this case, 
where Mr. Piercy argues that the 1982 ordinance is invalid. First, the cases cited by Co-
Defendant, including Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 
688 P.2d 1191 (Ct. App. 1984), deal with the situation where a plaintiff seeks relief. The cases 
show how the respective courts determine that a non-party must be joined in order for the 
plaintiff to obtain.the relief sought in the complaint. That is not the situation in the present case. 
Here, Plaintiffs have sued Defendants for their personal injuries caused by a collision 
between the vehicle they were in and Mr. Piercy's bull. In order to obtain complete relief as 
contemplated by Rule 19, Canyon County does not need to be joined. Plaintiffs have not alleged 
any wrongdoing on the part of Canyon County, without whom relief could not be obtained. 
Therefore, Canyon County does not need to be joined. 
Here, there is a defendant asserting as part of his defense that a county ordinance is 
invalid by motion practice. This is factually distinguishable from the cited cases. No cases 
could be found where Rule 19 was used to join a non-party for determination of an issue in 
motion practice; nor could any case be found where a non-party was forced to be joined an 
action where the plaintiff could not obtain relief from that non-party. Because of the factual and 
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procedural differences in this matter vis-a-vis the cases cited by Co-Defendant, Canyon County 
does not need to be joined in this matter. 
Second, established case law in Idaho does not require the joinder of a county when 
determining the validity of a herd district ordinance. The procedural facts of this matter are 
identical to those found in Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 745 P.2d 294 (1987). In Miller, the 
defendant, E. Paul Miller, "argued that since a large portion of BLM ground was included in 
the herd district that the entire herd district ordinance was void." 113 Idaho at 416, 745 P.2d 
at 295. The District Court did not agree, which led to the appeal. After discussion regarding 
the proper manner in which to establish a herd district by the Bannock County Commissioners 
and the actions taken by the District Court to eliminate BLM lands from the subject herd district, 
Id. at 417-8, 745 P.2d at 296-7, the Supreme Court of Idaho held, "The district court properly 
should have simply ruled that the herd district was invalid due to the inclusion of BLM land. " 
Id. at 418, 745 P.2d at 297 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court did not rule that Bannock 
County needed to be a party to the case in order for the District Court to determine that the herd 
district was invalid. Instead, it held that the District Court could "simply rule". 
In the very next paragraph in Miller, the Supreme Court stated: 
An additional issue raised by E. Paul was that the area in which the events 
occurred was "open range" and pursuant to I.C. § 25.-2402 could not be included 
within a herd district. Our first holding that the herd district was invalid due to 
the inclusion of BLM land makes it unnecessary to discuss this issue. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court did not hold that Bannock County needed to be a 
party to the action for it to rule the herd district invalid. Because the county had improperly 
created the herd district due to BLM land being included within its boundaries, the Court ruled 
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the herd district invalid. The county did not need to be joined for the determination of validity 
to be made. 
Here, we have the identical situation. Defendant Dale Piercy has argued that the 1982 
ordinance, by creating one herd district for the whole of Canyon County contains BLM lands, 
should be found invalid. Following the holding in Miller, '[t]he district court properly should 
... simply rule[] that the herd district was invalid due to the inclusion of BLM land." Canyon 
County does not need to be joined as a party to this action for the Court to rule on the present 
Motion for Summary Judgment concerning the validity of the 1982 ordinance. 
Further, the Co-Defendant attempts to argue that Canyon County will be prejudiced by 
the Court voiding the ordinance. Should Canyon County not agree with the Court's ruling 
voiding the ordinance it is not bound as admitted by Co-Defendant. The voiding of this 
ordinance would simply require Canyon County Commissioners to make a new herd district that 
is compliant with the law. Since, the County no longer must have a landowner petition it would 
likely be a simple solution to pass a new ordinance. There is simply no danger of significant 
prejudice to Canyon County. 
If the Court does find that Canyon County is a necessary party, Defendant Piercy moves 
that the Court aliow him to join Canyon County as a party. Despite the passage of time from 
the date set by th~ scheduling order, it would be very prejudicial to Defendant Piercy, who has 
rightfully relied on Miller for the proposition that the County did not be included to dismiss his 
motion on that basis. 
B. The Court's Decision will not be an Advisory Opinion. 
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Co-Defendant asserts that any decision by the Court without the inclusion of Canyon 
County in this matter will result in an advisory opinion which will have no effect upon the non-
party county. See Opposition, pp. 11-2. Co-Defendant cites to Ostman v. St. John's Episcopal 
Hosp., 918 F.Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) to support this proposition. However, Ostman has 
only been followed by one other case, Case v. Sobol, et al., 988 F.Supp. 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
In both cases, plaintiffs sought monetary relief from non-party states. No other cases were 
found which adhered to this holding. 
Because the Court can rule on the 1982 ordinance's validity without the inclusion of 
Canyon County, Miller, supra, any decision by the Court on this matter will not be considered 
an advisory opinion. If the Court declares the ordinance invalid, it will have an enforceable 
affect upon Canyon County. Id. What Canyon County does to reinstate herd district status to 
the applicable areas of the cqunty is not at issue here. As in Miller, once the herd district is 
considered invalid, it is invalid. This would not be an advisory opinion. 
C. Co-Defendant and Plaintiffs Have not met Their Burden of Proof to Establish the 
Doctrine of Estoppel by Laches. 
The doctrine of estoppel by !aches does not prevent Defendant Piercy from asserting his 
motion for summary judgment. 
rights, 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
Like quasi-estoppel, !aches is an affirmative defense and the party asserting the defense 
has the burden of proof. Whether or not a party is guilty of !aches is a question of fact. 
(citation omitted). The necessary elements to maintain a defense of !aches are: 
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiff's rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiff's 
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) 
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lack of 
injury 
the suit 
knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) 
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or 
is not held to be barred. 
Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 449, 915 P.2d 6, 11 (1996). (citation omitted). 
Because the doctrine of !aches is founded in equity, in determining whether the doctrine 
applies, consideration must be given to all surrounding circumstances and acts of the 
parties. (citation omitted). The lapse of time alone is not controlling on whether !aches 
applies. (citation omitted). 
Thomas v. Arkhoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002). 
Co-Defendant and Plaintiff have failed to provide evidence establishing the elements required 
to make a claim of laches. The only evidence provided is that Plaintiffs, Co-Defendant and 
some police officers thought that it was illegal for cows to be on the roadway. This belief has 
nothing to do with any of the elements of laches. 
First, thete must be an invasion of the rights of the non-moving party by the moving 
party. Defendant Piercy has never asserted that Plaintiffs or Co-Defendant invaded any of his 
rights. The rights to a person in open range is immunity from liability when a car collides with 
their livestock. The elements of laches requires proof of a previous invasion of rights, not an 
invasion of rights if the Court does not grant the relief requested by the non-moving party. 
Therefore, the laches claim violates the first element of a claim of !aches. 
The second element involves a delay in asserting a right. Defendant Piercy's right to 
immunity from liability did not even arise until Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant had the accident 
involving his animal. Defendant Piercy asserted his right to immunity from liability in his 
Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint. Defendant Piercy quickly asserted his rights in this matter. 
Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant have not provided any evidence to the contrary. 
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Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant have also not provided any evidence concerning the third 
element of !aches, which requires that they prove that Co-Defendants and Plaintiffs had no 
knowledge that Defendant Piercy would assert his rights. Co-Defendants and Plaintiff had 
knowledge from the instigation of this lawsuit that Defendant Piercy was planning to assert his 
rights. 
Essentially, Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant are relying on the passage of time to base their 
arguments. The Thomas case states that this is not a sole basis for granting this affirmative 
defense. In fact, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a Trial Court's ruling to invalidate a 66-
year-old ordinance. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir and Canal Co., 123 
Idaho 634, 851 P.2d 348 (1993). This case states that despite evidence that the movant had 
relied on the state of the law for 66 years, was not evidence enough to establish laches. Id. at 
637. 851 P.2d 348, 351. 
Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant often make global assertions such as "The entirety of Canyon 
County has followed the "fence in" rule of the herd district . . . , for 25 years", and that "Piercy 
has benefitted from herd district status, as his lands have not been subject to depredations from 
the at large cattle of his neighbors." (Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Opposition to Defendant Dale 
Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment at 14-15.) These assertions, however, are without any 
evidence. Plaintiffs and Co-Defendants have not provided any proof to establish that the 
doctrine of laches should apply. It is simply not applicable in this case. 
D. The Miller Case is Dispositive of the Treatment of Herd Districts That are Invalid. 
In Co-Defendant's second brief, which was untimely, it is argued for the first time that 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' AND CO-DEFENDANT'S RESPONDING MEMORANDUMS 
AND MOTION TO STRIKE CO-DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF- 25 
442 
this Court should ignore the precedent set by the Miller and instead only partially revoke the 
herd district attempted to be created by the 1982 ordinance. Co-Defendant is asking the Court 
to redefine what. the herd district is and what its effect will have upon those within the herd 
district, which is just the type of legislating that is forbidden by the Miller case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The evidence and law establish that the 1982 ordinance was void from its inception. The 
subject pasture and bull were in open range at the time of the accident. Idaho Code § 25-2118, 
provides Defendant Piercy with immunity from suit. The Court should grant Defendant Piercy's 
motion for summary judgment. 
DATED this 30th day of August 2007. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA, an individual, and 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE PIERCY, an individual, and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-2005-4848 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, JOINING CANYON 
COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER 
MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THE 
HERD DISTRICT'S VALIDITY IS 
RESOLVED 
This is a civil matter. Defendant Dale Piercy (Piercy) fil~d a Motion for Summary 
Judgment (motion) on May 2, 2007, with supporting Memorandum, affidavits, and 
exhibits. Essentially, Piercy asks this court, as a matter of law, to rule Canyon County 
contains no herd districts, although Canyon County is not currently a party to this 
litigation. He also filed supplemental Memorandums on July 9, 2007; July 31, 2007; and 
August 9, 2007. Plaintiff Erika Rivera (Rivera) and Luis Guzman (Guzman) filed their 
opposition to Piercy's motion on July 20, 2007, followed by Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
(Sutton), who filed her opposition to Piercy's motion on July 24, 2007. 
The court heard oral argument on September 6, 2007. Mr. Rod Saetrum 
presented extensive and insightful oral argument on behalf of Piercy. Equally extensive 
and insightful, Mr. Timothy Walton argued on behalf of Rivera and Guzman, while Mr. 
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Josh Evett argued on behalf of Sutton, principally arguing that Canyon County must be 
joined in order for this court to decide the issue of the herd district's existence. Based 
upon the "facts" presented, the law tendered, and the arguments of counsel, this court 
denies Piercy's motion. However, on the issue of punitive damages, this court will hold 
that in abeyance until the issue of the herd district is resolved after the joinder of 
Canyon County. 
While the court has resisted the notion of joining Canyon County, it reluctantly 
concludes that in order to resolve the issue of the herd district in a meaningful way 
before the parties try this action to a jury, there exists no other feasible way to directly 
address the issue. Accordingly, although Piercy raises the issue of the validity of 
Canyon County herd districts very late in the process, the court still concludes joining 
Canyon County in this litigation is necessary. Moreover, while it may be necessary to 
vacate the currently trial setting, once the issue of the herd district is settled following 
the joinder of its proponent, Canyon County, this court will put this matter on a "fast 
track" for a reset. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Contrary to the assertion of Piercy's counsel, this court cannot find as a matter of 
law that the presumption of a herd district has been overcome with the "facts" 
presented. That does not necessarily translate, however, to the notion that for the 
purposes of this litigation, one in fact does exist, at least to the extent the court need no 
longer consider it. Regrettably, the parties have not "shaped the battle" for the court to 
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take the herd district issue head-on, as Piercy asks via the summary judgment process. 
At the heart of the hundreds of pages of filings in support and in opposition to the 
summary judgment motion lies Piercy's request: he asks this court to invalidate herd 
districts created by the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 and 1908. This court is 
not prepared to honor that request, for it asks the court to rewrite history, or, at the very 
least, to rewrite a "presumed" history; and this court abhors revisionism in any form. On 
the other hand, the court does have a keen interest in the truth of the matter. 
During much of the twentieth century, various Canyon County Boards of 
Commissioners created herd districts in different Canyon County locations. In 1982, the 
Board of Canyon County Commissioners enacted a final order intending to convert the 
remaining "open range" land in Canyon County to herd district status. Piercy complains 
the board's order failed to comply with the clear requirements of Idaho Code §25-2401 
et seq. Piercy also makes the underpinning of his procedural complaint clear. If this 
court invalidates the herd district status in the area of the accident at the center of this 
litigation, this effectively eliminates his liability, since his bull would have escaped from 
"open range." See e.g., Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 152 P.3d 558 (2007), 
overruling Soran v. Schoess/er, 87 Idaho 425, 394 P.2d 160 (1964). 
There remains no mystery, then, why Piercy takes strong issue with the 
procedures followed by the Canyon County Commissioners in December 1982. Both 
parties have provided this court with the recorded actions of the board. For example, it 
is undisputed that the board issued the following resolution, approved on December 2, 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
JOINING CANYON COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE 
UNTIL THE HERD DISTRICT'S VALIDITY IS RESOLVED- Page 3 
447 
1982, as found in the minutes of the Board of Canyon County Commissioners in Book 
27, Page 207 in the Canyon County Recorder's Office. 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS 
IN CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the 
Canyon County Board of Commissioners on the 2nd day of 
December, 1982: Upon motion of Commissioner Hozba and 
the second by commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as 
follows: That because of the confusion that exists due to the 
over-lapping lines of herd districts and open range and 
because over ninety-five (95%) percent of the area of 
Canyon County is already designated a herd district the 
Board will issue an order designating all of Canyon County 
to be herd district as of December 14, 1982. Motion Carried 
Unanimously. 
It is also undisputed that the Board issued the following order, as found in the 
Canyon County Recorder's Office and the Office of the Canyon County Commissioners. 
ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT 
The Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd 
District Boundaries throughout the County and has 
determined, by resolution, that the time has come to simplify 
and unify the status of Herd Districts in Canyon County. In 
making this determination the Board has found the following: 
1. A survey map, attached to the Order on file in the Recorder's 
Office, prepared by the Planning and Zoning Administrator 
designates the three small areas within the County which 
remain open range. 
2. That map shows that over 95% of the land within the County 
is now in Herd District status. 
3. Through the years confusion has existed because of 
overlapping boundary lines and indefinite District boundary 
descriptions. 
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4. Canyon County has reached the stage of urban 
development which destroys the original purpose and 
usefulness of the concept of open range. 
5. The mobility of our citizens has increased to the point at 
which it becomes necessary that Herd District status exist 
throughout the County. 
Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the board of Canyon County 
Commissioners on this 10th day of December, 1982, that a 
Herd District be established in the three remaining open 
range areas in Canyon County as shown on the survey map 
filed with this Order in the Recorder's Office (Marked in 
black), to the end that the entire land area of Canyon County 
be placed in Herd District Status. 
Finally, Piercy alleges the board failed to cause the publication of this Order in 
the Idaho Press Tribune on December 20, 1982, as set out in the Affidavit of Dawn 
McClure and the accompanying CD (containing a PDF file without authentication) as to 
which newspaper and on what date the paper published this information. 
The procedural history, as it relates to the numerous Complaints and the most 
recent application to amend for punitive damages purposes in this case, is set forth in 
this Court's Order of April 27, 2007. After entry of that Order, Plaintiffs filed a Third 
Amended Complaint alleging the conduct of the defendants was reckless and/or willful. 
The Third Amended Complaint also eliminates the parents and natural guardians of 
Erika Rivera and Luis Guzman as plaintiffs to the action. 
On July 20, 2007, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1604, Rivera and Guzman filed a 
Motion to Amend the Complaint, seeking to include a claim for punitive damages 
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against Defendant Piercy. The court also heard oral argument on this motion on 
September 6, 2007. Mr. Andrew Chasan presented argument on behalf of Rivera and 
Guzman. Mr. Ryan Peck argued on behalf of Piercy against the motion to amend. Mr. 
Josh Evett, counsel for Jennifer Sutton, was present at the hearing, but offered no 
argument on this issue. As noted, however, the court should hold this issue in 
abeyance until a resolution comes at the trial level concerning the Canyon County herd 
district's validity. Compare Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 418, 745 P.2d 294, 297 
(1987) 1 with Marchbanks v. Roll, 142Idaho117, 119-20, 124 P.3d 993, 995-96 (2005).2 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Summary Judgment in General 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
and affidavits on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. l.R.C.P. 56(c); City of Idaho Falls v. 
Home Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 604, 606, 888 P.2d 383, 386 (1995). At all times, the 
burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests upon the moving 
party. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 
(1991). Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
1 Holding that the inclusion of SLM land in a county herd district invalidates that district; note especially 
Shepard, C.J., in dissent, commenting that Miller has effectively overruled Benewah County Cattlemen's 
Assoc., Inc., v. Board of County Commissioners of Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983). 
2 Where Schroeder, C.J., would not allow a challenge to the Canyon County herd district's validity in view 
of the parties stipulating at the trial in magistrate court concerning its validity. Appellants raised the issue 
of validity for the first time on appeal to the district court, then the Idaho Supreme Court. Appellants' 
counsel asked both reviewing courts to take "judicial. notice" that Canyon County contains BLM lands. 
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party resisting the motion. Id.; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Nevertheless, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving 
party must anchor its case in something more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of 
evidence does not create a genuine issue. Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 
853, 727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 1986). Put another way, the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations contained in the 
pleadings; rather, the non-moving party must produce evidence by way of affidavit or 
deposition to contradict the assertions of the moving party. Ambrose v. Buhl School 
Dist. #412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, _1091 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Herein, the "battle of the affidavits" has raised issues of material fact. Hence, the 
presumption of the herd district's validity pursuant to the Idaho Code, so far, carries the 
day for the plaintiffs. This court rejects affidavits in support of Piercy's motion that simply 
imply the absence of something otherwise required to create a valid herd district. The 
court further rejects any affidavits advancing the notion "we cannot find it, therefore it 
does not exist," in view of the presumption of validity of any and all Canyon County herd 
district ordinances. 
B. Herd Districts and Their Presumption of Validity 
Before this court considers the merits of Piercy's claims on the invalidity of the 
herd district at issue, the court must recognize the standards set forth in Idaho Code 
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§31-857, which presumes the validity of a herd district, if not challenged within two (2) 
years. 3 
School, road, herd and other districts--Presumption of 
validity of creation or dissolution 
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or 
other district has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, 
declared to be created, established, disestablished, 
dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county 
commissioners in any county of the state of Idaho, a legal 
prima facie presumption is hereby declared to exist, after a 
lapse of two (2) years from the date of such order, that all 
proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of 
such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to 
warrant said board in making said order, and the burden of 
proof shall rest upon the party who shall deny, dispute, or 
question the validity of said order_to show that any of such 
preceding proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not 
properly or regularly taken; and such prima facie 
presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the 
state of Idaho. 
Idaho Code§ 31-857. 
Thus, Piercy has the burden of convincing this court that the board followed 
improper procedures, such that this court should overturn the herd district created in 
1982 after twenty-five (25) years of existence. Indeed, this constitutes an onerous task. 
Idaho case law strongly favors the validity of ordinances and statutes. See e.g., City of 
Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 303 P.2d 680 (1956), and Hecla Min. Co. v. 
Idaho State Tax Com'n, 108 Idaho 147, 697 P.2d 1161 (1985). 
The extent of Piercy's burden is set forth in Idaho Rule of Evidence 301. IRE 301 
states, "The burden of going forward is satisfied by the introduction of evidence 
3 In 1982, Idaho Code§ 31-857 allowed for a challenge to the validity of a district within five (5) years. 
However, the Legislature amended Idaho Code§ 31-857 in 1989 for the current two (2) year window for 
challenge. 
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sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the presumed fact does not exist. 
If the party against whom a presumption operates fails to meet the burden of going 
forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved." (Emphasis supplied). 
C. The Statutes at Issue 
At the time of the December 1982 Canyon County Ordinance at issue, the 1968 
version of Idaho Code §25-2401 et seq. established the criteria for creating a herd 
district. This set of statutes gives the board of county commissioners in a particular 
county the right to create herd districts, and sets forth procedures by which the board 
would create such districts. The three relevant statutes follow: 
l.C. 25-2402 Petition for district 
A majority of the landowners in any area or district described 
by metes and bounds not including open range and who are 
resident in, and qualified electors of, the state of Idaho may 
petition the board of county commissioners in writing to 
create such area a herd district. Such petition shall describe 
the boundaries of the said proposed herd district, and shall 
designate what animals of the species of horses, mules, 
asses, cattle, swine, sheep and goats it is desired to prohibit 
from running at large, also prohibiting said animals from 
being herded upon the public highways in such a district; 
and shall designate that the herd district shall not apply to 
nor cover livestock, excepting swine, which shall roam, drift 
or stray from open range into the district unless the district 
shall be inclosed by lawful fences and cattle guards in roads 
penetrating the district as to prevent livestock, excepting 
swine, from roaming, drifting, or straying from open range 
into the district: and may designate the period of the year 
during which it is desired to prohibit such animals from 
running at large, or being herded on the highways. 
Provided, any herd district heretofore established shall retain 
its identity, geographic definition, and remain in full force and 
effect, until vacated or modified hereafter as provided by 
section 25-2404, Idaho Code, as amended. 
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Idaho Code §25-2402 (1968) (Emphasis supplied). 
l.C. 25-2403 Notice of hearing petition (1968) 
It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners, 
after such petition has been filed, to set a date for hearing 
said petition, notice of which hearing shall be given by 
posting notices thereof in three (3) conspicuous places in the 
proposed herd district, and by publication for two (2) weeks 
previous to said hearing in a newspaper published in the 
county nearest the proposed herd district. 
Idaho Code §25-2403 (1968) 
l.C. 25-2404 Order creating district (1968) 
At such hearing, if satisfied that a majority of the landowners 
owning more than fifty per cent (50%) of the land in said 
proposed herd district who are resident in, and qualified 
electors of, the state of Idaho are in favor of the enforcement 
of the herd law therein, and that it would be beneficial to 
such district, the board of commissioners shall make an 
order creating such herd district, in accordance with the 
prayer of the petition, or with such modifications as it may 
choose to make. Such order shall specify a certain time at 
which it shall take effect, which time shall be at least thirty 
(30) days after the making of said order; and said order shall 
continue in force, according to the terms thereof, until the 
same shall be vacated or modified by the board of 
commissioners, upon the petition of a majority of the 
landowners owning more than fifty per cent (50%) of the land 
in said district who are resident in, and qualified electors of, 
the state of Idaho. 
Idaho Code §25-2404 (1968) 
The lessons gleaned from these sections of the Idaho Code inform this court as 
follows: 
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• A majority of landowners may petition for a herd district; 
• If such petition is made, it will set forth the metes and bounds description of the 
requested district, the animals to be included or exempt from the herd district; 
• Notice is to be given in three (3) locations and published in a newspaper in the 
county of the proposed district for two (2) prior to the hearing; 
• The board of commissioners may create a herd district by order either "in 
accordance with the prayer of the petition, or with such modifications as it may 
choose to make" 
• An order creating a herd district shall specify a date, after 30 days, when the 
district will take effect. 
Piercy argues that the order as entered by the Commissioners, and as set forth 
above, is invalid because it fails to reference the landowner petition; it doesn't provide a 
metes and bounds description of the herd districts to be created; it fails to provide which 
breeds of animals are subject to the herd district; and finally, it fails to set forth an date 
when the herd district went into effect. Piercy contends these flaws overcome the 
presumption of validity of the herd district; hence, this court must strike it down. 
D. The Missing Petition 
The bulk of Piercy's argument against the validity of the herd district arises from 
the fact that no one knows if a majority of the landowner presented their petition to the 
board of commissioners prior to the entry of this particular order. It appears from the 
filings that Piercy has attempted to find such petition and has been unable to do so. In 
addition, because the order fails to reference any landowner petition, Piercy argues, that 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
JOINING CANYON COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE 
UNTIL THE HERD DISTRICT'S VALIDITY IS RESOLVED-Page 11 
455 
,, 
translates to one never existing in the first place, thus generating the battle of the 
affidavits.4 In support of his argument, Piercy offers the Affidavits of Glenn Koch and 
E.G. Johnson. Glenn Koch is the sole living commissioner from 1982. In rebuttal, 
Plaintiffs offer the Affidavits of the same Glenn Koch (he can apparently see both sides 
of the issue) and Bill Staker, former county clerk. 
Glenn Koch asserts to the effect in both affidavits that he cannot recall if the 
board received a petition submitted by landowners for a herd district. He does state, 
however, that the commissioners in office in 1982 took their jobs very seriously and 
always attempted to follow the law in duty performance. (Compare Koch affidavit of 
July 3, 2007 with Koch affidavit of June 11, 2007). Bill Staker, the Clerk in 1982, also 
echoes the commitment to follow the law theme in his affidavit. He further asserts that 
he cannot recall whether the board received a petition. (Affidavit of June 14, 2007). 
The Affidavit of E.G. Johnson informs the court that Mr. Johnson is a long-time 
resident of Canyon County and landowner in Canyon County in the area and at the time 
of the 1982 herd district ordinance. It further informs that he did not sign a petition in 
4 There may be a good explanation for why no one has located a petition from twenty-five years ago: 
there appears to be no requirement under the code to keep it of record. A careful reading of Idaho Code 
§31-708 (Duties of clerk) and Idaho Code §31-709 (Records to be kept) informs with specificity what the 
county clerk must generate vis-a-vis records, and what the board must "cause to be kept permanently 
and indefinitely." Idaho Code §31-708.7 comprises the only section under the clerk's duties dealing with 
the preservation of petitions and applications. However, that specifically deals with "franchises," and this 
court concludes that a petition for a herd district is not a petition or application for a franchise. 
Nevertheless, even if a county clerk has the duty to "preserve and file" a petition for a herd district, under 
Idaho Code §31-709, there appears to be no duty to keep it "permanently and indefinitely." The only 
"keeping" required under part 6 is "Ordinance records, containing all ordinances, stating the date 
enacted." It seems the "ordinance record" means the ordinances with a statement of when the board 
enacted them. The statute sets forth no specific directions to keep any petition that might have driven the 
board to enact a herd district ordinance. Yet, even if the statute did require a board to keep a petition 
"permanently and indefinitely," and a board failed to do so, that still does not vitiate the presumption of 
validity or mean an ordinance otherwise validly enacted in the first instance becomes invalid. 
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1982, nor did he have notice that the commissioners considered the creation of such a 
herd district until after they created a herd district. (Affidavit of July 18, 2007). 
From these affidavits, this court is only able to determine that none of the living 
county officials who would have taken an active part in the process can recall whether 
interested landowners petitioned the board for a herd district, and that one of the land 
owners did not sign a petition to create (or consolidate) a herd district. On the other 
hand, while neither the Resolution nor the Order in question refers to a specific 
landowner petition, the Order does state, "The Board has again reviewed the complexity 
of the Herd District Boundaries ... " This court focuses on the language of "again 
reviewed" in conjunction with the fact that it cannot be clearly determined one way or 
the other whether the board performed this review at the request of a majority of 
landowners. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated a court will not presume a procedural 
irregularity in the face of silence as to the procedures taken. See Garrett Transfer & 
Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 33 P.2d 743 (1933). Thus, despite Piercy's 
arguments to the contrary, no party has presented this court with evidence showing that 
no petition existed-at least to the extent it overcomes the presumption of validity. 
Therefore, Piercy's argument and "evidence" falls short of the mark.5 
E. The Missing Metes and Bounds Description 
5 There is a bigger issue, however, for purposes of time lapse. While the place Piercy's bull "escaped" 
may be the 1982 herd district area, where the collision took place with Piercy's bull is apparently an area 
a former board put into herd district status in 1908. See Piercy's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated May 1, 2007, page 12. 
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Idaho Code §25-2402, as it stood in 1982, stated that a landowner's petition for a 
herd district "shall describe the boundaries of the said proposed herd district." Piercy 
argues that this language imposed on the Commissioners a duty to include metes and 
bounds legal property description in the Order creating the herd district at issue here. 
However, Idaho Code §25-2404 also provides that "commissioners shall make 
an order creating such herd district, in accordance with the prayer of the petition, or with 
such modifications as it may choose to make." (Emphasis supplied). Even if one or 
more landowners presented a petition to the Commissioners containing a metes and 
bounds description, the commissioners, by statute, did not have to use a metes and 
bounds description in their order in order to create it. 
The language of the order tells the court that the commissioners intended to limit 
the herd district created in 1982 to three small areas of remaining open range in Canyon 
County. The order states, "A survey map, attached to the Order on file in the 
Recorder's Office, prepared by the Planning and Zoning Administrator designates the 
three small areas within the County which remain open range," and "a Herd District be 
established in the three remaining open range areas in Canyon County as shown on the 
survey map filed with this Order." (Emphasis supplied). The commissioners also 
apparently recognized this action would place the entirety of Canyon County in a herd 
district, because the rest of the county already had herd district status. This court does 
not read this language to the effect that the commissioners were creating a "giant" herd 
district in their 1982 ordinance. Rather, they seem to be filling in the gaps so that in 
Canyon County (at least over the area they had jurisdiction) no open range would exist. 
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The court does not to say the intended effect would not be a "giant" herd district; rather, 
the 1982 ordinance simply did not describe all of Canyon County as being one large 
herd district. 
Piercy makes much of the fact that the survey map referenced in the order may 
or may not exist today, and without such map, no metes and bounds description exists 
for the herd districts thus created. Piercy avers this supplies the proof positive of his 
contention theory of the invalidity of Canyon County's herd districts. Again, this court 
declines Piercy's invitation to require a metes and bounds description in the order. The 
court further declines the invitation to invalidate the herd district created by the order 
based on a lack of legal description, given that the commissioners indicated the limited 
land area to be included in the newly created herd districts to the three small areas 
indicated on the survey map. As previously noted, this court does not adopt the "we-
cannot-find-it-so-it-never-existed" theory advanced by Piercy. Accordingly, as a matter 
of law, this court cannot determine that the herd district created by the 1982 Order is 
invalid for lacking a metes and bounds description. 
F. The Notice Requirement 
Idaho Code §25-2403 sets out the notice requirements for a hearing by the 
commissioners on a petition to create a herd district. The board must cause the posting 
of notice in three conspicuous places in the proposed herd district and by publication for 
two weeks prior to a hearing on the issue in a newspaper in the county of the proposed 
herd district. Idaho Code § 25-2403. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
JOINING CANYON COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE 
UNTIL THE HERD DISTRICT'S VALIDITY IS RESOLVED- Page 15 
459 
Piercy asks this court to invalidate the 1982 Order and the resulting herd districts 
because no notice apparently exists in the archives of the Idaho Press Tribune during 
the period of November 10, 1982 and December 20, 1982. (Affidavit of Dawn McClure). 
The affidavit of E.G. Johnson is also provided to the court as evidence that no notice 
existed because Mr. Johnson states, "I would have received information about the 
proposed herd district prior to the hearing if such information had been available." 
(Affidavit of E.G. Johnson). 
However, Plaintiffs, through the Affidavit of Deborah Schrecongost, inform the 
court that the Idaho Press Tribune was not the only newspaper in existence in Canyon 
County in 1982. Schrecongost indicates that The Parma Review was published in 
Canyon County from 1909 to 1993. No party provides the court with information 
concerning whether the county published notices of ordinances in this newspaper. 
Moreover, it is conceivable that while the board signed the Resolution and Order 
in December 1982, that the hearing on the issue may have occurred at some point prior 
to December 1982. It is also clear from the language of the Order that this was ri"ot the 
first time that the board confronted this issue as the Commissioners state in the Order, 
"The Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd District Boundaries." While 
Piercy is unable to find notice for the November to December 1982 time period in one 
newspaper published in the county at the time of the Order, this court, cannot based on 
this evidence alone, invalidate the herd districts. Piercy has failed to overcome the 
presumption of validity on this issue based upon the "fact" presented. 
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G. The Date of Effect 
Idaho Code § 25-2404 requires an order to create a herd district to include a 
specific date, thirty days after the entry of the order, at which time the herd district will 
take effect. Clearly, the Order at issue here does not contain such language, which 
opens the door to Piercy's argument that the Order has never taken effect. The 
Resolution passed by the Commissioners does give an effective date of December 14, 
1982. However, the "proponent agency" of the herd district, Canyon County, has not 
had an opportunity to deal with this issue. Again, it is one thing for a bull to escape from 
an area that is "open range," but there is every indication the accident occurred in an 
area that constituted a herd district in 1908. None of the parties have presented to this 
court anything on the consequences of this dynamic. 
H. BLM Land 
Finally, the parties ask this court to determine the validity of the herd district on 
the issue of whether the district purports to incorporate SLM lands. It appears Piercy 
contests the validity of the herd district where he pastured his bull (presumably created 
in 1982) and further contests the validity of the herd district created in 1908 where the 
accident occurred. Piercy's argument appears to suggest the board created a single 
giant herd district throughout the county, thus acting improperly, due to Canyon County 
containing SLM lands, which cannot be regulated by the county. While this court 
disagrees with Piercy's view the board created "one giant herd district" in 1982, the 
court still addresses the matter. 
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The foundation for Piercy's argument comes from Idaho Code§ 25-2402, set out 
above. The addition to the statute set out below forms the basis of Piercy's argument: 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the 
contrary, no herd district established before or after July 1, 
1983, shall: 
(a) Contain any lands owned by the United States of 
America, and managed by the department of the interior, 
bureau of land management, or its successor agency, upon 
which lands the grazing of livestock has historically been 
permitted. 
Idaho Code §25-2402 (1983)(Emphasis supplied). 
Under this statute, as amended, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated a herd 
district ordinance created by the Bannock County Commissioners because it contained 
BLM land. Miller v. Miller, supra. There, the Bannock County board purported, in May 
1984, to create a herd district encompassing the parties' (Millers) land and containing 
BLM land. The district court determined that under Idaho Code § 25-2401 et seq., the 
herd district was invalid as to the portions containing BLM land but otherwise upheld the 
herd district as created. The Supreme Court found that the district court's decision was 
at odds with Idaho Code § 25-2402(2) which prohibits a board of county commissioners 
from creating a herd district that includes BLM lands. The herd district in its entirety was 
found to be invalid because the Commissioners acted "outside the dictates" of the 
s~atute. Id. at419, 745 P.2d at297. 
The situation facing this court is unlike Miller. The board passed the ordinance 
before this court in 1982, prior to the amendment of Idaho Code§ 25-2402. In addition, 
while the statute, as amended, purports to apply to herd districts established before July 
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1, 1983, nothing in the amendatory language clearly indicates a legislative intent to 
invalidate all previously established herd districts containing federal land historically 
used for grazing. Idaho Code§ 73-101 clearly states that no statute is to be retroactive 
unless expressly so declared. See also State ex rel. Wasden v. Daice/ Chemical 
Industries, Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 (2005). Thus, while a court might 
construe the language "established before July 1, 1983" retroactivity, it does not rise to 
the level of express declaration to invalidate all previously established herd districts 
throughout the state, no matter how long established, that happen to contain BLM 
administered lands meeting the other definitional requirements of the amendment. 
Therefore, this court will not apply the language of Idaho Code § 25-2402(2) 
retroactively to the effect of automatically invalidating the herd district created by the 
1982 Order and the 1908 herd district. After all, does it seem reasonable the legislature 
really sought, in 1982, to undo the ordinances in forty-four Idaho counties after (then) 
seventy-five years of carving out herd districts? Especially since the current law (as 
amended in 1996) clearly states "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any 
herd district or herd ordinance in full force and effect prior to January 1, 1990, but shall 
apply to any modification thereof." Idaho Code§ 25-2401 (1996)(Emphasis supplied).6 
Despite this court's interpretation of the statute and retroactivity, there still exists 
a factual issue concerning whether the herd districts at issue here (1908 and 1982 
6 The significance of this language should be apparent. First, Piercy argues that since Canyon County 
contains lands owned by the United States of America, managed by BLM, where historical livestock 
grazing took place, the 1982 ordinance is void. However, the BLM amendment did not go into effect until 
July 1, 1983. Second, Piercy argues that since Canyon County herd districts (or, in his words, the "giant 
herd district) contain state lands, the Canyon County herd district(s) are (is) void. Yet again, the 
prohibition against herd districts containing state land did not go into effect until July 1, 1990. Both of 
these prohibitions come after the 1982 Canyon County Herd District Ordinance. 
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districts) actually contain federal land in violation of the statute as it now reads. In 
support of the theory that the herd districts contain federal BLM land, Piercy offers not 
one, but two, Affidavits of Rosemary Thomas, along with the Affidavits of Dennis Sorrell 
and Affidavit of Jerry Deal to show there is state land in the herd districts. Plaintiffs also 
offer an Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas to refute Piercy's contention that BLM land exists 
in the herd district where the accident occurred. Hence, a material fact immediately 
pops up, provided, that issue is even relevant. While Piercy says it is and every other 
party to the action indicate their doubts, the proponent of the herd district in the first 
instance, namely, Canyon County, had not had a vote in the debate. 
Furthermore, while the May 8, 2007, Affidavit of BLM Field Manager Rosemary 
Thomas provides the court with a map demonstrating that BLM grazing land exists in 
Canyon County, along with the statement that these lands are currently and historically 
used for grazing, in reviewing the map, this court is only able to determine that sections 
of land outlined in purple intend to indicate BLM allotments. Beyond that, the court is 
unable to glean information to assist it in its determination of whether BLM land 
historically used for grazing and the herd districts at issue overlap. 
Then, in the May 30, 2007 Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas, submitted by Plaintiffs, 
Thomas provides another map showing a large section of Canyon County in yellow 
(south of the Boise River) to indicate the location of herd districts in Canyon County. 
Thomas further opines that after a review of BLM records, she determined that no BLM 
land exists in the herd districts identified in the yellow and that the earliest records of 
grazing start in 1981. Not to be outdone, however, Piercy submits a third and final 
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Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas, dated August 8, 2007. In this affidavit, Thomas informs 
the court that she determined that the Black Canyon Management Framework Plan 
allowed grazing in Canyon County since 1967. However, upon review of the attached 
exhibit, this court is unable to determine any connection between the document and 
Canyon County, other than the word of Thomas as to its applicability. Frankly, to this 
observer, when one mentions Black Canyon, Gem and Payette Counties come 
immediately to mind, not Canyon County. 
Finally, the Affidavits of Dennis Sorrell and Jerry Deal further purport to show that 
Canyon County contains state land. One, however, must read these affidavits in 
conjunction with the May 2, 2007, Affidavit of Ryan Peck. That latter affidavit provides a 
map required in order to give the Sorrell and Deal affidavits meaning. The alleged 
effect of these affidavits and the map purports to show that the 1908 herd district, 
apparently where the accident occurred, contains state land. However, when one 
reviews the proffered map and affidavits, this court cannot find that the herd districts 
(1982 or 1908) are, as a matter of law, invalid. As stated above, this court is not of the 
opinion that the 1982 Order created one giant herd district-that was simply the affect of 
connecting the final three areas with all the other pre-existing herd districts-and this 
guides the analysis here. Yet, even assuming the 1982 Herd District Ordinance did 
create one giant herd district in Canyon County in December of that year, Piercy has yet 
to answer the "So what?" question. The current law states, as already noted, that "[t]he 
provisions of [the herd district law] shall not apply to any herd district or herd ordinance 
in full force and effect prior to January 1, 1990 .... " Idaho Code § 25-2401 (1996). 
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Because this court has not been given the legal description of the 1908 herd 
district, the allegations of state land included in that district only raises an issue of fact. 
The same is true of the 1982 herd district. Further confounding this court is the lack of 
specificity and detail concerning where the SLM land complained of by Piercy actually 
lies. Hence, the current posture of this litigation leaves the court with herd district 
statutes not cleanly dealt with by the legislature in setting out its intent concerning pre-
existing herd districts where it added certain land prohibitions to district formation, only 
underscored by opposing counsel's argument and briefing. Further, as explained more 
fully below, the court is without the position by the proponent of herd districts in Canyon 
County, the Board of County Commissioners. The board may very well want to make 
its position known before the court goes mucking around in its ordinances. 
I. Joinder of Canyon County 
Defendant Sutton asks this court to join Canyon County as a necessary party to 
this action, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Sutton argues any ruling by 
this court on the validity of the herd district has an impact on the county as the creator of 
the herd district, and the entity that enforces it. On this theme, the court intended 
originally to decline Sutton's invitation, particularly because significant issues of material 
fact exist with regard to the herd district and the motion comes very late in the process. 
Yet, this issue, strategically, is a legal issue this court needs to resolve before the 
parties litigate damages. The resolution of the herd district issue is paramount to 
getting to the issue of damages among the parties. In short, the herd district issue 
becomes the "trial within the trial" before this court can even allow the primary litigants 
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to present evidence to a jury on the issue of damages. Regrettably, this issue comes 
late. Perhaps Piercy intended it that way as a matter of strategy. Nevertheless, it must 
be resolved. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
This court finds and concludes that Piercy has failed to overcome the 
presumption of validity of the herd districts because genuine issues of material fact 
exist. For example, material issues of fact exist whether landowners petitioned the 
board and whether the board gave proper notice of the 1982 ordinance once enacted. 
There also remains unresolved the issue of the 1908 ordinance in relation to whether 
the 1982 ordinance affected its validity. The fact that the proponent of herd districts on 
Canyon County is absent from this litigation exacerbates the lack of resolution. Hence, 
Canyon County should be joined as a third-party defendant, though not for the purpose 
of liability. Rather, Canyon County needs to be a part of this litigation for the limited 
purpose of fully developing the validity of herd districts in the area Piercy's bull escaped 
and in the area where the collision with the bull took place. As a "heads up," the clerk 
should provide a copy of this decision to the Canyon County Prosecutor. Finally, this 
court anticipates that this decision will necessitate the vacation of the current trial date. 
Nevertheless, as the court informed all counsel at the time they argued for or against 
Piercy's motion for summary judgment, circumstances involving a rather serious felony 
matter may have already caused that vacation, apart from this decision. Nevertheless, 
once the issue of Canyon County herd district validity is determined, should the court 
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have to vacate the current trial date, this court will ensure that the parties herein go to 
the "front of the line" for rescheduling purposes. 
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT: 
1. The court denies Piercy's motion for summary judgment. 
2. The court holds in abeyance the issue of another amendment to the 
complaint for punitive damages until the court can determine the validity of herd districts 
in Canyon County. 
3. The court directs the joinder of Canyon County as a third-party defendant 
for the limited purpose of determining whether valid herd districts exist at the locations 
of the bull's escape and the location of the collision between the Sutton automobile and 
Piercy's bull. 
4. The court directs Sutton's counsel to prepare and serve the necessary 
pleadings to join Canyon County, through its Board of Commissioners, as a third-party 
defendant. 
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CERT/FICA TE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on :t_ October 2007 s/he served a true and correct copy of the 
original of the forgoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, JOINING CANYON COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE 
UNTIL CANYON COUNTY HERD DISTRICT VALIDITY IS DETERMINED on the following individuals in 
the manner described: 
• Upon the Canyon County Prosecutor, 
when s/he placed the same into the latter's respective "pick up" boxes at the Canyon County Clerk's 
office, Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho, 
• and upon Rodney R. Saetrum, of SAETRUM LAW OFFICES, 101 S. Capitol Blvd, Boise, Idaho, 
83702, attorneys for Defendant Piercy; and upon 
• Joshua S. Evett of ELAM and BURKE, P.A., PO Box 1539, Boise, Idaho 83701, attorney for 
Defendant Sutton; and upon 
• Timothy C. Walton of CHASAN & WALTON, LLC PO Box 1069 Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 and 
upon Stephen E. Blackburn of BLACKBURN LAW, P.C., 660 E. Franklin Road, Suite 255, 
Meridian 83642, attorneys for the Plaintiffs Rivera and Guzman, 
when s/he caused the same to be deposited into the US Mails, sufficient postage attached, at the 
addresses set forth above. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court 
By:I~ 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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Joshua S. Evett 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Evett - ISB #5587 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA, by and through ) 
LOREE RIVERA, her mother and natural ) 
guardian; and LUIS J. GUZMAN, by and ) 
through BALLARDO GUZMAN, his father ) 
and natural guardian, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
Canyon County, Idaho, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV05-4848 
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY 
WDGMENT 
Pursuant to the Court's Order of October 9, 2007,1 Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
("Defendant Sutton"), by and through her attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., allege and 
assert as follows with respect to Canyon County: 
1 See Order Denying Defendant Piercy' s Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, and 
Holding all Other Motions in Abeyance Until the Herd District's Validity if Resolved. A copy of this Order is 
attached as Exhibit A. 
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II. PARTIES 
1. Jennifer Sutton is an individual and Defendant in Canyon County case number 
CV05-4848. Ms. Sutton resides in Ada County, Idaho. 
2. Dale Piercy is an individual and Defendant in Canyon County case number 
CV05-4848. Mr. Piercy resides in Canyon County, Idaho. 
3. Erika Rivera is an individual and Plaintiff in Canyon County case number CV05-
4848. Ms. Rivera resides in Canyon County, Idaho. 
4. Luis Guzman is an individual and Plaintiff in Canyon County case number CV05-
4848. Mr. Guzman resides in Canyon County, Idaho. 
5. Canyon County is a duly recognized county in the State ofldaho. 
II. JURISDICTION 
6. Jurisdiction in this matter is proper under Idaho Code § 10-120 I. 
III. VENUE 
7. Venue is appropriate under Idaho Code§ 5-403. 
IV. ALLEGATIONS 
8. On March 20, 2005, Plaintiffs Erika Rivera and Luis Guzman were passengers in 
a Volkswagen Jetta being driven by Jennifer Sutton. 
9. While northbound on Warnstad Road, south of Parma, Idaho, the Jetta hit a black 
bull owned by Defendant Dale Piercy. 
10. As a result of the collision, Rivera and Guzman suffered personal injuries, and 
sued Piercy on May 10, 2005. 
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11. Piercy asserted a comparative fault defense against Sutton. Rivera and Guzman 
then sued Sutton and joined her to their case against Piercy. 
12. The accident occurred just south of the Boise River on Wamstad Road in a herd 
district established by the Canyon County Board of Commissioners in 1908. A copy of the 
county ordinance establishing this herd district is attached as Exhibit B. 
13. The bull was pastured north of the Boise River in a herd district established in 
1982. A copy of the county ordinance establishing this herd district is attached as Exhibit C. 
14. In the spring of 2007, defendant Piercy filed a motion for summary judgment in 
which he claimed that the 1982 herd district (where his bull was pastured) and the 1908 herd 
district (where the Jetta hit the bull) were invalid. 
15. Piercy claims that the 1982 herd district is invalid because the ordinance was not 
enacted pursuant to a petition, does not describe the metes and bounds of the district, does not 
describe the types of animals to which the district applies, does not specify a date on which the 
ordinance became effective, and because it includes state and federal land on which grazing has 
historically been permitted. 
16. Piercy claims that the 1908 herd district was invalidated by subsequent legislation 
providing that herd districts cannot contain state or federal land on which grazing has historically 
been permitted. 
17. Rivera and Guzman contend that the 1982 and 1908 herd districts are valid. 
Rivera and Guzman do not challenge the validity of these herd districts. 
18. Sutton contends that the 1982 and 1908 herd districts are valid. Sutton does not 
challenge the validity of these herd districts. 
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19. In response to Piercy's motion for summary judgment, Sutton contended that 
Canyon County is a necessary party, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a)(l), to 
adjudicating the validity of the 1982 and 1908 herd districts. The District Court ordered Canyon 
County joined to this action so that Canyon County can participate in adjudicating Piercy's 
claims that the 1982 and 1908 herd districts are invalid. 
V. CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF 
20. All previous allegations are incorporated herein. 
21. Idaho Code § I 0-120 I empowers the court to declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations. 
22. Idaho Code§ 10-1202 empowers the court to determine any question of 
construction or validity of a municipal ordinance and declare the rights, status or other legal 
relations thereunder. 
23. An actual and justiciable controversy exists in this case regarding the validity of 
the 1982 and 1908 herd districts by reason of Piercy's claim that these districts are invalid and 
his motion requesting that the District Court enter a judgment declaring these districts invalid. 
24. By Order of the Court, Canyon County is a necessary party to the issue of whether 
or not the 1982 and 1908 herd districts are valid. 
25. Piercy requests that the District Court invalidate the 1982 and 1908 herd districts. 
26. Rivera, Guzman, and Sutton request that the District Court uphold the 1982 and 
1908 herd districts. 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Sutton demands a trial by jury in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38(b) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Sutton prays for judgment as follows: 
A. An Order upholding the validity of the 1982 and 1908 herd districts; and 
B. Other and further relief as to the Court seems just and equitable. 
DATED this rJb:_ day of October, 2007. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By ?( ,4 ([(//:) 
Joshua S. Evett 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this fJ/k-aay of October, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Timothy C. Wal ton v U.S. Mail 
Chasan & Walton, LLC Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1069 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 Facsimile 
Stephen E. Blackbum / U.S. Mail 
Blackbum Law, P.C. Hand Delivery 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 Overnight Mail 
Meridian, ID 83642 Facsimile 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
-U U.S. Mail 
Ryan Peck Hand Delivery 
Saetrum Law Offices Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 7425 Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83707 
Joshua S. Evett 
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- 6 
475 
l 
f 
. "') 
' ' 
; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAN~ON 
ERIKA L RIVERA, an individual, and 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, an individual, . 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE PISRCY, an individuali and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-2005-4848 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, JOINING CANYON 
COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER 
MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE UNTIL THE 
HERD DISTRICT'S VALIDITY IS 
RESOLVED : 
This is a civil matter. Defendant Dale Piercy (Piercy) filed a Motion. for Summary 
Judgment (motion) on May 2, 2007, with supporting Memorandum, affidavits, and 
exhibits. Essentially, Piercy asks this court, as a matter of law, to rule Canyon County 
contains no herd districts, although Canyon County is not currently a' party to this 
litigation. He also filed supplemental Memorandums on July 9, 2007; July ~1. 2007; and 
August 9j 2007. Plaintiff Erika Rivera (Rivera) and Luis Guzman (Guzrrian) filed their 
opposition to Piercy's motion on July 20, 2007, followed by Defendant J~nnifer Sutton 
(Sutton), who filed her opposition to Piercy's motion on July 24, 2007. 
The court heard oral argument on September 6, 2007. Mr. Rod Saetrum 
presented extensive and insightful oral argument on behalf of Piercy. Equally extensive 
and insightful, Mr. Timothy Walton argued on behalf of Rivera and Guzman, while Mr. 
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Josh Evett argued on behalf of Sutton1 principally arguing that Canyon County must be 
joined in order for this court to decide the issue of the herd district's existence. Based 
upon the "facts" presented, the law tendered, and the arguments of coun~el, this court 
denies Piercy's motion. However, on the issue of punitive damages, this c'ourt will hold 
that in abeyance until the issue of the herd district is resolved after the joinder of 
Canyon County. 
While the court has resisted the notion of joining Canyon County1 it reluctantly 
concludes that in order to resolve the issue of the herd district in a me:aningful way 
before the parties try this action to a jury, there exists no other feasible w:ay to directly 
address the issue. Accordingly, although Piercy raises the issue of the validity of 
Canyon County herd districts very late in the process, the court still concludes joining 
Canyon County in this litigation is necessary. Moreover, while it may be;necessary to 
vacate the currently trial setting, once the issue of the herd district is settled following 
the joinder of its proponent, Canyon County, this court will put this matter on a "fast 
track" for a reset. 
I. 
FACTS ANO PROCEDURE 
Contrary to the assertion of Piercy's counsel> this court cannot find as a matter of 
law that the presumption of a herd district has been overcome with the 11facts" 
presented. That does not necessarily translate, however, to the notion that for the 
purposes of this litigation, one in fact does exist, at least to the extent the ~ourt need no 
longer consider it. Regrettably, the parties have not "shaped the battle" f~r the court to 
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take the herd district issue headwon, as Piercy asks via the summary judg~ent process. 
At the heart of the hundreds of pages of filings in support and in opposition to the 
summary judgment motion lies Piercy's request: he asks this court to invalidate herd 
districts created by the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 and 1908. ' This court is 
not prepared to honor that request, for it asks the court to rewrite history, or1 at the very 
least, to rewrite a "presumed11 history; and this court abhors revisionism in any form. On 
the other hand 1 the court does have a keen interest in the truth of the matter. 
During much of the twentieth century, various Canyon County Boards of 
Commissioners created herd districts in different Canyon County locations. In 1982, the 
Board of Canyon County Commissioners enacted a final order intending to convert the 
remaining "open range'1 land in Canyon County to herd district status. Piercy complains 
the board's order failed to comply with the clear requirements of Idaho Code §25~2401 
et seq. Piercy also makes the underpinning of his procedural complaint clear. If this 
court invalidates the herd district status in the area of the accident at the: center of this 
litigation, this effectively ellminates his liability, since his bull would have ·escaped from 
"open range.'' See e.g., Moreland v. Adams1 143 Idaho 687, 152 P.3d 558 (2007), 
overruling Soran v. Schoessler, 87 Idaho 425, 394 P.2d 160 (1964). 
There, remains no mystery, then, why Piercy takes strong issue with the 
procedures followed by the Canyon County Commissioners in December 1982. Both 
parties have provided this court with the recorded actions of the board. For example, it 
is undisputed that the board issued the following resolution, approved on December 2, 
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1982, as found in the minutes of the Board of Canyon County Commissioners in Book 
27, Page 207 in the Canyon County Recorder's Office. 
RESOLUTION PASSED REGARDING HERD DISTRICTS 
IN CANYON COUNTY 
The following Resolution was considered and adopted by the 
Canyon County Board of Commissioners on the znd day of 
December, 1982: Upon motion of Commissioner Hozba and 
the second by commissioner Bledsoe the Board resolves as 
follows: That because of the confusion that exists due to the 
over-lapping lines of herd districts and open range and 
because over ninety-five (95%) percent of the area of 
Canyon County is already designated a herd district the 
Board will issue an order designating all of Canyon County 
to be herd district as of December 14, 1982. Motion Carried 
Unanimously. 
It is also undisputed that the Board issued the following order, as found in the 
Canyon County Recorder's Office and the Office of the Canyon County Commissioners. 
ORDER ESTABLISHING HERD DISTRICT 
The Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd 
District Boundaries throughout the County and has 
determined, by resolution, that the time has come to simplify 
and unify the status of Herd Districts in Canyon County. In 
making this determination the Board has found the following: 
1. A suNey map, attached to the Order on file in the Recorder's 
Office, prepared by the Planning and Zoning Administrator 
designates the three small areas within the County which 
remain open range. 
2. That map shows that over 95% of the land within the County 
is now in Herd District status. 
3. Through the years confusion has existed because of 
overlapping boundary lines and indefinite District boundary 
descriptions. 
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4. Canyon County has reached the stage of urban 
. development which destroys the original purpose and 
usefulness of the concept of open range. 
5. The mobility of our citizens has increased to the point at 
which it becomes necessary that Herd District status exist 
throughout the County. 
Therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the board of Canyon County 
Commissioners on this 10th day of December, 1982, that a 
Herd District be established in the three remaining open 
range areas in Canyon County as shown on the survey map 
filed with this Order in the Recorder's Office (Marked in 
black), to the end that the entire land area of Canyon County 
be placed in Herd District Status. 
Finally, Piercy alleges the board failed to cause the publication of this Ord~r in 
the Idaho Press Tribune on December 20, 1982, as set out in the Affidavit of Dawn 
McClure and the accompanying CD (containing a PDF file without authentication) as to 
which newspaper and on what date the paper published this information. 
The procedural history, as it relates to the numerous Complaints and the most 
recent application to amend for punitive damages purposes in this case, is set forth in 
this Court's Order of April 27, 2007. After entry of that Order, Plaintiffs filed a Third 
Amended Complaint alleging the conduct of the defendants was reckless and/or willful. 
The Third Amended Complaint also eliminates the parents and natural guardians of 
Erika Rivera and Luis Guzman as plaintiffs to the action. 
On July 20, 2007, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-1604, Rivera and Guzman filed a 
Motion to Amend the Complaint, seeking to include a claim for punitive damages 
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against Defendant Piercy. The court also heard oral argument on this motion on 
September 6, 2007. Mr. Andrew Chasan presented argument on behalf of Rivera and 
Guzman. Mr. Ryan Peck argued on behalf of Piercy against the motion to amend. Mr. 
Josh Evett, counsel for Jennifer Sutton, was present at the hearing, but offered no 
argument on this issue. As noted, however, the court should hold this issue in 
abeyance until a resolution comes at the trial level concerning the Canyon County herd 
district's validity. Compare Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 418, 745 P.2d 294, 297 
(1987) 1 with Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119-20, 124 P.3d 993, 995-96 (2005).2 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Summary Judgment in General 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, 
and affidavits on file show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... 1.RC.P. 56(c); City of Idaho Falls v. 
Home Indemnity Co., 126 Idaho 604, 6061 888 P.2d 383, 386 (1995). At all times, the 
burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests upon the moving 
party. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.1 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 
(1991). Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
1 Holding that the inclusion of BLM land in a county herd district invalidates that district; note especially 
Shepard, C.J., in dissent, commenting that Miller has effectively overruled Benewah County Cattlemen's 
Assoc., Inc., v. Board of County Commissioners of Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983). 
2 Where Schroeder, C.J., would not allow a challenge to the Canyon County herd district's validity in view 
of the parties stipulating at the trial in magistrate court concerning its validity. Appellants raised the issue 
of validity for the first time on appeal to the district court, then the Idaho Supreme Court. Appellants' 
counsel asked both reviewing courts to take "judicial notice" that Canyon County contains SLM lands. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
JOINING CANYON COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE 
UNTIL CANYON COUNTY HERD DISTRICT VALIDITY IS DETERMINED-Page 6 
481 10/09/2007 TUE 1:i·:i1 rn JR\/ '1n i:::aM, r:i, "".., 
. '• 
' 
party resisting the motion. Id.; Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sohool Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Nevertheless, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving 
party must anchor its case in something more solid than speculation. A mere scintilla of 
evidence does not create a genuine issue. Edwards v. Conchemco lnc. 1 111 Idaho 851, 
853, 727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 1986). Put another way, the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment may not merely rest on the allegations contained in the 
pleadings; rather, the non-moving party must produce evidence by way of affidavit or 
deposition to contradict the assertions of the moving party. Ambrose v. Buhl School 
Dist. #412, 126 Idaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Herein, the "battle of the affidavits" has raised issues of material fact. Hence, the 
presumption of the herd districfs validity pursuant to the Idaho Code, so far, carries the 
day for the plaintiffs. This court rejects affidavits iri support of Piercy's motion that simply 
imply the absence of something otherwise required to create a valid herd district. The 
court further rejects any affidavits advancing the notion "we cannot find it, therefore it 
does not exist," in view of the presumption of validity of any and all Canyon County herd 
district ordinances. 
B. Herd Districts and Their Presumption of Validity 
Before this court considers the merits of Piercys claims on the invalidity of the 
herd district at issue, the court must recognize the standards set forth in Idaho Code 
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§31-857, which presumes the validity of a herd district, if not challenged within two (2) 
years. 3 
School, road, herd and other districts--Presumption of 
validity of creation or di$solution 
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district, or 
other district has heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, 
declared to be created, established, disestablished, 
dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county 
commissioners in any county of the state of Idaho, a legal 
prima facie presumption is hereby declared to exist, after a 
lapse of two (2) years from the date of such order, that all 
proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of 
such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to 
warrant said board in making said order, and the burden of 
proof shall rest upon the party who shall deny, dispute, or 
question the validity of said order_to show that any of such 
preceding proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not 
properly or regularly taken; and such prima facle 
presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the 
state of Idaho. 
Idaho Code§ 31-857. 
Thus, Piercy has the burden of convincing this court that the board followed 
improper procedures, such that this court should overturn the herd district created in 
1982 after twenty-five (25) years of existence. Indeed, this constitutes an onerous task. 
Idaho case law strongly favors the validity of ordinances and statutes. See e.g., City of 
Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 303 P.2d 680 (1956), and Heo/a Min. Co. v. 
Idaho State Tax Com'n, 108 Idaho 147, 697 P.2d 1161 (1985). 
The extent of Piercy's burden is set forth in Idaho Rule of Evidence 301. IRE 301 
states, "The burden of going forward is satisfied by the introduction of evidence 
3 In 1982, Idaho Code § 31-857 allowed for a challenge to the validity of a district within five (5) years. 
However, the legislature amended Idaho Code§ 31-857 in 1989 for the current two (2) year window for . 
challenge. · 
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sufficient to permit reasonable minds to conclude that the presumed fact does not exist. 
. . 
If the party against whom a presumption operates fails to meet the burden of going 
forward, the presumed fact shall be deemed proved." (Emphasis supplied). 
c. The Statutes at Issue 
At the time of the December 1982 Canyon County Ordinance at issue, the 1968 
version of Idaho Code §25-2401 et seq. established the criteria for creating a herd 
district. This set of statutes gives the board of county commissioners in a particular 
county the right to create herd districts, and sets forth procedures by which the board 
would create such districts. The three relevant statutes follow: 
l.C. 25·2402 Petition for district 
A majority of the landowners in any area or district described 
by metes and bounds not including open range and who are 
resident in, and qualified electors of, the state of Idaho may 
petition the board of county commissioners in writing to 
create such area a herd district. Such petition shall describe 
the boundaries of the said proposed herd district, and shall 
designate what animals of the species of horses, mules. 
asses, cattle, swine. sheep and goats it is desired to prohibit 
from running at large, also prohibiting said animals from 
being herded upon the public highways in such a district: 
and shall designate that the herd district shall not apply to 
nor cover livestock, excepting swine! which shall roam. drift 
or stray from open range into the district unless the district 
shall be inclosed by lavvful fences and cattle guards in roads 
penetrating the district as to prevent livestock. excepting 
swine, from roaming, drifting, or straying from open range 
into the district; and may designate the period of the year 
during which it is desired to prohibit such animals from 
running at large, or being herded on the highways. 
Provided, any herd district heretofore established shall retain 
its identity, geographic definition, and remain in full force and 
effect, until vacated or modified hereafter as provided by 
section 25-2404, Idaho Code1 as amended. 
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Idaho Code §25~2402 (1968) (Emphasis supplied). 
l.C. 25-2403 Notice of hearing petition (1968) 
It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners, 
after such petition has been filed, to set a date for hearing 
said petition, notice of which hearing shall be given by 
posting notices thereof in three (3) conspicuous places in the 
proposed herd district, and by publication for two (2) weeks 
previous to said hearing in a newspaper published in the 
county nearest the proposed herd district. 
Idaho Code §25-2403 (1968) 
l.C, 25-2404 Order creating district (1968) 
At such hearing, if satisfied that a majority of the landowners 
awning more than fifty per cent (50%) of the land in said 
proposed herd district who are resident in, and qualified 
electors of, the state of Idaho are in favor of the enforcement 
of the herd law therein, and that it would be beneficial to 
such district, the board of commissioners shall make an 
order creating such herd district, in accordance with the 
prayer of the petition, or with such modifications as it may 
choose to make. Such order shall specify a certain time at 
which lt shall take effect, which time shall be at least thirty 
(30) days after the making of said order; and said order shall 
continue in force, according to the terms thereof, until the 
same shall be vacated or modified by the board of 
commissioners, upon the petition of a majority of the 
landowners owning more than fifty per cent (50%) of the land 
In said district who are resident in, and qualified electors of, 
the state of Idaho. 
Idaho Code §25-2404 (1968) 
The lessons gleaned from these sections of the Idaho Code inform this court as 
follows: 
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• A majority of landowners may petition for a herd district; 
• If such petition is made, it will set forth the metes and bounds description of the 
requested district, the animals to be included or exempt from the herd district; 
• Notice is to be given in three (3) locations and published in a newspaper in the 
county of the proposed district for two (2) prior to the hearing; 
• The board of commissioners may create a herd district by order either "in 
accordance with the prayer of the petition, or with such modifications as it may 
choose to make" 
• An order creating a herd district shall specify a date, after 30 days, when the 
district will take effect. 
Piercy argues that the order as entered by the Commissioners, and as set forth 
above, is invalid because it fails to reference the landowner petition; it doesn't provide a 
metes and bounds description of the herd districts to be created; it fails to provide which 
breeds of animals are subject to the herd district; and finally, it fails to set forth an date 
when the herd district went into effect. Piercy contends these flaws overcome the 
presumption of validity of the herd district; hence, this court must strike it down. 
D. The Missing Petition 
The bulk of Piercy's argument against the validity of the herd district arises from 
the fact that no one knows if a majority of the landowner presented their petition to the 
board of commissioners prior to the entry of this particular order. It appears from the 
filings that Piercy has attempted to find such petition and has been unable to do so. In 
addition, because the order fails to reference any landowner petition. Piercy argues, that 
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translates to one never existing in the first place, thus generating the battle of the 
affidavits.'4 In support of his argument, Piercy offers the Affidavits of Glenn Koch and 
E.G. Johnson. Glenn Koch is the sole living commissioner from 1982. In rebuttal, 
Plaintiffs offer the Affidavits of the same Glenn Koch (he can apparently see both sides 
of the issue) and Bill Staker, former county clerk. 
Glenn Koch asserts to the effect in both affidavits that he cannot recall if the 
board received a petition submitted by landowners for a herd district. He does state, 
however, that the commissioners in office in 1982 took their jobs very seriously and 
always attempted to follow the law in duty performance. (Compare Koch affidavit of 
July 3, 2007 with Koch affidavit of June 11, 2007). Bill Staker, the Clerk in 1982, also 
echoes the commitment to follow the law theme in his affidavit. He further asserts that 
he cannot recall whether the board received a petition. (Affidavit of June 14~ 2007). 
The Affidavit of EG. Johnson informs the court that Mr. Johnson is a long-time 
resident of Canyon County and landowner in Canyon County in the area and at the time 
of the 1982 herd district ordinance. It further informs that he did not sign a petition in 
4 There may be a good explanation for why no one has located a petition from twenty-five years ago: 
there appears to be no requirement under the code to keep it of record. A careful reading of Idaho Code 
§31-708 (Duties of clerk) and Idaho Code §31-709 (Records to be kept) informs with specificity what the 
county clerk must generate vis-a-vis records, and what the board must "cause to be kept pennanently 
and indefinitely." Idaho Code §31-708.7 comprises the only section under the clerk's duties dealing with 
the preservation of petitions and applications. However, that specifically deals with "franchises," and this 
· court concludes that a petition for a herd district is not a petition or application for a franchise. 
Nevertheless, even if a county clerk has the duty to "preserve and file" a petition for a herd district, under 
Idaho Code §31-709, there appears to be no duty to. keep it "permanently and indefinitely." The only 
"keeping" required under part 6 is "Ordinance records, containing all ordinances, stating the date 
enacted: It seems the "ordinance record" means the ordinances with a statement of when the board 
enacted them. The statute sets forth no specific directions to keep any petition that might have driven the 
board to enact a herd district ordinance. Yet, even if the statute did require a board to keep a petition 
"permanently and indefinitely,• and a board failed to do so, that still does not vitiate the presumption of 
validity or mean an ordinance otherwise validly enacted in the first instance becomes invalid. 
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1982, nor d~d he have notice that the commissioners considered the creation of such a 
herd district until after they created a herd district. (Affidavit of July 18, 2007). 
From these affidavits, this court is only able to determine that none of the living 
county officials who would have taken an active part in the process can recall whether 
interested landowners petitioned the board for a herd district, and that one of the land 
owners did not sign a petition to create (or consolidate) a herd district. On the other 
hand, while neither the Resolution nor the Order in question refers to a specific 
landowner petition, the Order does state, ''The Board has again reviewed the complexity 
of the Herd District Boundaries ... " This court focuses on the language of "again 
reviewedn in conjunction with the fact that it cannot be clearly determined one way or 
the other whether the board performed this review at the request of a majority of 
landowners. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated a court will not presume a procedural 
irregularity in the face of silence as to the procedures taken. See Garrett Transfer & 
Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 33 P.2d 743 (1933). Thus, despite Piercy's 
arguments to the contrary, no party has presented this court with evidence showing that 
no petition existed-at least to the extent it overcomes the presumption of validity. 
Therefore, Piercy's argument and "evidence" falls short of the mark.6 
f, The Missing Metes and Bounds Description 
s There is a bigger issue, however, for purposes of time lapse. While the place Piercy's bull "escaped" 
may be the 1982 herd district area, where the collision took place with Piercy's bull is apparently an area 
a former board put into herd district status in 1908. See Piercy's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated May 1. 2007, page 12. 
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Idaho Code §25-24021 as it stood in 19821 stated that a landowner's petition for a 
herd district µshall describe the boundaries of the said proposed herd district." Piercy 
argues that this language imposed on the Commissioners a duty to include metes and 
bounds legal property description in the Order creating the herd district at issue here. 
However, Idaho Code §25-2404 also provides that "commissioners shall make 
an order creating such herd district, in accordance with the prayer of the petition, or with 
such modifications as it may choose to make." (Emphasis supplied): Even if one or 
more landowners presented a petition to the Commissioners containing a metes and 
bounds description, the commissioners, by statute, did not have to use a metes and 
bounds description in their order in order to create it. 
The language of the order tells the court that the commissioners intended to limit 
the herd district created in 1982 to three small areas of remaining open range in Canyon 
County. ·The order states, "A survey map, attached to the Order on file in the 
Recorder's Office, prepared by the Planning and Zoning Administrator designates the 
three small areas within the County which remain open range,n and (;a Herd District be 
established in the three remaining open range areas in Canyon County as shown on the 
survey map filed with this Order." (Emphasis supplied). The commissioners also 
apparently recognized this action would place the entirety of Canyon County in a herd 
district, because the rest of the county already had herd district status. This court does 
not read this language to the effect that the commissioners were creating a ugiant" herd 
district in their 1982 ordinance. Rather, they seem to be filling in the gaps so that in 
Canyon County (at least over the area they had jurisdiction) no open range would exist. 
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The court does not to say the intended effect would not be a "giant" herd district; rather, 
the 1982 ordinance simply did not describe all of Canyon County as being one large 
herd district. 
Piercy makes much of the fact that the survey map referenced in the order may 
or may not exist today, and without such map, no metes and bounds description exists 
for the herd districts thus created. Piercy avers this supplies the proof positive of his 
contention theory of the invalidity of Canyon County's herd districts. Again, this court 
declines Plercy's invitation to require a metes and bounds description in the order. The 
court further declines the invitation to invalidate the herd district created by the order 
based on a lack of legal description, given that the commissioners indicated the limited 
land area to be included in the newly created herq districts to the three small areas 
indicated on the survey map. As previously noted, this court does not adopt the "we-
cannot-find-it-so-it-never-existed" theory advanced by Piercy. Accordingly, as a matter 
of law, this court cannot determine that the herd district created by the 1982 Order is 
invalid for lacking a metes and bounds description. 
F. The Notice Requirement 
Idaho Code §25-2403 sets out the notice requirements for a hearing by the 
commissioners on a petition to create a herd district. The board must cause the posting 
of notice in three conspicuous places in the proposed herd district and by publication for 
two weeks prior to a hearing on the issue in a newspaper in the county of the proposed 
herd district. Idaho Code § 25-2403. 
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Piercy asks this court to invalidate the 1982 Order and the resulting herd districts 
because no notice apparently exists in the archives of the Idaho Press Tribune during 
the period of November 10, 1982 and December 20, 1982. (Affidavit of Dawn McClure). 
The affidavit of E.G. Johnson is also provided to the court as evidence that no notice 
existed because Mr. Johnson states1 "I would have received information about the 
proposed herd district prior to the hearing if such information had been available." 
(Affidavit of E.G. Johnson). 
However, Plaintiffs, through the Affidavit of Deborah Schrecongost, inform the 
court that the Idaho Press Tribune was not the only newspaper in existence in Canyon 
County in 1982. Schrecongost indicates that The Parma Review was published in 
Canyon County from 1909 to 1993. No party provides the court. with information 
concerning whether the county published notices of ordinances in this newspaper. 
Moreover1 it is conceivable that while the board signed the Resolution and Order 
in December 198.2, that the hearing on the issue may have occurred at some point prior 
to December 1982. It is also clear from the language of the Order that this was not the 
first time that the board confronted this issue as the Commissioners state in the Order, 
. 
"The Board has again reviewed the complexity of the Herd District Boundaries." While 
Piercy is unable to find notice for the November to December 1982 time period in one 
newspaper published in the county at the time of the Order, this court, cannot based on 
this evidence alone, invalidate the herd districts. Piercy has failed to overcome the 
presumption of validity on this issue based upon the "fact" presented. 
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G. The Date of Effect 
Idaho Code § 25-2404 requires an order to create a herd district to include a 
specific date, thirty days after the entry of the order, at which time the herd district will 
take effect. Clearly, the Order at issue here does not contain such language, which 
opens the door to Piercy's argument that the Order has never taken effect. The 
Resolution passed by the Commissioners does give an effective date of December 14, 
1982. However, the "proponent agency" of the herd district, Canyon County, has not 
had an opportunity to deal with this issue. Again, it is one thing for a bull to escape from 
an area that is "open range," but there is every indication the accident occurred in an 
area that constituted a herd district in 1908. None of the parties have presented to this 
court anything on the consequences of this dynamic. 
H. BLM Land 
Finally, the parties ask this court to determine the validity of the herd district on 
the issue of whether the district purports to incorporate BLM lands. It appears Piercy 
contests the validity of the herd district where he pastured his bull (presumably created 
in 1982) and further contests the validity of the herd district created in 1908 where the 
accident occurred. Piercy's argument appears to suggest the board created a single 
giant herd district throughout the county, thus acting improperly, due to Canyon County 
containing BLM lands, which cannot be regulated by the county. While this court 
disagrees with Piercy's view the board created "one giant herd district'' in 1982, the 
court still addresses the matter. 
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The foundation for Piercy's argument comes from Idaho Code § 26-2402, set out 
above. The addition to the statute set out below forms the basis of Piercy's argument: 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the 
contrary, no herd district established before or after July 1, 
1983, shall: 
(a) Contain any lands owned by the United States of 
America, and managed by the department of the interior, 
bureau of land management1 or its successor agency, upon 
which lands the grazing of livestock has historically been 
permitted. 
Idaho Code §25-2402 (1983)(Emphasis supplied). 
Under this statute, as amended, the Idaho Supreme Court invalidated a herd 
district ordinance created by the Bannock County Commissioners because it contained 
BLM land. Miller v. Miller, supra. There, the Bannock County board purported, in May 
1984, to create a herd district encompassing the parties' (Millers) land and containing 
BLM land. The district court determined that under Idaho Code§ 25~2401 et seq., the 
herd district was invalid as to the portions containing BLM land but otherwise upheld the 
herd district as created. The Supreme Court found that the district court's decision was 
at odds with Idaho Code § 25-2402(2) which prohibits a board of county commissioners 
from creating a herd district that includes BLM lands. The herd district in its entirety was 
found to be invalid because the Commissioners acted "outside the dictates" of the 
statute. Id. at 419, 745 P.2d at 297. 
The situation facing this court is unlike Miller. The board passed the ordinance 
before this court in 1982, prior to the amendment of Idaho Code § 25-2402. In addition, 
while the statute, as amended, purports to apply to herd districts established before July 
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1, 1983, nothing in the amendatory language clearly indicates a legislative intent to 
invalidate all previously established herd districts containing federal land historically 
used for grazing. Idaho Code§ 73-101 clearly states that no statute is to be retroactive 
unless expressly so declared. See also State ex rel. Wasden v. Daicel Chemical 
Industries, Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 106 P.3d 428 (2005). Thus, while a court might 
construe the language "established before July 1, 1983" retroactivity, it does not rise to 
the level of express declaration to invalidate all previously established herd districts 
throughout the state, no matter how tong established, that happen to contain BLM 
administered lands meeting the other definitional requirements of the amendment. 
Therefore, this court V'v'ill not apply the language of Idaho Code § 25-2402(2) 
retroactively to the effect of automatically invalidating the herd district created by the 
1982 Order and the 1908 herd district. After all, does it seem reasonable the legislature 
really sought, in 1982, to undo the ordinances in forty-four Idaho counties after (then) 
seventy-five years of carving out herd districts? Especially since the current law (as 
amended in 1996) clearly states 'The provisions of this chapter shall not apf?IY to any 
herd district or herd ordinance in full force and effect prior to January 1, 1990, but shall 
apply to any modification thereof." Idaho Code§ 25-2401 (1996)(Emphasis supplied).6 
Despite this court's interpretation of the statute and retroactivity, there still exists 
a factual issue concerning whether the herd districts at issue here (1908 and 1982 
6 The significance of this language should be apparent First, Piercy argues that since Canyon County 
contains lands owned by the United States of America, managed by BLM, where historical livestock 
grazing took place, the 1982 ordinance is void. However, the BLM amendment did not go Into effect until 
July 1, 1983. Second, Piercy argues that since Canyon County herd districts (or, in his words, the "giant 
herd district} contain state lands, the Canyon County herd district(s) are (is) void. Yet again, the 
prohibition against herd districts containing state land did not go into effect until July 1, 1990. Both of 
these prohibitions come after the 1982 Canyon County Herd District Ordinance. 
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districts) actually contain federal land in violation of the statute as it now reads. In 
support of the theory that the herd districts contain federal BLM land, Piercy offers not 
one, but two, Affidavits of Rosemary Thomas, along with the Affidavits of Dennis Sorrell 
and Affidavit of Jerry Deal to show there is state land in the herd districts. Plaintiffs also 
offer an Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas to refute Piercy's contention that BLM land exists 
in the herd district where the accident occurred. Hence, a material fact immediately 
pops up, provided, that issue is even relevant. While Piercy says it is and every other 
party to the action indicate their doubts, the proponent of the herd district in the first 
instance, namely, Canyon County, had not had a vote in the debate. 
Furthermore, while the May 8, 20071 Affidavit of BLM Field Manager Rosemary 
Thomas provides the court with a map demonstrating that BLM grazing land exists in 
Canyon County, along with the statement that these lands are currently and historically 
used for grazing, in reviewing the map, this court is only able to determine that sections 
of land outlined in purple intend to indicate BLM .allotments. Beyond that, the court is 
unable to glean information to assist it in its determination of whether BLM land 
historically used for graz:ing and the herd districts at issue overlap. 
Then, in the May 30, 2007 Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas, submitted by Plaintiffs, 
Thomas provides another map showing a large section of Canyon County in yellow 
(south of the Boise River) to indicate the location of herd districts in Canyon County. 
Thomas further opines that after a review of BLM records, she determined that no BLM 
land exists in the herd districts identified in the yellow and that the earliest records of 
grazing start in 1981. Not to be outdone, however, Piercy submits a third and final 
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Affidavit of Rosemary Thomas1 dated August 8, 2007. In this affidavit, Thomas informs 
the court that she determined that the Black Canyon Management Framework Plan 
allowed grazing in Canyon County since 1967. However, upon review of the attached 
exhibit, thi$ court is unable to determine any connection between the document and 
Canyon County, other than the word of Thomas as to its applicability. Frankly, to this 
observer, when one mentions Black Canyon, Gem and Payette Counties come 
immediately to mind1 not Canyon County. 
Finally, the Affidavits of Dennis Sorrell and Jerry Deal further purport to show that 
Canyon County contains state land. One, however, must read these affidavits in 
conjunction with the May 2, 2007, Affidavit of Ryan Peck. That latter affidavit provides a 
map required in order to give the Sorrell and Deal affidavits meaning. The alleged 
effect of these affidavits and the map purports to show that the 1908 herd district, 
apparently where the accident occurred, contains state land. However, when one 
reviews the proffered map and affidavits, this court cannot find that the herd districts 
(1982 or 1908) are, as a matter of law, invalid. As stated above, this court is not of the 
opinion that the 1982 Order created one giant herd district-that was simply the affect of 
connecting the final three areas with all the other pre-existing herd districts-and this 
guides the analysis here. Yet, even assuming the 1982 Herd District Ordinance did 
create one giant herd district in Canyon County in December of that year, Piercy has yet 
to answer the 11So what?" question. The current law states, as already noted, that "[t]he 
provisions of [the herd district law] shall not apply to any herd district or herd ordinance 
in full force and effect prior to January 1, 1990 .... '' Idaho Code§ 25-2401 (1996). 
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Because this court has not been given the legal ·description of the 1908 herd 
district, the allegations of state land included in that district only raises an issue of fact. 
The same is true of the 1982 herd district Further confounding this court is the lack of 
specificity and detail concerning where the BLM land complained of by Piercy actually 
lies. Hence, the current posture of this litigation leaves the court with herd district 
statutes not cleanly dealt with by the legislature in setting out its intent concerning pre-
existing herd districts where it added certain land prohibitions to district formation, only 
underscored by opposing counsel's argument and briefing. Further, as explained more 
fully below, the court is without the position by the proponent of herd districts in Canyon 
County, the Board of County Commissioners. The board may very well want to make 
its position known before the court goes mucking around in its ordinances. 
I. Joinder of Canyon County 
Defendant Sutton asks this court to join Canyon County as a necessary party to 
this action, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Sutton argues any ruling by 
this court on the validity of the herd district has an impact on the county as the creator of 
the herd district, and the entity that enforces it. On this theme, the court intended 
originally to decline Sutton's invitation, particularly because significant issues of material 
fact exist with regard to the herd district and the motion comes very late in the process. 
Yet> this issue, strategically, is a legal issue this court needs to resolve before the 
parties litigate damages. The resolution of the herd district issue is paramount to 
getting to the issue of damages among the parties. In short, the herd district issue 
becomes the "trial within the trial" before this court can even allow the primary litigants 
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to present evidence to a jury on the issue of damages. Regrettably1 this issue comes 
late. Perhaps Piercy intended it that way as a matter of strategy. Nevertheless, it must 
be resolved. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
This court finds and concludes that Piercy has failed to overcome the 
presumption of validity of the herd districts because genuine issues of material fact 
exist. For example, material issues of fact exist whether landowners petitioned the 
board and whether the board gave proper notice of the 1982 ordinance once enacted. 
There also remains unresolved the issue of the 1908 ordinance in relation to whether 
the 1982 ordinance affected its validity. The fact that the proponent of herd districts on 
Canyon County is absent from this litigation exacerbates the lack of resolution. Hence, 
Canyon County should be joined as a third-party defendant, though not for the purpose 
of liability. Rather, Canyon County needs to be a part of this litigation for the limited 
purpose of fully developing the validity of herd districts in the area Piercy's bull escaped 
and in the area where the collision with the bull took place. As a "heads up," the clerk 
should provide a copy of this decision to the Canyon County Prosecutor. Finally, this 
court anticipates that this decision will necessitate the vacation of the current trial date. 
Nevertheless, as the court informed all counsel at the time they argued for or against 
Piercy>s motion for summary judgment, circumstances involving a rather serious felony 
matter may have already caused that vacation, apart from this decision. Nevertheless, 
once the issue of Canyon County herd district validity is determined, should the court 
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have to vacate the current trial date, this court will ensure that the parties herein go to · 
the "front of the line" for rescheduling purposes. 
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT: 
1. The court denies Piercy's motion for summary judgment. 
2. The court holds in abeyance the issue of another amendment to the 
complaint for punitive damages until the court can determine the validity of herd districts 
in Canyon County. 
3. The court directs the joinder of Canyon County as a third-party defendant 
for the limited purpose of determining whether valid herd districts exist at the locations 
of the bull's escape and the location of the collision between the Sutton automobile and 
Piercy's bull. 
4. The court directs Sutton's counsel to prepare and serve the necessary 
pleadings to join Canyon County, through its Board of Commissionerst as a third-party 
defendant. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on _ October 2007 slhe served a true and correct copy of the 
original of the forgoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PERCY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, JOINING CANYON COUNTY, AND HOLDING ALL OTHER MOTIONS IN ABEYANCE 
UNTIL CAHYON COUNTY HERD DISTRICT VALIDITY IS DETERMINED on the following individuals in 
the manner described: 
• Upon the Canyon County Prosecutor, 
when s/he placed the same into the latter's respective "pick up" boxes at the Canyon County Clerk's 
office, Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho, 
• and upon Rodney R. Saetrum, of SAETRUM LAW OFFICES, 101 S: Capitol Blvd, Boise, Idaho, 
83702., attorneys for Defendant Piercy; and upon 
• Joshua s. Evett of ELAM and BURKE, P.A., PO Box 1539, Boise, Idaho 83701, attorney for 
Defendant Sutton; and upon 
• Timothy C. Walton of CHASAN & WALTON, LLC PO Box 1069 Boise, Idaho 83701~1069 and 
upon stephen E. Blackbum of BLACKBURN LAW, P.C., 660 E. Franklin Road, Suite 255, 
Meridian 83642, attorneys for the Plaintiffs Riilera and Guzman, 
when s/he caused the same to be deposited into the us Mails, sufficient postage attached, at the 
addresses set forth above. 
WILUAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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BOOK 27 
TUKYTr TIIIttO DAY UP l/UVbNUK~ 1EAN, A.~ •• 1982 
CALDWELL, IDAllO OECEHBER 10, 199~ 
PRESEHT: Carlos B. Bledso•, Chairman, DPl Hobza, Glenfi o. Kaan, 
JeaniP. Irvine, Deputy ClPrK. 
J;Q'·ll·IISSHIHfit!S Rf:FEf! COPY Of SUMHD!lS t'f<0!-1 ATTORqq f()fl (!AflY 
GOG.Hjl10UO TO T!iE P110SECllI!UG AITORllEY 
ThP. Uoard of Commi.:;sior..ers acknowlPdged rec'P1pt t>f a Sumrzoti:S 
frnm 1-ierbert W. RettiG, attorney for G~:-y G<ldi.-nour, and 
rPfPrr~d 3ummons to the OfficP. nf thP. Prosecuting Attorney 
for advica as ta further prnceAdlng3. 
Ol!DEI! l>STAllLISHI!/fi HEHD llV-il'HIC'l' 
Thi' Board ha3 agaln revi~wi>d tha co;nple:il.ty of thi> HPr<i 
Dl3tr16t Ohunda~ie1 throughout th• County and ha~ determlned, 
by 1•t1::1olution, that thfl tia:A has comn ~" sir•plify and unify 
thA otatua of llr.rd Dl.otrlcts l.n Canyon County. ln m;ik1ng 
thi3 dAtermlnation th~ Ooard has found :hP following: 
1. A survey map, attachPd to th~ Order on filP. in th~ 
Hec6rdPr'" OCficP, prPparPJ by thP Planning and 
Zoning Administrator d~sl.gnatns thfl threP. small 
arPas within the County which r•main opP.n range. 
;; • 'fhat map shows that o~<>r 95:4 of tha land within thP. 
County ls no:; in !IP.rd lli3trl.ct otatus. 
3, Through the ~ears confusion ha9 Pxlstea becaus" o~ 
overlappinc bound~ry ilnA3 ana indofinltP. Uistrict 
boundary descriptions. 
4. Canyon Co•Jn ty 'lU:J '""1ct1"d tht> utag" ,,y urban 
deVP.lopm•nt which dP~troys thA original pur~os~ an~ 
us<>fulness of th• cunc~pt of opAn range. 
5. The mo bl l1 ty ot' our citizens 11a1:1 increased to th A 
point at which it bP.comPS ni>cAusary that llPrct 
Uistriot status exist throughout th? County. · 
TlHtre for A, 
1'f [!:; llEIHWY OR!lllHEU by the Uoard •>f Canyou Coun1;y 
Commissioners on th1<l \0th day of UecPmbt'r, 1982, that ... i!;H•d 
Uistrict bP Rutablished in th~ thr~• rRmainlng op"n range 
area3 ln Canyon County n:i 3hflwn on th .. surv<'y map f11Pd wltl-1 
thin OrdRr 1n the Recorder•:i Office (Marked 1n black), to th~ 
end that th~ entirR land arPa or Canyon County bP plac•d l.n 
HPrd District status. 
Order signe<J by th" ll•i~rJ 111' canyon County Coromi!lsion<"ra antl 
nltl'5tPd by thP Deputy ClRrk to thP l!oard ol' Co111mlssloni-rs. 
JJ.filiQ.lJffI!lti PAS.9t:l• REGAR!>ltl{) mmHifF'>i H!iOl!l;;S1' 'CO m;scrno Pllt:YI!llJS 
,!!l'j801.llTlON IN OHDiil! "[(J MAIN'CA!N A f'\11.L SW::NGT!I STAf"f IH IHK 
C"'" Qt'PAllTMENT . 
ThA following Hesolution was ean:iid•reu und adoptad by thP 
Ci!nyon County lloard of Comml.s~ionero on thR 10th day nf 
Deco:nbf'r, 1982: Upori motion or Co::ia.i:;sionar• Oledao11 and tilt> 
s~cond by Commi:isinnAr Koch th11 lloard rnsolve~ as follows: 
Th" Hesolution of Septe:aber 20, 1982, appointing ll::ivetta 
Nauinann to s"rve as ?ublic lnforr.iat.ion Specialist. for l:1vil 
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NOV 0 S 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. Guzman 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA by and through ) 
LOREE RIVERA her mother and ) 
natural guardian, AND LUIS J. GUZMAN) 
by and through BALLARDO GUZMAN ) 
his father and natural guardian, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON individually, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV05-4848 
Judge Gordon W. Petrie 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
November 6, 2007 
On the 6th day of December, 2007, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., or as soon 
thereafter as counsel can be heard, in the Courtroom of the Canyon County 
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, before the Honorable Judge Gordon W. Petrie, the 
undersigned will call up for hearing Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. 
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~· 
DATED this /day of November, 2007. 
CHASAN & WAL TON, L.L.C. 
~ ~ By ~~:::::::::::::::::;;;;:;;;;~~ 
Timothy C. Walton, of the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
7r "1 t I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -- day of __ ~_.ov ___ , 2007, a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served upon by: 
Joshua S. Evett 
Elam & Burke 
251 E. Front St., No. 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
Attorneys for Jennifer Sutton 
Ryan Peck 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneys for Dale W. Piercy 
~ail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Courier 
D Facsimile to (208) 384-5844 
~ail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Courier 
D Facsimile to (208) 336-0448 
CHASAN & WALTON, LLC 
Timothy C. Walton 
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Timothy C. Walton ISB #2170 
CHASAN & WAL TON LLC 
Park Center Pointe 
1459 Tyrelt Lane 
Post Office Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 
Telephone: (208) 345-3760 
Facsimile: (208) 345-0288 
Stephen E. Blackburn ISB #6717 
BLACKBURN LAW, P.C. 
660 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 220 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 898-3442 
Facsimile: (208) 898-9443 
F I _A.~4--9-M 
NOV 0 8 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. Guzman 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA by and through ) 
LOREE RIVERA her mother and ) 
natural guardian, AND LUIS J. GUZMAN) 
by and through BALLARDO GUZMAN ) 
his father and natural guardian, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON individually, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CV05-4848 
Judge Gordon W. Petrie 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
November 6, 2007 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Piercy moved for summary judgment, contending that Canyon 
County's herd districts are invalid. The Court denied Piercy's motion for 
summary judgment. The Court also held that Canyon County shall be added as 
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a party to this litigation, and that there will be a separate hearing, prior to the 
main trial, to determine whether the herd districts at issue are valid. 
In its decision denying Piercy's motion for summary judgment, the Court 
did not address the arguments advanced by Plaintiffs and Defendant Sutton that 
Piercy is estopped to challenge the validity of Canyon County's herd district 
ordinances. If Piercy is estopped to challenge the validity of the herd districts, it 
is unnecessary to conduct a "mini-trial" to determine whether the herd district 
ordinances are valid. 
Thus, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to rule (1) that the 1982 
ordinance was properly enacted, or that Piercy is estopped to contend that the 
1982 herd district was not properly created, and (2) that Canyon County should 
be dismissed from this case, since there is no need for a "mini-trial to determine 
the validity of the herd districts. 
PIERCY IS ESTOPPED IN THIS LAWSUIT FROM 
ATTACKING THE VALIDITY OF THE HERD 
DISTRICT CREATED IN 1982 
Piercy has had 23 years to challenge whether the County Commissioners 
followed proper procedure when they enacted the 1982 herd district ordinance. 
Piercy is estopped to now deny the validity of the ordinance. Piercy 
cannot accept the benefits of living, working and operating his ranch and farm 
under herd district status for 25 years and then, after he paralyzes Erika and 
severely wounds Luis, be heard to challenge the law he accepted and benefited 
from for 25 years. 
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That Piercy voluntarily accepted the benefits of living and working under 
the herd district ordinance is undeniable. Because ranchers are required to keep 
their livestock fenced 1 , other ranchers' livestock was prevented from mingling 
with Pie.r:cy's livestock (as may occur in open range). Other rancher's livestock 
was prevented by such fences from trampling and ruining Piercy's crops. And as 
Piercy drove the roads of Canyon County over the last 25 years, the 1982 
ordinance protected Piercy from colliding with another rancher's livestock, 
because all ranchers were required by that law to keep their livestock fenced, 
and off the Canyon County roads Piercy drove. 
Piercy cannot argue that he had no notice of the existence of the 1982 
herd district. It is undisputed that notice of the creation of the herd district was 
published several times in the Idaho Press Tribune in December 1982. Piercy's 
affiant, E.G. Johnson2 , testified in his affidavit that that was when he was notified 
of the herd district. Piercy acknowledges that he has been farming and ranching 
in Canyon County for 50 year. It is inconceivable that Piercy was unaware of the 
existence of the1982 herd district (in which he owns land), but even if he was 
unaware he is charged with notice of the creation of the herd district since he 
admits that notice of the creation of the herd district was published in the Idaho 
Press Tribune. 
1. Piercy himself testified that he intended to keep his livestock in his enclosed pastures, and that all livestock in Canyon County 
is contained in "enclosed" fields. Of course, because all of Canyon County has been herd district for 25 years, that is exactly 
what one would expect. Contrast "open range", where livestock generally roams unenclosed. Piercy's testimony confirms that 
Piercy and, indeed, all of Canyon County's ranchers, have conformed to the county's herd district status. Plaintiffs are only 
asking that Piercy's conduct be governed by, and judged by, the law that everyone in the county understood to be in effect at the 
time of the accident. 
2. Defense counsel Saetrum also represents E.G. Johnson in a separate "herd district" case brought against E. G. Johnson 
Farms, Inc by plaintiff Gazzaway, who was injured when his vehicle struck Johnson's cow. In that case, the defendant rancher 
alleged that the 1982 herd district was invalid because it was not properly enacted (just as Piercy alleges here). 
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The doctrine of quasi estoppel was adopted as law in Idaho in the case of 
KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279 (1971), where the Idaho Supreme Court 
said that, "The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a 
person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced, or of 
which he accepted a benefit." 94 Idaho, at 281. 
That Piercy accepted the benefits of the herd district ordinance is not 
subject to dispute, as the case of Wong v. Public Utilities Commission, 33 Hawaii 
813 (1936) makes abundantly clear. The Idaho Supreme Court, in adopting the 
quasi estoppel doctrine in KTVB v. Boise, supra, cited and relied upon the 
holding in Wong. 
In Wong, plaintiff was a common carrier who operated his business under 
the authority of the public utilities commission. Pursuant to law, Wong was 
required to comply with the regulations promulgated by the public utilities 
commission. Among other requirements, the regulations required Wong to 
obtain a certificate to operate his business. 
Wong sued when the public utilities commission yanked his certificate to 
do business. In his suit, Wong contended that the statute that required Wong to 
obtain the certificate was invalid, just as Piercy argues in this case. The Hawaii 
court held that Wong was estopped to attack the validity of the statute since he 
had accepted the "benefit" of the statute. The Hawaii court stated: 
To permit (Wong) to voluntarily invoke the regulatory 
provisions of law and to enjoy the benefits and privileges thereof 
and, after the violation by him of the terms and conditions attached 
to such benefits and privileges, to attack such law as invalid upon 
the grounds urged would be to countenance juridical gymnastics 
with which this court has little sympathy ... 
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The option lay with (Wong) to conform to the law and to 
secure a certificate of convenience and necessity with its attendant 
benefits or insist upon the invalidity of the statute and stand upon 
the constitutional and statutory rights and privileges which he 
believed the statute invaded. He chose the former course. By such 
voluntary acceptance of benefit he is now estopped from assailing 
the validity of the statute. 33 Hawaii, at 813-814. 
While Wong likely perceived that regulatory scheme to be a burden rather 
than a benefit, the Hawaii court clearly determined that Wong's duty to operate 
his business in accord with the regulatory scheme of the public utilities 
commission was a benefit. 
Per Wong, Piercy can not argue, after Piercy has violated the law under 
which he lived, worked, transacted business, and accepted benefits for 25 years, 
that the law is invalid. 
Under the rationale of Wong, Piercy can not be heard in this case to argue 
he received no benefit from the herd district law under which he lived and 
operated his business for the last 25 years. If the regulatory scheme in Wong 
benefited Wong, the herd district ordinance in this case benefited Piercy. His 
herds were protected from co-mingling with other ranchers' livestock. His crops 
were protected from trampling by other ranchers' herds. And Piercy was safer 
when he drove the roads of Canyon County these last 25 years, because other 
ranchers were required to keep their livestock fenced and off the road so Piercy 
wouldn't collide with such livestock and himself be injured. 
While the herd district ordinance does impose burdens on Piercy, Uust as 
Hawaii's statute imposed burdens on Wong), the herd district ordinance also 
clearly benefited Piercy Uust as Hawaii's statute benefited Wong). 
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Moreover, since Piercy chose not to attack the validity of the ordinance for 
25 years, Piercy has acquiesced in the application of the ordinance. 
As noted in KTVB v. Boise, supra, where Piercy has either "acquiesced" 
in the application of the ordinance, or "accepted the benefits" of the ordinance, 
he is estopped to challenge the validity of the ordinance. KTVB v. Boise City, 
supra. 
For 25 years Piercy has acquiesced in and benefited from living under, 
and operating his business under, the herd district ordinance. The doctrine of 
quasi estoppel precludes Piercy from attacking the validity of the ordinance. 
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ALSO PRECLUDES PIERCY 
FROM CONTESTING THE VALIDITY OF THE HERD DISTRICT 
In Alexander v. Trustees of the Village of Middleton, 92 Idaho 823 (1969), 
it was undisputed that the village had enacted an ordinance that annexed 
plaintiff's land in violation of law. In upholding the annexation on the grounds 
the plaintiff land owner was estopped by laches to contest the validity of the 
ordinance, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the doctrine of estoppel by 
I aches 
"has application even though the proceeding by which the 
municipal boundaries were extended are void, when by reason of 
lapse of time the municipal authority has been exercised, and there 
has resulted changed conditions involving extensive public and 
private interests. 
Such holdings are based upon public policy. Where a 
municipal corporation and the parties affected acquiesce in such 
action by the officials of the corporation, and transact business 
upon the theory that the land is located within the boundaries of the 
municipality, it is in the interest of the general public that such a rule 
be applied ... 92 Idaho, at 826 (emphasis added). 
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As in Alexander, over the last 25 years the county, through law 
enforcement, has enforced herd district status throug~out the county; over that 
25 years there have "resulted changed conditions involving extensive public and 
private interests"; and the county and private parties have "transacted business" 
with the understanding that the entire county was subject to herd district status. 
"Public policy" and "the interest of the general public" mandate the application of 
estoppel by laches to the facts of this case. See quoted language from 
Alexander, supra. 
In Alexander, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court held that where (1) two 
years had elapsed since enactment of the ordinance, (2) the land owner 
challenging the ordinance had notice of the enactment of the ordinance, (3) the 
governmental entity that enacted the ordinance would be harmed if the ordinance 
was declared invalid, and (4) the land owner had been benefited by the 
ordinance, the land owner was estopped by laches from contesting the validity of 
the ordinance. 
Applying the standards set forth in Alexander: (1) twenty-five years have 
elapsed since the ordinance was enacted; (2) Piercy had notice of the ordinance, 
since notice of enactment of the ordinance was published in the Idaho Press 
Tribune in 1982; (3) the harm to Canyon County and its citizens (and especially 
Erika and Luis) would be massive if large swaths of Canyon County are suddenly 
and retroactively declared to be open range; and as noted above, (4) Piercy has 
been benefited by the ordinance. 
Piercy is estopped by laches from contesting the validity of Canyon 
County's herd district. 
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GAZZAWAYv. E. G.JOHNSON FARMS, INC. 
The Court will recall E. G. Johnson, who submitted an affidavit in this case 
on behalf of Piercy. Mr. Johnson's farm corporation is a defendant in a herd 
district case pending before Judge Hoff (Gazzaway v. E. G. Johnson Farms. Inc., 
Canyon County case no. CV0?-2141). Mr. Saetrum's law office represents Mr. 
Johnson and his farm corporation in that case. 
The rancher in that case raised exactly the same arguments that Piercy 
raises in this case: that the 1982 herd district is invalid because it was 
improperly enacted, and that therefore the site of the collision involving 
Gazzaway's vehicle and Johnson's cow is open range. 
Judge Hoff rejected Johnson's arguments in that case and held, "that the 
Canyon County Board of Commissioners followed the procedure set forth in 
Idaho Code 25-2402 as it was in 1982". See Reporter's transcript of October 25, 
2007 proceedings in Gazzaway, attached hereto, page 14. Judge Hoff 
concluded that there was not sufficient evidence presented by Mr. Saetrum's 
office to overcome the "strong presumption" that the ordinance was properly 
enacted pursuant to the herd district statutes. Reporter's transcript, pgs. 15-16, 
attached. 
Judge Hoff also concluded that the Board of Commissioners were not 
required in 1982 to wait until a majority of the landowners presented a petition for 
the creation of a herd district, but rather that the commissioners were empowered 
by case law and statutes to create the herd district in 1982 even in the absence 
of such a petition. Reporter's transcript, pgs. 14-15. 
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Citing Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass'n v. Benewah County, 105 Idaho 
209 (1983), Judge Hoff noted that the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the 
County Commissioners have the authority to enact an ordinance requiring 
ranchers to fence in their livestock, even though the ordinance was not enacted 
in accord with the procedural requirements of the herd district statutes. As Judge 
Hoff noted, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in the Benewah case: 
Within the legislative contemplation was a process whereby 
a majority of the landowners in an area could compel the county to 
create herd districts and thereby place upon livestock owners within 
such districts the duty to fence in their stock. We find nothing in that 
statutory scheme indicating counties may not exercise their police 
power to control roaming livestock, but rather must ignore any 
problems and wait until action is forced upon the county by the 
presentation of a petition for the formation of a herd district. 105 
Idaho, at 214. See also attached reporter's transcript, pg. 14. 
Thus, concluded the Idaho Supreme Court and Judge Hoff, the County 
Commissioners are free to enact an ordinance requiring ranchers to fence in their 
livestock, and the county need not wait for a petition to be presented to the 
commissioners before exercising such police power. Under the Benewah case, 
even if Piercy's allegations that the 1982 ordinance was not enacted pursuant to 
IC 25-2402 is true, the ordinance is still valid and enforceable. 
Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate herein by reference, the reasoning 
advanced by Judge Hoff in the Gazzaway case. While Judge Hoff's decision is 
not binding on this Court, Judge Hoff's logic is sound. Further, the interest of 
judicial consistency mitigates in favor of this Court rejecting Piercy's attack on the 
law that has governed this county these last 25 years. 
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CONCLUSION 
Estoppel is a creature of equity. Which is fairer? To allow Piercy, after he 
has paralyzed Erika and severely wounded Luis to challenge the validity of a law 
under which he, every rancher in the county, law enforcement and the citizens of 
Canyon County (including Erika and Luis) have transacted business, been 
protected, and ordered their affairs for these last 25 years, or to hold Piercy 
accountable under that law? 
There is nothing fair about allowing Piercy to attempt to immunize himself 
from conduct that he knew was wrong. He admits he attempted to keep his bull 
contained. But he failed miserably, and at age 17, two months shy of her high 
school graduation and about to embark on a course of study and a career in 
nursing, Erika paid the price for his failure with the loss of voluntary control of 
much of the left side of her body. Equity demands that the 1982 ordinance be 
enforced against Piercy, which is nothing less than Piercy had a right to expect. 
Piercy, and every other rancher in the county, has had 25 years to file a 
declaratory judgment action to challenge the validity of the 1982 ordinance. 
Piercy is free to file a declaratory judgment action now, to prospectively attack 
the validity of the ordinance (though the courts may conclude that, after 25 years 
he is estopped to do so). Under the doctrines of quasi estoppel and/or estoppel 
by !aches Piercy is estopped from retroactively challenging the validity of 
Canyon County's herd district ordinances. 
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Finally, per the rationale of Judge Hoff in Gazzaway v. E. G. Johnson 
Farms, Inc. not only has Piercy failed to overcome the presumption that the 1982 
herd district ordinance was validly enacted, the county commissioners were 
empowered to enact the 1982 ordinance even if they did not (as Piercy alleges) 
comply with the mandates of IC 25-2402. 
Such being the case, a "mini-trial" to determine the validity of the county's 
herd district ordinance is unnecessary, since Piercy is bound by the herd district 
law in any event. 
Erika and Luis therefore respectfully request: that the Court dismiss 
Canyon County from this suit; that the Court rule that Piercy was obligated to 
abide by Canyon County's herd district law; and that the Court immediately set 
for trial the issues of who is liable for, and the amount of damages to be awarded 
for, the injuries sustained by Plaintiffs. 
DATED this f ~November, 2007. 
CHASAN & WAL TON, L.L.C. 
= 
By -----------
Timothy C. Walton, of the firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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AHO 
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4 'TiiE COURT: The next matter, GaiZaViay VliITTi\15 
S Johnson Farms. This is a case that I previously hHl"d 
6 af!luments from counsel. And thlllt weis on July zo. At 
T that time the motion on the - l)laiPtiff'S: motian ta 
B mike affidavits e:iseotially w~s no longer at Issue and 
9 summary Judgment was tha remaining Cssue. t didnlt rule 
10 e>n that case bei;ausethere was a slmllar caise pending 
11 before anothes- judife. A decision mi$ made ori t:liat case, 
12 and Mr. Gates, who's present on behllllf of the defendant, 
13 had served that an me and on Mr. Gunnell, Who's here on 
14 bel'lalf of the l)'laintiff. 
15 eecause or that document, I caused a 
16 eonfemnee call yes~rday to be placed to both counsel 
17 t:,o del:ermlne If they wanted ta stay these proceedings 
'f8 and awZ!lt further decision In that matter. I was 
19 advised by both counsel that neither party wanted to 
20 stay thfs action and that both sides were ready tD 
21 proceed with any fUrther aryument today and decision of 
22 the court. 
23 Is that your understanding, Mr. Gunnell? 
24 MR. GUNNELL.: Yes, lt is, Your Honor. 
25 THE COUR.T: Mr. Gates? 
1 
1 MR. GATES: Yas, Youi· Honor. 
2 THE COURT: All right. In the meantime, thete has 
3 been additional documentation provi~ by Mr. Gates, and 
4 I did have Q cha nee to review thi't and prior argumel'lts 
5 of coun!:el yest:erdP1y. I will permit counsel to comment 
I further at this time. 
1 Mr. Gunnell -- or Mr, Got=;? 
8 MR. GATES: Thank you, Y~ur Honor. I d()l11t know 
e whether it would serve the court best If I went thrcu~h 
10 the -- all of our entire a111uments again, but let me 
11 first eddMSS the issue of what were tbe boundaries ol' 
12 the Notus hera aistrlct at me time of the Initial 
13 designation of their district and then alter Gem and 
14 Payette counties ware taken out of Canyon C.Ounty bcick 111 
15 191.9 and Ut17. 
16 "rHS COUR.T: That's actually what you had submlt%ed 
11 as a·· 
MR. GAiES; That's correct. 1B 
19 THE <XIUR.I! -- suppl~ment. It was a multlple-page 
2D document, not one P-'SC, zictually, on the Notus herd 
district. 21 
22 Mil. GA1'cs: That's correct. 
THE COUR.T; You may proceed. 
1 northern pa ..:anyon County, basically redemgnated 
2 the h~rd districts in 1918. The only change to the 
3 Notus herd district was that the northern part of it was 
4 lopped off at th~ county line. 'The western border, 
6 whh:h Is the one that we're cancemed with, remained at 
G Fountain Road, whk:h Is appro)(lmat:ely one mile ~st of 
7 where the accident between l;he truck and the row took 
a place~ and it's cert:ainly outside the area of when;: the 
9 cow came from. 
10 So lf thl:! ~urt has any other qtJestions ori 
11 that. That's the cmrv aJ'!lumant,. additional argument 
12 that we have, excepc to say t:lti5t plaintiJf has basically 
13 argued that the 1Slfi3 versfon of the Notus herd district 
14 which puts the west b11rder about a mHe west of the 
15 orlglnat herd district western border is the tn.11:: one. 
1& Your Honer, If we did that, t'1is herd 
17 dlsb"lct, whi<:h W~$ unl'ortunately described by using a 
18 voting precinct: as Its boundaries, woold became a moving 
19 target, end Che herd dlsbict could be chansed whe.oev~r 
20 the voting precinct borders were changed. And, frankly, 
21 If that happene.d there wauld be a la<:X of due process 
22 there bel;i.'luse of the statute, !daho Code Section 
23 25-2402, would hot be followed with regard to any 
24 modification or change In nerQ disbicts. 
25 Sa It's our po$ltlon, Your Honor, that the 
3 
1 19iS herd distrld: rcdeslgnatlon which put the western 
.z bomer mt Fountain lls:>ad ls the correct l)ne. And we 
3 &till reit:entte our previQUS arguments theft~§"~ 
4 ~01:1nt;yJ1;1er:dllistlllct~11re-ga11111SC1op~ 
s dllttfelvarloos-m:ason'S'lffiatlwe\!fia-l>$'§6ifcai!ovel1Mn&t~fifr.e~ 
6 And I don't want to take up the ~LITT'~ tJme wttl'i 
7 rearguing everything, But suffice It to say thM: there 
8 are at lealSt eight difficulties with thal: particular 
o ordinance, ahd it ~houtd be lnvalidzited. 
1U All those ~rgumentS aside, Your Honor, the 
11 Notus nerd district does eont;;iin federal IMd whic::h h15S 
12 been usecl for gr21ziog b9S~d on the affldaivlts that we 
13 submitted q1.1ite iome time ~gg, And und'er the statute 
14 r-e9ardin9 herd district as it now stand5, we maintoin 
15 th11t bei;ause it does contain federal gtaztng land that 
1fi the Notus herd district Itself could be lnvalfdated If 
17 this court determines ttM3t the 1963 version of the Notus; 
18 voting 11rec;;lnc;t Is the correct one. 
19 so other r.l'lail'I that, Your Hor1or, w~ reniaw ou; 
ZD arguments ~llestfng sum~TY judgm~l'lt on behalf of 
21 JQhnso11 i=arms and WC;1uld request an ordar on that. Thank 
22 Ybu. 
~ THE COURT; Thank you, Mr. Gates. 23 
24- MR.. GAT"e5; The Canyon County commJss1onets, alter 24 Mr. Gunnell? 
MR. GUNNELi..: Thank you. Your Honor, with regard 
4 
25 the E>tate had created lwo new counties out: of the 25 
2 
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1 to tha lat~t argument by the' ns party for summary 'f pnor to J;;i 1, 1990, but st\all llpply to any 
2 juc1gment, we'd ask the court ci more consideration 
3 to the moat ret;ent legal description of the Notus voting 
4 precinct Which Included the area where this Incident 
5 occurred and which was provraed by the derensl!!, by 
6 defense counsel, as the appropriate district 11'1 earll~r 
7 affldavits for the -- Chat voti119 - or the boundaries 
8 of that voting precinct. And It's certainly not - a 
9 lot more n:cent thlln the 90-year-old version of the 
1 D Notus prednci:. 
11 In l!lnY event, Your Honor, we beHeve thi:lt the 
1Z court should reject the argument that the 1982 ordinance 
13 ls invalld. Your HoriDr, Idaho Code Section .:n-857 s;,vs. 
14 ~A legal prima fade presumption Is hereby deelared to 
1S exfst, after a lapse of two years from the date of such 
16 oraer"' with regard to herd -- herd and other districts. 
17 Presumption af vall<ntv. 
2 modification thereof.'' 
a The Mnter case simply does not i!SPPIY. That 
4 was deiillng With a herd district that was Cl'Cl5t:ed l'.lftcr 
5 19~. This herd district was t:reated in 1992. So with 
6 that, Your Honor. wll:h what we've submitted, we'd ask 
7 that the court deny the summary judg~nt motion. Th~nk 
8 you. 
9 
10 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Did you want to n::spond~ Mr. Gates? 
11 MR. GAICS: Jt.rs;t briefly, Your Honor. With 
12 respect tQ the .1.'382 ordinance~ essentially plaintiff Is 
13 asking us to prove a negative. Plaintiff has CXJrne up 
14 with no supporting evtden~ of 1'11$ own sayin9 that thrs 
15 5ti:ltute ts valtd. We hav~ to come up with evidence 
16 showing that lt"s invalid. 
17 If the P™urnptl'on -- tf'll! sJ;atutory 
18 And it's oUi' ~rgumcnt, Your Honor, thirt this 18 presumption Is so s.trong, then, Your HQnor, not even an 
19' matter could have bean taken up with the commission iong 19 unconstitutional orc11nanr:e could ewer be Invalidated, 
20 ago. It's 25 years old. This c:ounty h~ known for 25 20 because you'd ~Jwavs be byj11g to prove a ne~atlve which 
21 years I.hat it's a dosed district. 
22 The -- I fltid It ironic that now the del'endant 
23 Is ~aying that if there had been a petition, he wouldn't 
24 have signed It. Well, he's known it's been a closed 
25 dlstrli;:t fQr 2S years and has done nothing about rt 
5 
1 until thts lnc1oent occurred. 
2 In fact, the propert.Y damao= c;laim was paid 
3 readily for my dient's vehicle, right i:IW01y, as Is 
4 usually the c;;:ise and has been going on for years. And 
5 the commissioners drd a goorl thing by closing the ~ 
6 this dfstric:t: based upon the growth of ttiis area. 
7 People n~ed .. - people have relied upon thilt, that It Is 
8 a closed district, for yei:lrs. 
9 lhls IS a stran9 presumption. and it requires 
10 deer and convincing evidence to overcome. 
'11 The Supreme Court has stated that the court 
12 will not presume a procedural Irregularity In the race 
1 ~ of ~ilence as to procedures taken If the defensis has not 
14 shown enough evidence to show that the Irregularities 
1$ existed. 
'16 The Idaho COde Section 25-2404 soiys, 
17 "Commissioners shall make an order creating such herd 
18 dlstri<:ts, in accordance with the prayer of the 
19 petltlOl'I, or with such modific=itlons as Jt may choose to 
20 mrike." And we believe the defendant has f'ftlted to 
21 overcome that presumption. 
n Also, Your ttonor, we reiterate our ~19ument 
23 that me current law M al'l"lal'lded Jn 1996 dearly &tates, 
Z4 "The provlsfOllS of this chapter shall npt apply to any 
25 herd dlSttid: ol" herd ordinance in ft.Ill foree and effect 
6 
21 Is dlfflwlt, as the court koOW$. 
22 So ~ bt!lfave tflat the ordinance, number one, 
23 Is Invalid on Its !'ace, bl!caU$~ it foils to meet the 
24 standards set out In the 1963 version of Idaho Cocle 
25 Semon 25-2402 In that It lnduded open range areas. 
7 
1 Amt it sald ritJht In the ordinance, we're going to 
2 ini;!Ude all of the rest of the open rang~ ~~s In 
3 0:111yon county_ Well, the 1963 version of th~ statute 
4 IMIYS that open r.ange -- thut h~rd cllsb'lcts cannot be 
5 created out of open range areas. So right there t'he 
6 statute is iawalld. 
7 Plus there was no enactment date WhQh the 
_ 8 lrti:$b.lt1t was going to go lnl:D etrect. The -- thlu"e's no 
s desaiption of the animals who are affected by the herd 
10 distric;t. There was no notice that we could Hnd either 
11 in the recorder"s office or at the newspape:rs that we~ 
12 published at tl'lert time. There was no petition that WQ 
1S cnuld find in the recorder's office. So we bell~e that 
14 there w~re adequate re"sons. for lnvalldath'l9 the 1982 
1$ herd distrtct ordinance. 
16 With regard to the 1990 amel'ldl'\"lent of Idaho 
1? Cade Sectioo 25 .. 2402, we'd just remind the court:~ at 
18 the end or the - ar In the statute -- that's 
19 25-2402.(Z)(a), Wl'llch says, •Notwithstanding any other 
20 provision of law w the 'ontrarv, no herd district 
21 she.11: Olnt~ln any (ands owned by the Unltl!d Sl;al:e$ of 
22 Amertc:a or the state of Idaho, upon which ttie gri!IZlng of 
23 livestock has htstorlcally been permitted." 
24 That seems fairly clear and stralghtrorward. 
2.5 tt's this court's duty to interpret that statut:e. And 
a 
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1 we maintain that thnt is d~eir herd district 1 THE r: AJI rl~ht, Okay. 
2 ~nnot contain either state 1:1r 2 Now, that old statute required, then, a 
3 Ahd with that, Your Honor, we thanlC you again 3 majon"ly of thi! landowners In any - and this is 
4 !Ind a~tn r~uest that we be 9ranted summary 1udgment. 4 2.5-2402. A rnaJority of the landowner.; in any area or 
S THE COURT: All rfght. 111ank you, counsel. 6 district prescribe by metes and bounds, not !ndoding 
6 This i$ an intriguing case. Both sides have 6 Open rangE!, and/or also resident and qual!fled electors 
7 spel"lt & «;ansldentble period or time. We've boon too king 7 of the state of Idaho. And then it's mCJY petition the 
8 e~ old minute:> from county commissioners meetlngs. a board of caunty commlssirmets in writing to create such 
~ We've been Jocking at maps, affidavlt:s from 9 area a herd district. 
10 commissioners from years ago, 25 years ago. at the time 10 So I view that - and I'll talk a little bit 
11 that me !lecond hflrd district st.ipposedly was set up in 11 more about statutory interpretation as a citizen option. 
12 canyon County. 1<a The second statute which the plaintlff argues 
13 13 iSI appllcabli: is the i.983 5tatute. And there had been 
14 ase was operating 14 some litigation, ancl that was discussed by both sides 
15 whic:h collided with ii CJ:JW on Highway 20/26 between NQtus 15 regarding whether BLM lands could be lnduded. But that 
16 and Panna. And that local.ion where that aeddent 16 amendment or that statute In 1983 essentlafly amended 
17 occurred, of course, is the focal point of the arguments 17 two matters. Ancl that was that the herd district could 
18 before me. i1le ~laintiffs trudc W<:1S damaged, ~nd the 18 not contain any lands owned by the United States and 
19 plaintiff std'l'erea lnJUties and brought the Instant suit 19 managed by the BLM and then, sei;ondly, the subpc:irt, riot 
20 against the defendant, Johnson fanns, who had care or 20 partic:ulariy relevant here, but was that the 
:21 tne cow at the time of this accld'lht. 21 establishment of a herd district shall not result In a 
22 The defendant Rvest'Otk owner contends that 22 highway di:Wict being held liable. so there was a 
23 the accident occurred in open range beetiusc the 1982 23 protection fOr liability of the highway disbict. 
24 Canyon county ordinance placing tha ~ubjec;I; property 24 This court condudes that the board proceed~d 
25 into a hc:rd dlsb"ict was Improperly acioptea. 25 to create a herd diStrict In 1962, and ultlmately t•rn 
9 11 
1 t:ssentiaJty, rm being called upe>rt to analyze 
2 the applicability of two mtutes, the 1907 statute on 
3 herd districts and tllen the 1983 statute. 
4 The 1~07 statute had a mandate. Specific;ally 
5 l:he board of - and thl:s fs a quote. "The bo<trd or 
6 county eammissioners of' Qach CCJunty In the stata shall 
1 have the power to create herd districts In such county 
8 as hereafter provided." 
9 And it's kind of 1nterestin91 because in 
10 statutory construction the attorneys and myself are 
11 always looking to •may" and "sn~ll." The caption 
12 heading for the sratute says, "CommiSsioners may crute 
1a herd distncts.14 It does contain the ltshall." 
14 The l.980 hen:I distr"id: that Mr, Gates 
1 S continues ta arg1.1"' is opplicable here would place the 
16 accident site outside a herd district ~nd in open range. 
1 t Is that corrett? 
is MR. GATES; If 1 understand YQl,ff H1Jnor corred:iy, 
19 yes, the -.. bssed upon what we were able to determine 
20 and h~ed upon the herd district stawte - or, exeu$1! 
21 me, the herd district map wnicl'\ was submitted with the 
'22 1982 Canyon <;;ounty ordinance, yes, that the location C)f 
23 the accld®t did occur Jn open riange and, furthennorn, 
24. the cow came from an area that was s::irevlously open 
25 range. 
10 
1 requin::d to apply the law that was In effect at that 
2 time. l'm c::slled upon to interpret the statute as It 
3 existed In 1982. 
4 IJndar stab)tory lnterpretal:lonlll!illl•aJ1f1~ 
5 1999 
6 case. And therein the file only quotes, ~llt!mF!l!f 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1i e 
- --- ~ 
' 
14 95i suptt;!me Court case. The rule • • th~ 
15 general rules of stab.ltory construction also apply tQ 
16 the inl;erp.ret or loc;tl ordinances. And obviously I'm 
17 looking at the ~nYon County ordinance at Issue herein. 
18 S~CQncUy I cite Lewiston versus Matthewson, 76 
19 rdaha ~7 at page 351, a 1956 Idaho Suprem~ court case-
20 -rhe l'l.Jltil, eonstn.u;;tion of an ordinance is l.l ciu~stlon of 
21 law tor the court to detelTl'\tne. 
~ t ul5o i;ite Ada County versus Gib~n. 126 
23 Idaho 8S4 &t: page S59. This I& a Court of App@21ls. 1995 
24 case. And I quot~. "It is a)!ioml!ltlc: that the objective 
:ZG in interpreting a stabJtQ or ordinance Is to derive the 
12 
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1 intent of the legislative body dr>pted the act. 
2 AnV ~uch atialysis begins wltti literal language ot' 
3 th~ enactment. Where the statutory language is 
4 unam~iguous, the clearly e~re5:ied intent of the 
S legislative body mLtSt be given effect, and there is no 
S o~lon for a court to consider rules of statutory-
., construalon. Where the ~ngulilge of a statute or 
8 ordinahce is ambiguous, however, the court Jooks to 
9 roles of ~h$tructlon fol"' gufdanc:e ... 
10 And l also cite for the aspect Of p~umptJon 
11 of validity l:M cases discussed by coun5el. Boise aty 
12 versus Beerer Homes, 72 Idaho 441 at r>ase 447, a 1952 
13 Supreme c:ourt case. Ordinances and tesolutions of a 
14 municipal corporation are presumed valld Until the 
15 contrary Is l>hown. The burden ls on tne party who 
16 attacks such ad; to show the ilJegziijty thereaf, 
17 And then secondly with regard to the 
18 presumptloh of validity, Cole-Coflist.er l'fN'WUS Boise, 93 
19 Idaho 558, a 1970 ca&e at page 563. And therein the 
20 standard that Mr. Gunnell mentiQlled again this morning, 
21 th"'t presumption has. to be OVetO)me by dearly~ 
22 convincing, and uncnntradleted evidence. 
23 With regerd dgain to tile presumption of 
211 validity statute, 1 cite 31-857, which addN""s the 
~ presumption of valldlcY of c:reation of herd atstrtcts 
13 
NV.,::llL r. ~..au 
S~y v. E. G. Johnson F~rms 
·1 empow e case law and statotes to ~ke the 
2 action they did In this atSe. 
3 No~~att21d<~th:v:iicJ1tfof 
4 the way that tnat ... prop<>Sitl~1De'Jfiif01Tf~Uff~ ~~~-"' ~,, 5 Mt, Gates' -· - er as~ in 
8 ~on4,,,· .. - , .. ~:~· 
7 n 
B ·f'iaf''"''' '.,,-"'·--··~ _ .. . ~dlt;y, ~nd I 
s . •halfli6f~his bu~ell of pr~~'~'tRfir0• .. 
10 It's a high standard. And 2.5 years have 
11 lapsed. That's pretty compelling in thrs 12se. 
12 So I don't see that·- and I have to lndlca~e 
13 coul\$el did work very hard at bringing a lot or evlden<;e 
14 In. Butthe ... ~~ .. 00!'~.~~~~· 
15 I coni;tude"'at this ee r.<-·--
16 ~ Further, there Is no prohibition of eLM land 
17 oh tM 1982 statute. Therefore this coatt J.s not 
18 emr>owered to Invalidate the herd district t1s 54)1.lght by 
19 the def'enc:fonts. 
20 Idaho Code 31~857 stab!s that after a herd 
21 dlStrlct Is created, I quote, "a legal plima fade 
22 pres1.1mptlon i$ hereby dedared to exist, after a lapse 
23 of two years front the di.lte of such order." So we have 
24 w~tl mo,..., than two years which have lapsed. We have 25 
25 yurE. And, again, I don't find that the dcf~nd~rit has 
15 
1 and provides that whenever any herd district be declared 1 overcome that Gtrbng presumption. 
2 to be created by order of the board of county 2 "l'he defendant hills aJso argued that federal lew 
3 commissioners in any county of the state of Idaho -- and 3 preempts the field, and t;heref'Ora the herd district ls 
4 I stress ~- a legal prima fade presumption is hereby 4 invalid. l do not find this. argument to be compelllng, 
5 declared tQ exist, after a la~ of two years from the 5 because the federat statute tl'\at was relied upon does 
8 rJilte of the order. Ii ni;at cover the same subj~ mertt~r as the herd <2lstrlct 
7 And nnany with regard ro presumption, I dte 7 and applies to cr!rrtinal prosecutions for trespassing on 
8 Benewah County cattlemen'$ ASsoc;h:ltion versus Benewah 8 BLM land, So I clid not: find that argument to be 
9 County, 105 ldaho 209, a 1983 case from the Suprernra 9 compellll'lg. 
10 court. And l quote. This Is on po:ige 214. "Wrthln the 10 I find the defendant has failed to meet Its 
11 legislative contemplation was a process whereby a 11 burden on summary 3ue1gment. ihe herd district iS 
12 majority of the landowners in an area could compel the 12 presumed valid. And although w11 did Walt for the 
13 county to create herd districts and thereby place upo11 13 decision of one of my eoll~g1.1os who Is another district 
14 livestock OW11em within such districts the duty to fence '14 judge, I'm obviously not bound by that, so I guess I'm 
15 In their stock. we find nothing In that statutory . , _ 15 conciuding dlfl'erently. But both counsel Indicated that 
16 scheme lndleating · t exerc;ise e·r, p·oif~?"~ '·16 they prefer to have this CQl.lft rule, and so I've gone 
17 power to control rooming I 17 ahead and ruled today. 
18 Ignore any problems and wait until action is forced upon 18 Now, what E'll have for my findings, fonnal 
the county f)y presentation of a petition for the 19 findings and conc:1us1ons Is the court reporters 
fonnation Qf it herd d g "- · -· 20 tran$Crlpt. tilld I'll be glad to sign that if necessary 
e landowners 
presented a petition. On the contrary, the board was 
14-
:21 as written doeumentittic>n. 
22 Mr. GunneU, I wlll lnstruc.t you to prepare 
23 only an order Indicating my final ruling \n this matter, 
24 and then all of my legal cooc:luslons will be contained 
21i of record. 
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• MK. GUNNELL; That'll e,. Your iionor. 
2 THE COURT: Anything er from either side? 
3 MR. GATES: No, Your Honor. 
-4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you .. guys. 
::i MR. GUNNELL: Thank you. 
6 
7 (The proceedings condud~cf t1t 9:46 a.m.) 
B 
9 
10 
11 
1~ 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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20 
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22 
23 
24 
2S 
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NU. ? j t L r. o LP#"W 
10125107 
l~V. ?JI L r. ~ ._Q-'[J_ 
RBPOR.!'D'S CKRT:tFXCA'rE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF CANYON } 
I, KA~HERINE J. KLEMETSON, RPR, CSR f~36, one 
of the duly appointed quali~1ed and acting official 
reporters of the Third Judicial District of the Stat~ of 
Idaho. do hereby car~i!y that I reported in shorthand 
the evidence and proceedings adduced in the above and 
foregoing cause1 and that I thereafter transer~bed sa~d 
shorthand notes intc typewriting ~nd that the within and 
foregoing pages cons~ituta a full, t£ue and correct copy 
of the tr~nscript of eaid evidence and to the best of my 
ability and according to my shorthand notes consistinq 
of pages l through 18, inclasive. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
hand this 5th day of November, 2007. 
1odged ~ith me this day 
of , 2007. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk 
By: 
18 
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DAVID L. YOUNG, ISB #3679 
CHARLES L. SAARI, ISB #2121 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
~JLJd9.M. 
NOV 0 8 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA, by and through 
LOREE RIVERA, her mother and natural 
guardian; and LUIS J. GUZMAN, by and 
through BALLARDO GUZMAN, his father 
and natural guardian, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants, 
) 
) 
) CASE NO. CVOS-4848 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) ANSWEROFTHIRDPARTY 
) DEFENDANT CANYON COUNTY, 
) IDAHO 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
). 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
COMES NOW, Third Party Defendant Canyon County, Idaho, by and through its attorney 
of record the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney, and in answer to Third Party Plaintiff 
RIVERA/GUZMAN CV05-4848 
ANSWER OF THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT CANYON COUNTY 
N:\CVL LIT\2007\Piercy-Sutton\Answer of Defendant Canyon County.wpd 
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Jennifer Sutton, alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. 
This answering Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Third Party Complaint 
not specifically and expressly admitted herein. 
2. 
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are admitted. 
3. 
Paragraph 12 is admitted but this Defendant avers that other matters, in addition to the 
1908 order establishing a Canyon County Herd District, are addressed in Exhibit B, attached to 
the Third Party Complaint. 
4. 
In response to Paragraph 13, this Defendant is without information or belief as to the truth 
of the allegations contained in the first sentence of paragraph 13 of the Third Party Complaint, 
and, therefore, denies the same. 
5. 
In response to Paragraph 13, this Defendant admits the second sentence and avers that the 
County Commissioners by its action added five percent of open range land to the existing herd 
district, consisting of ninety-five percent of the land of Canyon County, Idaho. 
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6. 
Paragraph 14 is admitted. 
7. 
Paragraph 15 is denied and this Defendant avers that the Canyon County 1982 herd 
district was validly created or established in accordance with law. 
8. 
Paragraph 16 is denied. 
9. 
Paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 are admitted. 
10. 
This answering Defendant realleges its answers to paragraphs 1 through 19 as if the same 
were set out here and in full. 
11. 
Paragraphs 21 and 22 are admitted. 
12. 
To the extent a response is required to Paragraph 23, Paragraph 23 is denied. 
13. 
Paragraph 24 is admitted in that the Court has authorized the joining of this answering 
Defendant to this action and this Defendant avers that the 1908 and 1982 herd districts were 
validly created or established. 
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14. 
Paragraphs 25 and 26 are admitted as to the parties' requests but this answering 
Defendant avers that the 1908 and 1982 Canyon County Herd Districts were validly created or 
established. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The 1908 and 1982 herd districts were validity created or established following proper 
procedures in accordance with law. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
By Idaho Code § 31-857, the 1908 and 1982 herd districts were validly created or 
established and a prima facie presumption by operation of law exists and provides that all 
proceedings and jurisdictional steps preceding the making of the herd district orders were 
properly and regularly taken; the burden of proof rests on those challenging the validity of the 
creation or establishment of herd districts. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Idaho Code§ 73-101 provides that statutes cannot be applied retroactively without the 
expressed intent of the legislature and no such intent is found in the governing herd district 
statutes. 
WHEREFORE, Third Party Defendant Canyon County, Idaho, having fully answered 
Third Party Plaintiff Jennifer Sutton's Third Party Complaint, prays as follows: 
1. The Defendant prays that the Court find that the 1908 and 1982 Canyon County, Idaho 
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herd districts were validly created or established. 
2. This answering Defendant be awarded its costs of suit incurred herein. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court seems just and equitable in the premises. 
Dated this Bib day of November, 2007. 
RIVERNGUZMAN CVOS-4848 
ANSWER OF THIRD PARTY 
DEFENDANT CANYON COUNTY 
DAVID L. YOUNG 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: {;Jurz/l, L S ~ 
Charles L. Saari 
Attorney for Defendant Canyon County, Idaho 
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~ • I \ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jl1h day of November, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER OF THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT CANYON COUNTY was served on 
the following in the manner indicated. 
Joshua S. Evett 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
251 East Front Street 
Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Timothy C. Walton 
Chas an & Wal ton, LLC 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 
Stephen E. Blackburn 
Blackburn Law, P.C. 
660 East Franklin Road 
Suite 220 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
Ryan Peck 
Saetrum Law Offices 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Board of Commissioners 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
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Overnight Delivery 
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U.S. Mail 
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Hand Deli very 
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Overnight Delivery 
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Overnight Delivery 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
~ L SQ-QM' 
Charles L. Saari 
Attorney for Defendant, Canyon County, Idaho 
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Joshua S. Evett 
Meghan E. Sullivan 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
Post Office Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Evett - ISB #5587 
Sullivan - ISB #7038 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
F I L E D 
---A.M !Cb P.M. 
NOV 2 7 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J DRAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA, by and through LOREE 
RIVERA, her mother and natural guardian; 
and LUIS J. GUZMAN, by and through 
BALLARDO GUZMAN, his father and 
natural guardian, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV05-4848 
DEFENDANT JENNIFER SUTTON'S 
RESPONSE AND JOINDER IN 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton ("Sutton"), by and through her counsel of record, does hereby 
respond and join Plaintiffs Erika L. Rivera and Luis J. Guzman's ("Plaintiffs") Motion to 
Reconsider. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On or about October 9, 2007, this Court entered an Order Denying Defendant Piercy's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County, and Holding All Other Motions In 
Abeyance Until the Herd District's Validity is Resolved. On or about October 15, 2007, an 
Action for Declaratory Judgment was filed against Canyon County. Thereafter on or about 
November 8, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Reconsider supported by a memorandum. On 
November 8, 2007, Canyon County filed its Answer of Third Party Defendant. 
The Court's decision denying Defendant Dale Piercy's ("Piercy") motion for summary 
judgment did not address the estoppel arguments raised in the briefing by Sutton and Plaintiffs. 
Should the Court determine that Defendant Piercy is estopped from raising the validity of the 
1982 herd district ordinance, then dismissal of Canyon County from this action is warranted and 
proper. Sutton joins in the arguments set forth by Plaintiffs in the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Reconsider to the extent such arguments are consistent with Sutton's arguments in her 
memorandum in opposition to Piercy's motion for summary judgment. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Piercy's Motion to Void a 25-Year-Old Ordinance Is Barred by the Doctrine of Estoppel by 
Lach es 
The doctrine of estoppel by !aches is applicable in cases where a party claims that an 
ordinance is invalid because of the means of its enactment. Lachesis a claim founded in equity 
and is a species of estoppel. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (2004). Most cases in Idaho 
regarding the application of I aches in the context of a challenge to a law or regulation involve 
municipal annexations. In Alexander v. Trustees of Village of Middleton, 92 Idaho 823 (1969), 
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Middleton annexed land owned by plaintiff but did so in violation of state law. In that case 
plaintiff made arguments similar to Piercy in this case: that a municipality (in this case a county) 
derives its authority solely from the state legislature and that only annexations (in this case herd 
districts) complying with the conditions, restrictions, and limitations imposed by the state are 
valid. Id., 92 Idaho at 825. 
The Alexander Court cited MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Vol. 2, § 7.09, 
holding that if the elements of estoppel are present, the owners of land over which a municipal 
corporation has exercised the powers and functions of government for a significant time will be 
estopped from questioning the location of municipal boundaries. Alexander, 92 Idaho at 826. 
The Alexander Court, citing Finucane v. Village of Hayden, 86 Idaho 199 (1963), with approval, 
noted that this rule is applied even though the municipal boundaries as extended are void when 
by reason of lapse of time municipal authority has been exercised, and there have resulted 
changed conditions involving extensive public and private interests. Alexander, 92 Idaho at 826 
(citations omitted). 
These holdings are based on public policy. Where the parties acquiesce in the action of 
public officials and transact business on the theory that the land is located with the boundaries of 
the municipality, it is in the interest of the general public that such a rule be applied. Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Lapse of time, while an important element, is not controlling in determining the 
applicability of a laches defense. Finucane, 86 Idaho at 206. "Courts must accord due legal 
regard to all surrounding circumstances, and the acts of the parties in their relationship to the 
property involved in the controversy." Id. (citations omitted). 
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In the Alexander case, Idaho Code § 50-303 provided, in pertinent part, that a 
municipality could only annex property "laid off into lots or blocks, containing not more than 
five acres ofland each .... " Alexander, 92 Idaho at 824. It was stipulated in the case that the 
plaintiff Alexander's property was larger than five acres and technically was annexed in violation 
of 50-303. Id., 92 Idaho at 823 and 825. ("All parcels of property involved herein exceed five 
acres in size and all are devoted to agricultural uses.") 
In Alexander, more than two years had elapsed from the annexation to the time suit was 
filed. Plaintiffs were notified of the intent to annex and the annexation was accomplished. 
Plaintiffs knew their land would be annexed. Plaintiffs' land benefitted through increased value 
and the elimination of hazardous health conditions. There was a correlative detriment to the 
municipality by expenditures of money to maintain the sewer system to which plaintiffs' property 
was attached following annexation. 
On these facts, the Idaho Supreme Court estopped the appellant in that case from arguing 
that the municipal boundaries were void. 
Other jurisdictions have had similar holdings. For example, the Court of Appeals of 
Indiana held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that landowners' challenge 
to validity of city ordinance was barred by doctrine oflaches. Simon v. City of Auburn, Ind., Bd. 
of Zoning Appeals, 519 N.E.2d 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). In Simon, the Building Commissioner 
of the City of Auburn issued a building permit to Cedar Gleri Joint Venture to construct two 
condominiums in the Auburn area. Id. at 206. Both Plaintiffs lived near the site in question and 
brought action against Defendants on the issue of whether under the Indiana Code a city's 
general zoning ordinance is legally valid when it purports to incorporate by reference a zoning 
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map but no zoning map is included in the ordinance and no zoning map is on file in the city 
clerk-treasurer's office. Id. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 
plaintiffs' claim was barred by the doctrine oflaches. Id. at 215. The Court based its holding on 
the fact that plaintiffs did not initiate an action challenging the legal validity of the ordinance 
until nearly seventeen years after its enactment. Id. Furthermore, the Court held that plaintiffs 
were charged with knowledge of and acquiescence in the content of the zoning ordinance, and to 
allow plaintiffs to prevail would cause prejudice to defendants since defendants had already 
expended significant amounts of money on the development of the property at issue. Id. Lastly, 
the Court reasoned that to invalidate the ordinance would cause chaos, confusion and controversy 
to the City of Auburn, such that would hinder the economic growth and development of the 
entire area covered by the zoning ordinance. Id. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that prosecutrix was barred from 
challenging the validity of an ordinance that was nine years old. Benequit v. Borough of 
Monmouth Beach, 125 N.J.L. 65, 67-68, 13 A.2d 847, 849 (N.J. Sup. Ct.1940). InBenequit, the 
prosecutrix was convicted of violating a zoning ordinance. Id. at 847. On appeal was the issue 
of whether the ordinance was invalid for the reason that it had not been published in a qualified 
newspaper as required by statute. Id. at 849. 
In Benequit, the Court held that prosecutrix's complaint was barred by !aches. Id. The 
Court reasoned that the ordinance had been in effect for over nine years and that presumably 
citizens had conformed to its provisions. Id. There was also evidence that the prosecutrix knew 
of the ordinance as evidenced by a letter sent to the defendant borough stating that she had 
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purchased the property, that it was located in a zone wherein business was prohibited and applied 
'for a special exception to the terms of the zoning ordinance permitting the above mentioned 
premises to be licensed for a first class hotel'. Id. At the time of sending the letter, prosecutrix 
did not attack the validity of the ordinance. Id. The Court held that even assuming that the 
ordinance was not published in a qualified newspaper, such irregularity was merely procedural 
and the prosecutrix under these facts and circumstances was guilty oflaches, which estopped her 
from challenging the validity of the ordinance. Id. 
Although "lapse of time" is not dispositive, in the instant case it should be. In 
determining whether the doctrine oflaches applies, the Court must give "consideration ... to all 
surrounding circumstances and acts of the parties." Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 449 
(1996) (citations omitted, emphasis added). The time lapse between the enactment of the 1982 
herd district ordinance and this action is almost twenty-five years. Piercy has failed to show 
reasonable justification for the delay in challenging the ordinance. Essentially, the passage of 
twenty-five years demonstrates an implied waiver of the right to seek to invalidate the 1982 herd 
district ordinance by knowing acquiescence in a condition that had existed for so many years. 
The alleged defects, which are primarily technical irregularities, were present and could 
have been discovered and challenged twenty-five years ago, before so many citizens of Canyon 
County had come to rely on the validity of the ordinance. Piercy challenges the ordinance only 
after one of his cattle caused a motor vehicle accident. To invalidate the 1982 herd district 
ordinance accomplishes Piercy' s own individual purposes and would cause prejudice to the 
entire Canyon County community and more particularly, Plaintiffs. 
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Piercy challenges an ordinance that has been in effect for 25 years. When the ordinance 
was passed, neither Jennifer Sutton, Erika Rivera, nor Luis Guzman were even born. Glenn 
Koch, one of the commissioners who voted on the ordinance is 80 years old and cannot recall the 
details leading up to the passage of the ordinance. (See Affidavit of Glenn 0. Koch in 
Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment previously filed July 20, 2007 
("Koch Aff.").) The other two commissioners who voted on the ordinance are dead. (Id., iI 3.) 
The entirety of Canyon County has followed the "fence in" rule of the herd district, as 
opposed to the "fence out" rule of open range, for 25 years. For 25 years Canyon County 
ranchers have had the responsibility to fence in their livestock to keep their stock off the road and 
off their neighbors' property. Piercy himself admits that all livestock in CanyonCounty, to his 
knowledge, are either fenced in or contained by natural geographic barriers, such as rivers. This 
includes his own livestock. 
The public benefits and influence on public and private behavior of Canyon County's 25-
year herd district status are significant. Cattle are not allowed on Canyon County roads, and the 
county's police officers have confirmed that repeatedly in depositions. For 25 years it has been a 
misdemeanor for a rancher in Canyon County to permit his cattle to run at large in Canyon 
County. See Idaho Code§ 25-2407. For 25 years a rancher in Canyon County has been strictly 
liable for damages caused by his livestock to the property of others. See Idaho Code § 25-2408. 
For 25 years county commissioners have had the authority to order agricultural landowners in the 
vicinity of public domain where livestock are grazed to fence their land to prevent livestock in a 
herd district from entering onto their land. See Idaho Code§ 25-2405. 
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At the time of the accident there were no "Open Range" warning signs or cattle warning 
signs along the road where the accident happened. (See Affidavit of Jennifer Sutton previously 
filed July 24, 2007, iI 5.) Ms. Sutton had seen such signs in other parts ofidaho before the 
accident and understood these signs to indicate that livestock might be in the roadway and that 
she should keep a lookout for cattle. (Id., iI 6.) Jennifer Sutton did not expect any cattle on the 
road the night of this accident (see id., iI 8), a product of the absence of these warning signs and 
the fact that she grew up in an area where ranchers were required by county ordinances to keep 
their cattle fenced in. 
Piercy has benefitted from herd district status as his lands have not been subject to 
depredations from the at large cattle of his neighbors. Because he is required to fence his cattle 
in, fewer of his livestock (and the livestock of others) have been on the road and subject to injury 
or death because of collisions with automobiles. In the same way that third party automobile 
drivers have been protected since 1982 by a county wide herd district, Piercy has benefitted from 
that protection in his travels on roads throughout Canyon County. 
If ever public policy supported the application of estoppel by !aches, this is the case. 
Generations of Canyon County residents, Canyon County governments, and Canyon County law 
enforcement, have assumed the entire county is in a herd district. They have ordered their 
behavior accordingly. It is too late for Piercy, having benefitted from the herd district status of 
Canyon County for 25 years, to now complain about alleged technical defects in the ordinance's 
passage because he finds himself in this unfortunate case. He has had more than enough time to 
challenge herd district status and has not provided any reasonable justification for the delay in 
challenging the ordinance. 
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Last, because laches is an equitable doctrine, the Court is permitted to consider all the 
circumstances surrounding the issues raised by the parties. The Court can take into consideration 
the passage of time, fading of memories, and disappearance of evidence in determining whether 
it is equitable to uphold the validity of the herd district ordinance. Piercy and Plaintiffs have 
submitted affidavits, two by Glenn Koch (one of the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982) 
and the clerk of the Canyon County District Court in 1982, Bill Straker. Neither can remember 
whether the ordinance was passed pursuant to a petition. (See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment previously filed July 20, 2007, 
p. 19.) Neither man can recall the details leading to passage of the ordinance. Two of the county 
commissioners who voted on the 1982 ordinance are dead. (See Koch Aff., ~ 3.) 
This is precisely the type of situation laches is intended to avoid. Time has passed, 
memories have faded, and it is accordingly inequitable to force Plaintiffs and Ms. Sutton to 
defend a 25-year-old ordinance based on incomplete county records, faded memories, and 
incomplete evidence. 
Equity firmly supports upholding this herd district under the doctrine of estoppel by 
laches. 
DATED this 11{4.- day of November, 2007. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By C)d}1er-
Joshua S. Evett 
Attorneys for Defendant Jennifer Sutton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2'1Jtday of November 2007 I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Timothy C. Walton U.S. Mail 
Chasan & Walton, LLC Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 1069 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
./ Facsimile 
Stephen E. Blackbum U.S. Mail 
Blackbum Law, P.C. Hand Delivery 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 255 Overnight Mail 
Meridian, ID 83642 v Facsimile 
RyanB. Peck U.S. Mail 
Saetrum Law Offices Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 7425 Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83707 ~ Facsimile 
Charles L. Saari U.S. Mail 
Canyon County Prosecutor Hand Delivery 
Canyon County Courthouse Overnight Mail 
1115 Albany / Facsimile 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Joshua S. Evett 
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Rodney R. Saetrum, ISB: 2921 
Ryan B. Peck,_ ISB: 7022 
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101 S. Capitol Blvd 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone; (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA by and through LOREE 
RIVERA her mother and natural guardian AND 
LUIS J. GUZMAN by and through BALLARDO 
GUZMAN his father and natural guardian, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PJERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV05-4848 · 
DEFENDANT PIERCY'S 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
. I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the Court's Memorandum Decision regarding Defendant Piercy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider that ruling. Plaintiffs are essentially 
requesting that since the Court did not address the issues of estoppel in its Memorandum Decision 
that it now hold, as a matter of law, that Defendant Piercy is estopped from talcing the· position that 
the land where the subject bull was being pastured at the time of the accident is open range. 
Despite Plaintiffs assertions that they would limit the current motion to estoppel issues, they 
request that the Court now adopt the reasoning offered by Judge Hoff in a different case involving 
different parties. 
Il. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
At the hearing on the Defendant Picrcy's motion to vacate, Plain.tiffs' provided the Court a 
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case to support their position that they should be allowed to move forward with their motion to 
reconsider. In that case the Idaho Supreme Court states the applicable standard of adjudication if a 
non-moving party is to be granted summary judgment on an issue brought before the Court: "In 
instances where summary judgment is granted to the non-moving party, this Court liberally 
construes the record in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was entered." Harwood 
v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677·678, 3~ P.3d 612, 617, 618 (2001). This case establishes that for 
Plaintiffs to prevail upon their motion to reconsider, they must prove that there are no genuine 
issues of material fact regarding the issues of estoppel, while looki,n.g at the evidence before the 
Court in a light most favorable to Defendant Piercy. 
m. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Plaintiff admittedly has not provided the Court with any new case law or facts upon which 
to rule on the issue of estoppel. Plaintiffs' and Co-Defendant's affidavits as they were presented as 
part of the proceedings on Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment are the only evidence 
Plaintiffs have to support their motion to reconsider. The evidence provided does not support a 
claim for estoppels or !aches. 
A. Plaintiffs and CcrDefendant have failed to ~tabllsb the defense of quui-estoppeL 
Neither the ·Plaintiffs' nor the Co-Defendant's memorandums regarding these issues set 
forth the actual elements they must prove in order to establish a defense of quasi-estoppeL A 
cursory look at the elements of equitable estoppel shows Plaintiffs' and Co-Defendant's lack of 
evidence to support the defense of quasi-estoppel. The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
The doctrine of quasi~estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment 
of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken." (Citation 
omitted). This doctrine applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position 
than his or her .original position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage 
or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
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inconsistent position fr<?m one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
(Citation omitted). 
Atwoodv. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d310·(2006). 
The first element requires that a party asserting quasi-estoppel prove that the offending party 
took a contradictory position to that party's current position. The case law cited by Plaintiffs, 
although much older than the more current Atwood case~ states the same requirement. ((The 
requirements for proper application of quasi estoppel are, then, that the person against whom it is 
sought to be applied has previously taken an inconsistent position, with knowledge of the facts and 
his rights, to the detriment of the person seeking application of the doctrine." KTVB, Inc. v. Boise 
City; 94 Idaho 279, 282, 486 P.2d 992, 995 (1971). Unless it is established that a party has taken a 
contrary position then they cannot be held barred under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, despite their 
knowledge of, benefit from or acquiescence in an action. 
The 'other elements of quasi-estoppel are only relevant if Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant can 
first prove there is no genuine issue of fact upo~ whether Defendant Piercy took a contrary position 
to the position he is currently asserting. Plaintiff bas not provided any real evidence that MI. Piercy 
either thought that the land in question was a herd district or that he ever took that position. 'Mr. 
Piercy's second ~davit in support of sununazy judgment states that he has always thought that the 
land where the bull came from was in open range. This testimony is not contradicted by any other 
testimony. Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant have utterly failed to provide any evidence to prove this 
element of quasi-estoppel. Defendant Piercy has always believed that his pasture was in open range 
and has never contradicted that position. 
Tue only fact Plaintiff can positively assert is that prior to this lawsuit Defendant Piercy did 
not challenge the 1982 ordinances affect upon his land. The Idaho Appellate Court upheld a Trial 
Court's decision that such evidence as stated above was insufficient to apply the doctrine of 
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equitable estoppel. Winn v. Eaton, 128 Idaho 670, 675, 917 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Id.App. 1996). The 
Court held that the Defendants asserting equitable estoppel did not meet their burden of proof 
regarding equitable estoppe~. Jd. The Defendants alleged in an easement case that because the 
Plaintiffs lived forty feet behind them and shared a driveway that they were well aware of what 
Defendants were doing in staking out their property. The Defendant also cited that it was only after 
Defendants had completed huilding their home that Plaintiffs attempted to assert their rights. Tue 
Court st.ated that such silence before the trial on the issue is not evidence that Plaintiffs took a 
contrary position prior to the action they were pursuing. Id 
The essence of all Plaintiffs' ~guments in regard to the present case is that Defendant Piercy 
had not previously challenged the . 1982 ordinance. As in Winn, this type of evidence is not 
sufficient to prove that Defendant Piercy ever took a contrary position to what he is currently 
asserting. Defendant Piercy was not aware prior to this lawsuit that anyone was claiming that bis 
land 'WllS not open range with regard to cattle or otherwise. 
Further, Defendant Piercy did not gain any benefit from the land purportedly being in a herd 
district The affect of a herd district is to potentially expose Defendant Piercy to legal liability. 
Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant have not provided any evidence to suggest that Defendant Piercy has 
gained any special benefit from the 1982 ordinance, which did not even include cattle as an animal 
to be limited from free roaming. Plaintiffs and Co-Defendants rely on unsupported assertions that 
Defendant Piercy would benefit from his land being in a herd district. 
Plaintiffs cite Defendant Piercy's deposition regarding his understanding of the state of 
fencing in Canyon County to support their estoppel arguments. The existence or non-existence of 
fencing is not relevant to the issues of estoppel or whether there is a herd district. Neither Plaintiffs 
nor Co-Defendants have provided any evidence to suggest that there would not be any fencing in 
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Canyon County if the small area allegedly affected by the 1982 ordinance were open range versus a 
herd district. Cattlemen fence in their livestock whether they are in open range or not · 
The affidavits provided by Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant Sutton merely state that they 
thought it was illegal to have cows on the road. They do not even assert that they thought a herd 
district existed. These vague statements could just as likely be referring to knowledge of the 
criminal statute not the 1982 ordinance. The reliance of the Plaintiffs in this matter on what they 
thought was the law is not relevant to the elements of quasi-estoppel. The affidavits from the 
Plaintiffs are irrelevant. In short Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that Defendant Piercy should 
be estopped from arguing fuat the 1982 ordinance did nothing to affect the subject land's open range 
status. 
B. Plaintiffs and Co--Defendant have failed to establish the defense of laches. 
As with the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, Plaintiffs and Co-Defendants in all their arguments 
fail to address the actual elements of laches. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
Like quasi-estoppel, laches is an affirmative defense and the party asserting the defense 
has the burden of proof Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is a question of fact. 
(citation omitted). The necessary elements to maintain a defense of laches are: 
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiff's rights, 
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of 
knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury 
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit 
is not held to be barred. 
Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 449, 915 P.2d 6, 11 (1996). (citation omitted). 
Because the doctrine of laches is founded in equity, in determining whether the doctrine 
applies, consideration must be given to all surrounding circumstances and acts of the 
parties. (citation omitted). The lapse of time alone is not controlling on whether laches 
applies. (citation omitted). 
Thomas v. Arkhoosh Produr:e, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002). Co-Defendant 
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and Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence establishing the elements required to establish a claim 
of laches. The only evidence provided is that Plaintiffs, Co-Defendant and some police officers 
thought that it was illegal for cows to be on the roadway and that 23 years passed between the 1982 
ordinance and the accident. These facts do not support a claim for laches. 
First, there must be an invasion of the rights of the non-moving party by the moving party. 
Defendant Piercy has never asserted that Plaintiffs or Co-Defendant invaded any of his rights. The 
rights to a person in open range is immunity from liability when a oar collides with their livestock. 
The elements of laches requires proof of a previous invasion of rights, not an invasion of rights if 
the Court does not grant the relief requested by the non-moving party. Therefore, Plaintiffs and Co-
Defendant have failed to provide evidence for the first element of a claim of laches. It may be that 
Canyon County violated the: due process rights of Defendant Piercy or that the 1982 ordinance is 
unconstitutional, but Canyon County bas not asserted laches and a claim for laches does not apply to 
an unconstitutional ordinance. Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls) 49 Idaho 89, 286 P. 353 
(1930). 
The second element involves a delay in asserting a right and a finding pf notice. The Court 
has determined several issues of fact regarding the notice to Defendant Piercy of the enactment of 
the 1982 ordinance. Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant assert that constructive notice applies in this case, 
but do not support that assertion with case law. In Alexander v. Trustees of Village of Middleton, 92 
Idaho 823, 452 P.2d 50 (1969), relied on heavily by Plaintiffs and Co~Defendant, the court cites the 
facts that were determinative: "The appellants had adequate notice of the intent to enact the 
ordinance and of the actual enactment of the ordinance. They were aware their land would be 
included within the area to be annexed. Others whose land was proposed for annexation did protest 
and their lands were excluded from the annexation ordinance. Injury and prejudice to the Village 
has been shown if relief were to be afforded appellants." Id The notice provided to those in 
Al~xander was ex.tensive. There were several public hearings and it was shown that the affected 
parties were contacted and specifically given the opportunity to opt out of the annexation. Id Tbis 
is a far cry ffom the complete lack of notice of the proposed action of the Canyon County 
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Commissioners. Further~ the 1982 ordiUance does not even specify what it is attempting to place 
into a herd district or what animals it is attempting to prevent from roaming free. It also does not 
state when it will become effective. 
Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant claim great hann to Canyon County if the 1982 ordinance was 
found to be void. This is not true. The area affected by the 1982 ordinance is a s:m<tll percentage of 
the land in Canyon County. The 1982 ordinance only purported to affect 5% of the land area in 
Canyon County. The Canyon County Commissioners under the current laws could with little cost 
and with little enact a valid herd district ordinance regarding grazitlg in Canyon County. It may be 
lb.at Canyon County would not wish to bofuer with trying to change fue status of that 5% of land. 
Defendant Piercy did not delay in asserting his rights. Defendant Piercy's right to immunity 
from. liability did not even arise until Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant had the accident involving his 
animal. Defendant Piercy asserted his right to immunity from liability in his Answer to Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. Defendant Piercy quickly asserted bis rights in this matter. Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant 
have not provided any evidence to the contrary. 
Plain.tiffs and Co·Defendant have also not provided any evidence concerning the third 
element of !aches, which requires that they prove that Co~Defendants and Plaintiffs had no 
knowledge that Defendant Piercy would assert his rights. Co~Defendants and Plaintiff had 
knowledge from the instigation of this lawsuit that Defendant Piercy was planning to assert his 
rights. 
Essentially, Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant are relying on the passage of time to base their 
arguments. The Thomas case states that passage of time, by itself. is not basis for granting this 
a:ffirrnative defense. In fact; the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a Trial Court's ruling to invalidate a 
66-year-old water rights decree. Devil Creek Ranch Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Resenloir and Canal Co., 
123 Idaho 634, 851 P.2d 348 (1993). This case states that despite evidence that the movant had 
relied on the state of the law for 66 years, was not evidence enough to establish laches. Id. at 637. 
851 P.2d 348, 351. 
Plaintiffs and Co-Defendant often make global assertions such as "The entirety of Canyon 
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County has followed the "fence in" rule of the herd district ... , for 25 years", and that ''Piercy has 
benefitted from herd district status, as his lands have not been subject to depredations from the at 
large cattle of his neighbors." (Defendant Jennifer Sutton's Opposition to Defendant Dale Piercy's 
Motion for. Summary Judgment at 14~ 15 .) These assertions, however, are without any evidence, 
Plaintiffs and Co-Defendants have not provided any proof to establish that the doctrine of laches 
should apply. 
Further, Defendant Piercy is claiming that the 1982 ordinance is unconstitutional even if it 
was enacted properly. As cited above, the doctrine of estoppel and laches does not apply to 
unconstitutional laws. A trial on the declaratory judgment will be necessary despite any ruling on 
' 
procedural irregularities. 
C. The CCJnrt should not adopt the decision made by Judge Hoff. 
The decision by Judge Hoff was delivered from the bench in a different case with different 
parties. N5 made clear by the Court, the Court is not bound by the decision by Judge Hoff. Several 
of Judge Hoff's findings are inconsistent with the findings of this Court in its· Memorandum 
Decision. This Court identified several issues of fact concerning the passage of the 1982 ordinance 
which needed to be resolved, where Judge Hoff simply states that the Board followed its 
procedures. Further, Judge Hoff relies upon Benewah County Cattlemen 1s Association v. Benewah 
County, 105 Idaho 209 (1983), for the proposition that Counties have the inherent police power to 
create herd districts. 
This reasoning misinterprets Benewah Co14nty. While Benewah County holds that counties 
can enact livestock ordinances enforced by criminal sanctions, it specifically distinguishes that 
power from the authority to create a herd district which imposes civil liability. Canyon County 
already has a livestock ordinance, cited by Plaintiff..:: in their response to our motion for summary 
judgment, which imposes misdemeanor liability upon those violating the ordinance. It would be 
incredible to think that a county could avoid the civil immunity provided by the State of Idaho, 
simply by exercising its police power to make a livestock ordinance. Such a finding would make 
the entire statutory scheme for the creation and maintenance of herd districts irrelevant Judge Hoff 
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CERTIFICATE OF M.All.JNG 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of December 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicat<;;d below and addressed to: 
Timothy C. Walton U.S. Mail 
CHASAN & WALTON LLC Hand Delivery 
1459 Tyrell Lane Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1069 x Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701·1069 
Stephen E. Blackbum U.S. Mail 
BLACKBURN LAW PC Hand Delivery 
660 E. Franklin Road Overnight Mail 
Suite 255 x Facsimile 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Joshua S. Evett U.S. Mail 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. Hand Delivery 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 1539 x Facsimile 
' Boise, ID 83701 
Charles L. Saari U.S. Mail 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney Hand Delivery 
Canyon County Courthouse Overnight Mail 
1115 Albany ~ Facsimile 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
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Rodney R. Saetrum, ISB: 2921 
RyanB. Peck, ISB: 7022 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Dale Piercy 
~.k~~" 
FEB 12 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIK.AL. RIVERA and LUIS J. GUZMAN, 
individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
ORDER FOR DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
It having been stipulated and agreed between Plaintiff Erika Rivera and Co-Defendant Dale 
Piercy, through their attorneys of record, that the claims of Erika Rivera contained in the Complaint 
against Co-Defendant Dale Piercy in this matter have been settled and may be dismissed, and good 
cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND TIDS DOES ORDER, that Plaintiff Erika Rivera's 
claims in the Complaint against Co-Defendant Dale Piercy in this matter are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice with each party to bear its own costs and attorney fe 
DATED this ~ky of February 2008. 
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District Judge 
l ) L~cJ .. A:~-· ~ . 9.M. 
FEB 1 9 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI~l'ilil~EPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ERIKA L. RIVERA, by and through ) 
LOREE RIVERA, her mother and natural ) 
guardian; and LUIS J. GUZMAN, by and ) 
through BALLARDO GUZMAN, his father ) 
and natural guardian, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV05-4848 
ORDER FOR DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE OF CLAIMS BY ERIKA 
RIVERA ONLY 
BASED UPON the Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims by Erika Rivera 
Only, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that the claims of Plaintiff Erika 
Rivera only be dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear their own costs and attorney 
fees. 
DATED this / q day of February, 00 . 
Ho rable Gordon W. Petrie 
Canyon County District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \D\ day of February, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Timothy C. Walton L 
Chasan & Wal ton, LLC 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, ID 83701-1069 
Stephen E. Blackburn 
__,;;,,:,;____ 
Blackburn Law, P.C. 
660 East Franklin Road, Suite 220 
Meridian, ID 83642 
Rodney R. Saetrum L_ 
Saetrum Law Offices 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
Charles L. Saari /' 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Joshua S. Evett / 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
c;;;{dW 
DetYClerk 
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U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
.j. 
li@J .A.~- .. e 9M. 
MAR 2 7 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J DRAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually 
Defendants. 
CANYON COUNTY, IDAHO 
Third-party defendant. 
CASE NO. CV 2005-4848 
ORDER FROM SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE SETTING BENCH 
TRIAL ON CHALLENGE TO CANYON 
COUNTY HERD DISTRICTS 
THIS IS A CIVIL ACTION. The court and respective counsel held a status 
conference on the record on March 20, 2008. Based upon that conference, the court 
enters its order, below. 
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT: 
1. The above-described matter is now set for a two (2) day bench trial to commence 
on the 8th day of October 2008, at the hour of 9:30 o'clock a.m., before the 
Honorable Gordon W. Petrie, at the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho. 
2. The court also sets a new status conference for September 3, 2008, at 0930 
a.m. 
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3. The parties stipulate to a bench trial of that portion of this litigation challenging 
the validity of Canyon County's Herd District Ordinances. 
THIS ALSO ORDERS that within fourteen (14) days, all parties shall submit an 
amended stipulation to the following scheduling dates: 
(a) Joinder of parties or amendment of pleadings; 
(b) All discovery completed; 
(c) The filing, noticing, and hearing of all pretrial motions, which shall be 
filed and noticed in compliance with l.R.C.P. 56 (c); 
(d) The last day for advancing party to disclose expert witnesses, together 
with their opinions and reports; 
(e) The last day to disclose rebuttal experts, together with their opinions and 
reports; 
(f) If the parties are unable to agree upon the dates called for above, the 
parties shall forthwith contact the court's secretary to obtain a date for a 
scheduling conference. 
(g) The court notifies the parties that the current cut-off date for mediation 
and alternative dispute resolution is September 3, 2008; 
(h) The court further notifies the parties they must strictly adhere to l.R.C.P. 
56(e). If affidavits setting out facts on personal knowledge do not 
demonstrate on their face the evidence contained therein is admissible 
under the Idaho Rules of Evidence (or a case on point construing the 
same), the parties will assist the court by filing a memorandum in 
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support of the affidavit(s} or applicable parts, specifically referencing the 
evidence in question, and citing the court and opposing counsel to the 
rule or case supporting the court's consideration of the affidavit(s) 
proffered; 
(i) If a party moves to strike an affidavit as setting forth evidence that is 
not otherwise admissible, the movant, in either the motion or a 
supporting memorandum, will assist the court by directing it with 
specificity to the paragraph or paragraphs objected to and will further cite 
the court to the rule or case that supports the motion to strike. 
G) The court reminds the parties that a motion under l.R.C.P. 37(a) requires 
a certification that the movant has, in good faith, conferred or attempted 
to confer with the party not making the disclosure (serving as the object 
of the motion) in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
THIS FURTHER ORDERS that all parties shall file with the court no later than 
seven (7) days prior to the status conference the following: 
(a) A concise written statement of the theory of recovery or defense, the 
elements of such theory, and supporting authorities; 
(b) A written list identifying stipulated facts, all witnesses, and all exhibits to 
be introduced at trial, accompanied by a statement pertaining to each 
exhibit on whether each exhibit in question is stipulated as admissible; 
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.,. 
(c) A written statement that the parties have discussed settlement or the use 
of extrajudicial proceedings including alternative dispute resolution 
techniques to resolve the dispute. 
DAT~this 25th day of. __z::::.;...=.:.:...::::.::_-
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CERT/FICA TE OF SERVICE 
~ 
The undersigned certifies that on the i)_klf: day of March 2008, s/he served a true and correct copy of 
the original of the foregoing ORDER f'ROM SCHEDULING CONFERENCE SETIING BENCH TRIAL 
ON CHALLENGE TO CANYON COUNTY HERD DISTRICTS upon the following individuals in the 
manner described: 
• Upon Rodney R. Saetrum and Ryan B. Peck of SAETRUM LAW OFFICES, 101 S. Capitol Blvd, 
Boise, Idaho 83702, attorney for Defendant Dale Piercy; and upon 
• Joshua S. Evett of ELAM & BURKE, P.A., PO Box 1539, Boise, Idaho 83701, attorneys for 
Defendant Jennifer Sutton; and upon 
• Timothy C. Walton of CHASAN & WALTON LLC, PO Box 1069, Boise, Idaho, and upon Stephen 
E. Blackburn, BLACKBURN LAW PC, 660 E Franklin Road, Suite 255, Meridian, Idaho 83642, 
attorneys for Plaintiff Luis Guzman 
whens/he caused to be deposited a copy of the same into the U.S. Mail with sufficient postage affixed to 
the addresses set forth above; and upon 
• Charles L. Saari, Chief Civil Deputy for Canyon County, 
when s/he caused to be placed a copy of the same into the latter's "pick up" box in the Canyon County 
Clerk's Office, Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court 
By: CJP-ria )4 puty Clerk of the Court 
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Timothy C. Walton ISB #2170 
CHASAN & WAL TON LLC 
Park Center Pointe 
~ 1459 Tyrell Lane 
"--' Post Office Box 1069 
-y . Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 
C · Telephone: (208) 345-3760 
1 
Q J Facsimile: (208) 345-0288 
Stephen E. Blackburn ISB #6717 
BLACKBURN LAW, P.C. 
660 E. Franklin Rd., Suite 255 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Telephone: (208) 898-3442 
Facsimile: (208) 898-9443 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Luis J. Guzman 
MAR 2 7 2008 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. OAAWFORO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE W. PIERCY, individually and 
JENNIFER SUTTON individually, 
Defendants. 
CANYON COUNTY 
Third Party Defendant. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider- Page -1-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
557 
Case No: CV05-4848 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
(No hearing requested) 
On or about November 6, 2007, plaintiff moved this court to reconsider that part of 
the Court's October 9, 2007 order denying Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary 
Judgment that allows defendant Piercy to attempt to challenge the validity of Canyon 
County's 1982 herd district ordinance. 
The basis for Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider was that Idaho case law holds that 
defendant Piercy is estopped, under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel and/or under the 
doctrine of estoppel by !aches, from challenging the validity of Canyon County's herd 
districts, including the 1982 herd district ordinance. 
This motion has been fully briefed by the parties, and oral argument was held on this 
motion on December 6, 2007. 
The court has not yet issued its decision on Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider. Plaintiff 
Guzman requests that the court decide this Motion. In the event the Court determines that 
Piercy is estopped to contest the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance, the "mini-trial" 
scheduled by this Court for October 8 and 9, 2008, will be unnecessary, and the parties 
can proceed directly to the trial of plaintiff Guzman's claim against defendants Piercy and 
Sutton. 
In view of the fact that the parties have already fully briefed and orally argued this 
motion, and in the interest of conserving the Court's resources, plaintiff requests that the 
Motion to Reconsider be decided by the court without any further argument or briefing from 
any party. 
DATED this;:((o ~March, 2008. Chasan & Walton, LLC 
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Timothy C. Walton, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2,(p ray of fof.OA.cAr-- I 2008, a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served upon by: 
Joshua S. Evett ~ 
Elam & Burke D Hand Delivery 
251 E. Front St., No. 300 D Overnight Courier 
P.O. Box 1539 D Facsimile to (208) 384-5844 
Boise, ID 83701-1539 
Attorneys for Jennifer Sutton 
Ryan Peck 
Rodney R. Saetrum 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneys for Dale W. Piercy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and JENNIFER 
SUITON, individually, 
CANYON COUNTY 
Defendants. 
Third Party 
Defendant. 
Case No. CVOS-4848 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A RULING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider on March 26. 2008. This motion is 
essentially requesting that the Court rule on Plaintiff's prior motion to reconsider that was filed on 
November 6, 2007. 
Plaintiff asserts that oral arguments were held on the motion to reconsider on December 6, 
2007. This statement is incorrect. Oral arguments were presented on November 30, 2007, on 
Defendant Piercy' s motion to continue the hearing on Plaintiff's motion to reconsider. Defendant 
Piercy's motion was demed and the hearing on Plaintiff's motion to reconsider was going to 
proceed on December 6, 2007, but prior the hearing was canceled due to progress in the 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER - 1 
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settlement negotiations between the parties. The hearing was never re-scheduled. Defendant 
Piercy agrees that the arguments were fully briefed, but would not want to deprive the Court of 
the opportunity to question counsel in oral arguments-
Tberefore, Defendant Piercy will defer to the Court's desire on whether or not to nave 
oral arguments presented on the issues encompassed in the motion to reconsider. 
DATED this 28th day of March 2008. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
LUIS J. GUZMAN, individually 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE PIERCY, individually, and 
JENNIFER SUTTON, individually 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CANYON COUNTY, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendant) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
Case No. CV-2005-4848-C 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
On November 8, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider asking this Court to 
reconsider its decision on Defendant Piercy's Motion for Summary Judgment. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs asked the Court to find that the Canyon County herd district ordinance at issue in this case 
was properly enacted, or in the alternative that Defendant Piercy is estopped, under the doctrine of 
quasi estoppel and/or estoppel by laches, from challenging the validity of the Canyon County herd 
district ordinance. 
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Defendant Sutton filed a Response and Joinder in Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on 
November27, 2007, and Defendant Piercy filed an Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider on 
December 3, 2007. Oral argument was set for December 6, 2007 but was vacated prior to the time 
set for hearing. 
On March 27, 2008, Plaintiff Guzman (the sole remaining plaintiff) again filed a Motion to 
Reconsider asking this Court to now and again address the issues set out above. Plaintiff has asked 
the Court to issue its decision based on the prior briefing and without oral argument. Defendant 
Piercy filed a response to clarify that no oral argument was held. No objections have been made by 
any of the parties to this Court issuing a decision without oral argument and thus, the Court will 
defer the Plaintiffs request. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider is deemed submitted and a written decision will 
be issued forthwith. 
Dated this :'.5 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Plaintiff's 
Motion to Reconsider is forwarded to the following persons by U.S. Mail, first class postage 
prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse basket; or by facsimile copy: 
Timothy Walton 
Chasan & Wal ton LLC 
1459 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 1069 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1069 
Stephen Blackburn 
Blackburn Law PC 
660 E. Franklin Road, Suite 225 
Meridian, Idaho 83642 
Ryan Peck 
Saetrum Law Offices 
101 S. Capitol Blvd. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Joshua Evett 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
251 East Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Charles L. Saari 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Dated this ~ day of April, 2008 
William H. Hurst 
Clerk of the District Court 
By<?r2~~~ 
Deputy Clerk ~-
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Case No: CV05-4848 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider- Page -1-
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Plaintiff Guzman has asked this Court to rule on plaintiff Guzman's motion for 
reconsideration. Plaintiff's counsel has just been advised of another Idaho case that 
supports plaintiff's contention that Defendant Piercy is stopped to deny the validity of the 
herd districts at issue (said case came to light because another insurer is attacking the 
validity of another herd district in eastern Idaho, and undersigned has been communicating 
with Plaintiff's counsel in that eastern Idaho case). 
In Telferv School District No. 31 of Blaine County, 50 Idaho 274, 295 P. 632 (1931) 
a landowner attacked the validity of a school district created by the board of county 
commissioners, alleging that the district was created pursuant to a defective petition, and 
that: 
The complaint affirmatively states many omissions in the preliminary 
proceedings required by the laws of this state to authorize the commissioners 
to create school districts, and it is claimed this order of the board creating 
district No. 13 was null and void for want of jurisdiction in the county 
commissioners. 295 P., at 632. 
In short, the landowners in Te/ferwere contending, exactly as Piercy contends here, 
that the county commissioners failed to follow proper procedure in creating the district in 
issue. 
The Idaho Supreme Court noted in Telferthat the districts at issue were created 1 O 
to 20 years prior to the landowners' lawsuit; that the district had thereafter continuously 
existed as a political subdivision of the state; that it was therefore at least a de facto 
corporation, exercising the powers and duties of such political subdivision within the well 
defined territorial limits of the district. 
The trial court sustained the school district's demurrer to the landowners' complaint. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, stating: 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider - Page -2-
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"To permit the existence of public corporations to depend on private 
litigation would be inimical to the welfare of the community. Experience has 
demonstrated that irregularities of more or less importance are to be found 
in the organization of nearly every incorporated body. Technical accuracy is 
not to be expected. The legal existence of a public corporation cannot be 
questioned without causing disturbance more or less serious, and if the 
regularity of its organization can be kept open to inquiry indefinitely, no one 
can ever be sure that any of the taxes levied to meet its expenses or the 
contracts necessarily entered into by it would be valid and enforceable. The 
transaction of public business might be blocked by private litigation 
commenced at the will or whim of any citizen. While there has been an 
honest effort to comply with the law in the organization of a corporation, as a 
school district, and the officers selected proceed to execute the powers 
thereof, every presumption should be, and is, in favor of the regularity of 
such organization, and it is to be regarded as valid, save when assailed by 
the state on information in the nature of quo warranto." 
This rule is recognized and followed by the federal court in this district. In 
Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Kimama Highway Dist. (D. C.) 287 F. 734. 738, 
Judge Dietrich said: "The other contention is that, though irregularly 
organized, the district is to be deemed a de facto corporation, and its legal 
existence cannot be called into question by a private person in an action of 
this character. In that respect it was stipulated at the trial that since February, 
1920, the defendant district has 'been functioning as a highway district, and 
holding itself out as a highway district, since that time, under color of an 
organization.' Upon this showing of fact I am inclined to think defendant's 
position is well taken. The general proposition is considered at length in a 
decision recently rendered by the Supreme Court of the state in Morgan v. 
Independent School District, where there may be found a review of many 
typical decided cases upon the subject. It is to he borne in mind that this is a 
collateral attack by a private citizen upon the existence of a public 
corporation, and that the order assailed was not such an order as the board 
of county commissioners was without authority to make under any 
circumstances. If invalid at all, it is not because such an order is entirely 
beyond the general jurisdiction with which the board is vested, but because 
certain conditions precedent to the exercise of the power were not complied 
with." 
The rule seems of universal application, but sometimes stated differently. 
It is said in Henderson v. School District, 75 Mont. 154, 242 P. 979, 982: 
"Thus acquiescence in the exercise of corporate functions, and dealing with 
the corporation as such over a period of years will estop all persons dealing 
with the corporation from assailing its legality. In re Flemington Borough, 168 
Pa. 628, 32 A. 86; St. Louis v. Shields, 62 Mo. 247; Cowell v. Colorado 
Springs Co., 3 Colo. 82; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463; People v. Curley, 
5 Colo. 412; State v. Westport, 116 Mo. 582, 22 S. W. 888; State v. 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider - Page -3-
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Leatherman, 38 Ark. 81; State v. Pell City, 157 Ala. 380, 47 So. 246; Board 
v. Crittenden, 94 F. 613, 36 C. C. A. 418." 
Mr. Dillon, in his work on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.)§ 67, says: "In 
public affairs where the people have organized themselves, under color of 
law, into the ordinary municipal bodies, and have gone on, year after year, 
raising taxes, making improvements, and exercising their usual franchises 
their rights are properly regarded as dependent quite as much on 
acquiescence as on the regularity of their origin." 
In Cooley on Constitutional Limitation (8th Ed.) vol. 1, p. 531, it is said: "In 
proceedings where the question whether a corporation exists or not arises 
collaterally, the courts will not permit its corporate character to' be 
questioned, if it appear to be acting under color of law, and recognized by the 
State as such. Such a question should be raised by the State itself, by quo 
warranto or other direct proceeding." ... 
We hold school district No. 31 having existed, exercising all the functions 
of a public school district of the state over its present well-defined territory as 
a public corporation for the past ten years, its legal entity is not subject to 
attack by a landowner within the district in an injunction proceeding against 
its officers. It follows the demurrer was good. 295 P., at 633-634. 
Pursuant to the law laid down in Telfer some 57 years ago, and pursuant to the 
Idaho case law previously cited to this court, Piercy is estopped to collaterally attack the 
validity of the Canyon County Commissioners' orders creating the herd districts at issue in 
this case. The herd districts in issue were created 25 to nearly 100 years ago, and all of 
Canyon County has been recognized as a herd district, and the herd district laws have 
been enforced county-wide, since 1982. 
Plaintiff has previously indicated to the Court that Plaintiff waives oral argument on 
this motion. At the time Plaintiff waived oral argument, Plaintiffs counsel mistakenly 
believed oral argument on Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration had been previously heard, 
and Plaintiff did not wish to take up more of the Court's time on a motion that Plaintiff 
(mistakenly) believed had already been orally argued. In actuality, however, there has 
never been oral argument on Plaintiffs motion to reconsider (rather, there was oral 
Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider - Page -4-
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argument on Piercy's motion to vacate the hearing on Plaintiffs motion to reconsider). 
Piaintiffs motion is legally sound, and is based upon solid Idaho case law. The 
motion deserves careful analysis and consideration by the Court. If Plaintiffs motion is 
granted there will be no need for the "mini-trial" scheduled for October to determine the 
validity of the herd district. 
To the extent the Court feels oral argument would assist the Court in flushing out the 
issues at bar, Plaintiff would request that the Court schedule oral argument on Plaintiffs 
motion for reconsideration at the Court's convenience. 
·~ 
DATED this l ~ day of April, 2008. 
Chasan & Walton, LLC 
Timothy C. Walton, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
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